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Executive Summary  
 
The concept of tolerance implies an asymmetrical relationship of power between those entitled to 
tolerate and those who are object of tolerance. Power-asymmetries are shaping the contours of 
toleration / non-toleration / respect attitudes and not everyone has (the same) power to exert it. As 
such, the space of tolerance is entirely embedded in the political space and in politics. The existence of 
power-asymmetries, political domination, majority-minority relationships but also dynamics of 
competition, claims over power and minorities agency, which are at the core of politics relate strongly 
to the way in which tolerance may be exerted and to the transformation of the boundaries of tolerance 
in society. There is a fundamental tension between disagreement and acceptance at the heart of 
toleration but only those who have the power to do so can choose to accept or not what they disagree 
with. Tolerance thus appears as a tool which enables understanding tensions and challenges in the 
political life when it comes to dealing with difference and diversity, especially ethno-religious 
diversity. 
In the European context, the development of liberal-democracies has been strongly associated with the 
development of a culture of tolerance. The development of tolerance was meant to be part of the 
public culture as well as of the individual culture of the citizen. With the diversification of societies, 
notably by migration and the mobilization of native minorities, many institutional arrangements have 
been made in order to guarantee the acceptance of minorities in the political life. This has been the 
case for ethno-religious minorities but also for other dominated groups such as women or 
homosexuals. These practices of acceptance, however, have not always gone far beyond tolerance and 
many claims of minorities have been ignored by the State and the majorities.  
The objective of the research carried out in the frame of ACCEPT PLURALISM as regards to 
tolerance in the political life is to investigate key questions such as:  
What kind of cultural diversity is considered compatible with the ‘secular’ politics of European 
countries? 
What claims or requests are tolerated? 
What political practices are considered tolerant or intolerant?  
What values and norms are considered to promote or undermine tolerance in political life? 
The studies carried out in the frame of ACCEPT PLURALISM empirically challenge the concept of 
tolerance and the three-class concept of toleration, non-toleration and respect. The aim was to examine 
in a particular social space such as politics how these concepts can contribute to the analysis of 
diversity, difference and majority/minority relationship in European societies. 
The researches on tolerance and political life have stressed the diversity of the modalities of toleration. 
Toleration in the political life refers to a continuous tolerance boundary drawing activity which 
appears to be central in complex society’s assemblages. The different studies presented in this report 
bring empirical evidences about how boundary-drawing is realized in the public life. They provide a 
variety of answers to three core questions:  
Who is entitled to tolerate or not-tolerate? 
What is tolerable and what is not in a society? 
How acceptance or objection is expressed and implemented? 
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The different research projects carried out within this work-package are based on country-specific case 
studies investigated with qualitative research methods. All the research projects are empirically 
grounded and they aim at challenging the concepts of tolerance. For the purpose of comparability, all 
research cases analyse how the dimensions presented above (which we can summarize as: who / what / 
how) are embedded in the case study as well as in national (and European) public debates.  
The national case studies selected by the different partners have been organized into three main 
clusters. 
Cluster 1 is organised around the challenge of political discourses in relation with intolerance 
boundaries drawing activities. 
Cluster 2 is organised around the challenge posed by public policies of exclusion. It focuses on the 
institutional obstacles opposed to the rights and admission as normal of minorities.  
Cluster 3 is organised around quests for recognition and the political mobilisation of minorities. 
This cluster has been divided into two different chapters: one on the mobilization for recognition of 
native ethno-national minorities and one on a dialogue between the French and British experiences 
of Muslims organizations’ mobilisations. 
The different country cases are thus displayed in this report along four thematic chapters. They aim at 
drawing comparisons and highlighting similarities and differences between country cases, in order to 
explore the way the national contexts challenge the concept of tolerance.  
 
Political discourses and the definition of tolerance boundaries. 
 
In the first chapter, Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero present the challenges of intolerance embedded in 
political discourses in five countries: Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Spain. It focuses on 
political discourses in which tolerance/intolerance contributes to draw boundaries when it comes to 
defining the place of migrants and minorities in the society. The discourses analysed may present 
overtly anti-immigrant positions, while others seek to discuss the norms that enable the social and 
political acceptance of cultural or religious difference. Others finally seek to oppose racism and anti-
immigrant discourses and seek to limit the public expression of such discourses. The cases present 
how the boundary drawing activity is realized through political and public discourses and how 
political actors negotiate the limits of acceptance and/or tolerance of cultural diversity. 
Despite their differences in terms of experience related to migration and ways of dealing with cultural 
diversity, all countries under study have experienced important debates about migration and native 
minorities who are increasingly presented as a problem in terms of tolerance.  
All countries under analysis have seen the radical right gaining position in the political life. But the 
weight of these groups in the political landscape as well as in national and local controversies is very 
different from one country to another. While far right organizations are represented at the Parliament 
in Greece, Denmark and Hungary, extra-parliamentary radical groups and parties manage to influence 
mainstream politics in Spain and Germany. To understand the dissemination of intolerant discourses in 
the countries under analysis, the relationship between extreme-right's overtly anti-immigrant discourse 
and mainstream politics and parties is determinant. The radical right alone cannot reconfigure the 
boundaries of toleration. Discourses and debates which intend to define or redefine what can or cannot 
be tolerated as regards to cultural and religious diversity are effective when they become central in the 
public arena. In all the controversies and events under examination in the country cases, the discourses 
effectively succeeded in making tolerance to migration and native minority a mainstream concern and 
subject of contentious expressions. This means that the participation of mainstream political actors as 
well as mainstream media is crucial to transform isolated expressions of intolerance into a central 
society debate able to change effectively the limits of tolerance in the society. The studies explore the 
process by which discourse on tolerance/intolerance to cultural diversity has been mainstreamed. 
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The chapter focuses on the analysis of the discursive frames that contribute to toleration boundary 
drawing in the different countries. It pays attention to the content of the discourses, both the ones 
advocating for tolerance and the ones advocating for intolerance, depending on the cases analyzed in 
the different countries. The objects of toleration or intolerance vary in function of the cases. 
Discourses may define how much toleration must be allowed in public space, either through 
discourses (Denmark, Germany, and Spain) or practices (Greece, Spain, and Hungary). Others may 
refer to how much toleration must be granted to the practices and expressions which are perceived as 
conflicting with majority’s values and practices. It identifies three main frames: 
1. A frame in which legality is a condition for tolerance. 
2. A ‘law and order’ frame or security frame. 
3. A frame in terms of culture and identity. 
Other frames, which are specific to one or few country cases, are also presented, such as the 
“essentialist/biological” frame, the “crisis/welfare protectionism” frame and the “non-toleration 
towards intolerance” frame.  
Even if much of the content of the discourses on tolerance is common to several cases, the definition 
of limits of tolerance during the public debates refers also to dimensions which are particular to the 
national context, the culture, the history of migration and the definition of citizenship in each country. 
The authors thus present these particular features and highlight the predominance of national patterns 
in the way political discourses are dealing with minorities. 
The report ends by highlighting that one common feature of all cases is the tendency in political 
debates to depoliticize tolerance, which means to consider that tolerance and intolerance are not a 
political matter and therefore should not be politicized. 
 
Local and national policies of exclusion 
In the second chapter, Ambrosini and Caneva present the challenge posed by tolerance by what they 
define as policies of exclusion in Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. They present how 
increasingly restrictive policies have been implemented at the European and national levels, especially 
as they conceive migrants as a threat to security.  
They then present the interactions between local and national policies within this framework of 
restrictive policies. Even if local policies are usually seen as more inclusive, aimed at promoting 
measures and interventions for the benefit of immigrant populations, local governments often 
encounter difficulties and obstacles in implementing policies of inclusion, because of the lack of 
resources and regulatory frames. In the last few years new political discourses have risen at the local 
level too, emphasizing urban security, social cohesion, assimilationist instances and generally a more 
hostile attitude towards migrants, particularly irregular ones. Consequently, besides local policies 
which try to move away from, oppose or compensate for national policies, in the last few years the 
authors observe the growth of local policies that reinforce the restrictive or assimilationist approach of 
the national level policies. The authors show how local and national policies interact, in different 
ways, with inclusive (as in the case of local citizen mobilisation in the Netherlands) or rather 
restrictive (as for instance in the case of restricting local socio-economic rights in Italy) outcomes. The 
Bulgarian and Irish case study, on the other hand, discuss opposed examples of national policies that 
accommodate (the turban case in Ireland) or indeed ostracise (restricting the voting rights of Bulgarian 
Muslims and Roma) minority populations. 
The reduction of the space for tolerance raises the opposition of civil society actors who claim  respect 
for migrants (in the case of the Netherlands for instance). These groups and movements are able to 
intervene in the public arena and can sometimes affect the local policies. In some cases city 
governments rely on these groups and movements, or collaborate with them, in order to implement 
actions for the integration of minorities. In any case these civil society actors fill the gap between laws 
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and regulations that produce exclusion, and social needs to which society has to respond either for 
humanitarian reasons or because of general interests. 
The chapter ends by presenting the challenges that these policies pose conceptually in terms of 
tolerance. It underlines how intolerance is embedded and legitimized and promoted by institutional 
bodies which in principle are liberal and democratic. In the Netherlands and Bulgaria for instance, 
intolerance is justified by national policies based on the legal status of people. In Italy and Ireland 
instead, people are tolerated or not tolerated because of their “difference” and their cultural or 
religious claims, whereas their legal status is less important.  
The analysis thus confirms that there is a trend towards restrictive and neo-assimilationist tendencies 
in European policies on immigrants.  
Key messages for policy-makers 
- Reinforcing anti-discrimination norms and institutions. European institutions in particular could take 
on an even more incisive role in the defence of liberal values in the European framework. 
- Supporting and activating civil societies. This requires educational investment, seats for debate and 
the opportunity for dialogue with the relevant political institutions. 
- Giving immigrants, their representatives and their association networks the capacity to participate in 
matters regarding local policies and all discussions that concern them. 
 
Quests for recognition by Sámis, Silesians, Hungarians and Circassians 
 
In the third chapter, Kaya presents findings about quests for recognition of native minorities in Poland, 
Romania, Sweden and Turkey. He discusses theoretically different modalities of response to minority 
claims in Europe. Former Eastern and Central European states respond rather distinctly to such 
minority demands in comparison with Western countries, which difference can be summarized as 
justice and fairness discourse on the one side, and loyalty and security discourse on the other. In East 
and Southeast Europe the objection to the idea of collective rights is that they can be invoked as a 
basis of secession, or a threat to national security. On the contrary, in the West, the concern with 
collective rights is that they can be invoked to supersede individual rights, although cases of denial of 
collective rights of minorities have occurred over the last years. 
The chapter then proceeds to a comparison of four different cases, along different types of 
interrogations, in order to find out the convergences and divergences between the ways in which Sámi 
minority claims are responded by the Swedish state, Silesian minority claims by the Polish state, 
Hungarian minority claims by the Romanian state, and Circassian diaspora claims by the Turkish state. 
What kinds of means, institutions and techniques do they use to raise their political claims? Who are 
they? How are they defined by their respective states? 
It examines firstly the diverse modalities of dealing with minorities and, secondly, the type of 
minorities involved and the interactions they engage with authorities. The cases display different 
characteristics with regard to the definition of the term minority. While Sámi minority in Sweden and 
Hungarian minority in Romania are legally defined minorities, with rights in reason of their political 
representation at both local and national levels, Silesians in Poland and Circassians in Turkey are not 
accepted as legal minorities by their respective states. As regards to the channels for claims, Sámis and 
Hungarians, being officially recognized minorities, have local and national parliamentary facilities to 
present their claims. However, the Silesians and Circassians generate civic, cultural and folkloric 
associations to present their claims to the state. European integration process, transnational networks 
and internet also become strategically important for both communities to raise their claims in public 
space. Unlike the Circassians, the Silesians are inclined to generate political movements aiming at 
cultural, educational and linguistic autonomy.  
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Finally the chapter adopts a new lens and sees how the claims are perceived from the state and public 
institutions and examines the dynamics of recognition and mobilization. The Sámis and the 
Hungarians are officially recognized, but still exposed to discrimination and intolerance and then are 
mobilizing themselves to halt socioeconomic discrimination, or the deterioration of their situation. The 
Silesians are socially and culturally accepted minorities who are mobilizing themselves for the search 
of political recognition through the right to self-determination, or incorporation into the institutions. 
The Circassians instead are still discriminated, hence they mobilize themselves for the search of 
recognition and respect by the state. 
After summing up the main findings, Kaya observes that there are still two competing forms of 
managing diversity in the European countries: multicultural form and republican form. The former 
corresponds to the ‘unity-in-diversity’ approach, which recognizes ethno-cultural, linguistic, national 
and religious differences of minorities. The latter translates into the ‘unity-over-diversity’ approach, 
which is difference blind and assimilationist. 
 
Minority Mobilisations in France and the United Kingdom: the Case of Muslim Organisations 
 
Finally, the fourth chapter is dedicated more particularly to a comparison of the mobilisation of 
Muslim organisations in France and the United Kingdom. It considers and contrasts Muslim 
mobilisations around the British General Election of 2010 and the mobilisation during debates about 
laïcité in France as examples of minority claims-making in two “old immigration countries”.  
The report focuses on minority organisations and their attempts to articulate claims in the national 
context. In ‘multiculturalist’ Britain, minority representatives can be portrayed as divisive while in 
‘integrationist’ France, organisations struggle to make their claims seem acceptable in Republican 
terms.  
The main findings of these studies lead not to consider the level of acceptance as given and rather 
suggest that it should be explored as a result of interactions, symbolic claims and the extension of 
boundaries in which minority organisations are often centrally involved. 
Escafré-Dublet and Dobbernack start by providing background elements on the participation, the 
representation and the content of claims in both countries. While the participation of minorities 
remains low in both countries, there have been significant civil society mobilizations with ethnic 
minority involvement in the UK in recent years. The same can be observed in the case of minority 
representation which also remain low in both countries, but again some effort to increase the number 
of ethnic minority representatives can be acknowledged in British politics. 
As regards to claims-making on the basis of ethnic minority identities, French and British political 
structures display contrasting features. There is no general rule in Britain that would prevent minority 
groups from articulating specific concerns, although it may well be the case that mobilizations on the 
basis of ethno-religious minorities will be negatively perceived and thus remain unsuccessful. On the 
contrary, France is certainly more averse to ethnic demands, but there has been a tradition of 
mobilisation in immigrant-based organisations for a long time. 
The authors then proceed by presenting the case studies in the two countries, highlighting the common 
features of the mobilisations but also particular elements which stress the singularity of each national 
context.  
The analysis of the Muslim vote in the UK draws on the concept of misrecognition, which has recently 
been appropriated for identity claims by post-immigration communities. It identifies five types of 
misrecognition of Muslim claims, considered as distinctive topoi in the rhetoric of various advocacy 
organisations.  
1) Misrecognising Muslim identity politics as markedly different in kind to other identity politics 
(Muslim claims are exceptional)  
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2) Misrecognising the dynamic positioning and complexity of Muslim identities and concerns (Muslim 
claims are homogenous)  
3) Misrecognising Muslim agency as purely reactive, grievance-based of pariah politics (Muslim 
claims are reactions to stigma)   
4)Misrecognising Muslims concerns not compatible with an orientation towards the common good 
(Muslim claims are sectarian)   
5) Misrecognising Muslim political actors as toxic and refusing political association (Muslim claims 
are exclusive). 
The French case examines claims of organisations that mobilised in relation to the issue of laïcité in 
general, including old and new organisations. It shows that the participation of minority organisations 
and Muslim organisations to the mobilisation in defence of laïcité is a way to articulate claims for 
acceptance of Islam as a component of French religious diversity, on an equal footing with 
Protestantism and Judaism. In doing so, minority organisations are able to propose claims for 
acceptance that are more difficult to ignore by the majority population. 
The chapter then proceeds by opening perspectives on the contrasting configuration of identity politics 
between the two countries.  
It shows that minority constituencies face comparable challenges in the articulation of their political 
claims. In each context there is a tendency to be less tolerant towards Muslim claims on the ground 
that they are seen to be sectarian and particularist. In France this is justified by the general suspicion 
towards religious expressions in the public sphere. As a consequence, a striking result of the research 
is the fact that Muslim advocacy organisations seek to emphasize the compatibility of their claims 
with existing political frameworks. 
However, Muslim organisations in both countries face dissimilar obstacles that they seek to overcome 
in different ways. In the UK, the link between post-immigration groups and the Labour Party, and in 
some cases the exploitation of this link through forms of patronage politics, means that negative 
conceptions of the ‘Muslim Vote’ need to be overcome. As for Muslim minorities in France, when 
negotiating the terms of their visibility in political life, they use a language of universalist politics and 
draw on core Republican values, such as laïcité, in their claims-making. 
The chapter presents two main conclusions and policy recommendations. Firstly, the obstacles faced 
by Muslim activists result from the alleged exceptionality of their identities and claims and can be 
considered as forms of stigmatisation, intolerance and discrimination. In both cases, there is a need to 
raise awareness regarding this intolerance and to highlight the issue of religious discrimination in 
political activities. Secondly, the findings stress the fact that the wish for a certain normalization of 
Muslim claims and identities is evident in both case studies.  
 
---- 
The executive summary of all the national studies carried out for the work-package on Tolerance in 
Political life are displayed at the end of the report. 
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Tolerance; Toleration; Acceptance; Respect; Non-toleration; Politics; Political participation; Political 
representation; Political mobilization; Political discourses; Ethnic minorities; Immigrants; 
Majority/Minority relations. 
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Introduction1 
Flora Burchianti and Ricard Zapata-Barrero 
 
 
 
1. Diversity, tolerance and politics 
Tolerance and practices of toleration are embedded in particular social spaces which have their own 
rules, institutions and forms of interaction. The purpose of this report and of the different lines of 
research made within the scope of ACCEPT PLURALISM is to investigate the forms and practices of 
tolerance in the political life.  
The concept of tolerance has been defined as an attitude or a principle which correspond to 
disagreeing or disliking something and yet voluntarily enduring it (King, 1976: 20). This definition of 
tolerance applies to human relations but finds an application for the analysis of how European 
societies deal with the increasing diversity and pluralism they are experiencing. More particularly, in 
the realm of the political, the project aims at analysing: 
- The meaning and practices of tolerance when it comes to issues of political representation or 
participation of migrants and native minorities. 
- What kind of cultural diversity is considered compatible with the ‘secular’ politics of western 
democracies. What special claims or requests are tolerated? What political practices are considered 
tolerant or intolerant and what values/norms are considered to promote or undermine tolerance in 
political life? 
- How the embodiment of tolerance in political life norms and practices relates to concepts such as 
multiculturalism, liberalism, respect, understanding, national heritage and national tradition. 
 
Three types of attitudes are related with the broader concept of tolerance, and structure the analysis of 
particular national contexts. They can be seen as degrees of acceptance as regards to individuals or 
groups, beliefs or practices which differ from the majority or dominant group, its practices and beliefs 
(see Dobbernack, Modood, 2012): 
- Before toleration, non-toleration relates to attitudes, discourses or institutional arrangements 
which refuse toleration to other individuals or groups' attitudes, practices, beliefs or discourses 
because one disagrees with them or dislikes them. 
- Toleration itself is the fact of allowing, putting up with or not opposing attitudes, practices, 
beliefs or speeches although one disagrees with them or dislikes them.  
- Beyond toleration, recognition, respect as equal or admission as normal relate to practices and 
attitudes which admit that toleration is not enough for some groups, individuals or practices. It 
leads to the reconsideration of the relationship between majority/dominant group and 
                                                     
1
 The coordinators of this volume wish to express their gratitude to all the researchers of ACCEPT PLURALISM and 
especially to Anna Triandafyllidou, the principal investigator of the project, who has been present at all stages of the 
coordination and has read and commented all documents produced for this part of the research. We thank also in 
particular the authors of the different chapters which are presented in this volume for their help and dedication. As a 
comparative report based on different national cases studies, the presentation of the studies in the different chapters may 
sometimes paraphrase the original studies. In that case, the reader should understand the authors of the original studies 
(cited) as the real authors. 
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minorities/dominated groups, and implies that difference is perceived as normal feature of social 
life. 
This classification of attitudes within the broad concept of tolerance intends to make it operational for 
research about the relationship between cultural majorities/dominant groups and cultural 
minorities/dominated groups whose attitudes, practices, beliefs and discourses can differ from the ones 
which are considered 'normal' in society.  
The concept of tolerance, as stated here, implies an asymmetrical relationship between the one who is 
entitled the power to tolerate and the one who is object of tolerance (Bader, 2012). Power-asymmetries 
are shaping the contours of toleration/non-toleration/respect attitudes and not everybody have (the 
same) power to exert it. As such, the space of tolerance is entirely embedded in the political space and 
in politics. The existence of power-asymmetries, political domination, majority-minority relationships 
but also dynamics of competition, claims over power and minority’s agency, which are at the core of 
politics, relate strongly to the way in which tolerance may be exerted and to the transformation of the 
boundaries of tolerance in society. The fundamental tension between disagreement and acceptance at 
the heart of toleration, and the fact that only those who have the power to do so can chose to accept or 
not what they disagree with, make of tolerance a tool that enables understanding tensions and 
challenges in the political life when it comes to dealing with difference and diversity, especially ethno-
religious diversity. 
In the European context, the development of liberal-democracies has been strongly associated with the 
development of a culture of tolerance (Dobbernack, Modood, 2011). The development of tolerance 
was meant to be part of the public culture as well as of the individual culture of the citizen. With the 
diversification of societies, notably by migration and the mobilization of native-minorities, many 
institutional arrangements have been made in order to guarantee the acceptance of minorities in the 
political life. This has been the case for ethno-religious minorities but also for other dominated groups 
such as women or homosexuals. These practices of acceptance however, have not always gone far 
beyond tolerance and many claims of minorities have been ignored by the State and the majorities.  
The different political systems of European countries have led to different ways diversity has been 
managed. The classic liberal democracy's conception of tolerance as applied in several political 
systems did not lead to challenge the dominant culture, which remains privileged, and only led to 
allow minorities to express their culture or religion in specific spaces. The republican conception of 
tolerance which prevails in other political systems led to a public/private separation of the space of 
tolerance. While every practices and beliefs are admitted as components of the private life of citizens, 
they are only admitted publicly as far as they do not go against the State-defined common interest. 
This is notably the case in France and Italy. The liberal pluralist conception of tolerance is certainly 
the one that seeks to extend spaces of tolerance for ethno-cultural minorities practices and beliefs, and 
seeks to maintain pluralism. But the recognition as legitimately different does not mean recognition as 
equals. These systems are certainly not exhaustive or exist as pure systems in Europe. But one of the 
objectives of the different research projects presented in this report was to examine these national 
traditions and compare the systems to understand better the different modalities by which diversity and 
pluralism are managed in different political systems.  
Moreover, in recent years, manifestations of intolerance have increased in many European liberal-
democracies. One of the most important sign of it is the rise of a ‘new’ radical-right and of anti-
immigrant parties which clearly stand against cultural pluralism and advocate for reducing the space of 
tolerance. Another form of intolerance, and important component of the public debate in many 
countries, refers to a new liberal intolerance and its modalities. Liberal intolerance posits that 
intolerance is necessary when the principles of liberalism and human rights are infringed. This 
compatibility between liberal principles and intolerance are redefining the limits between the tolerable 
and the non-tolerable in Europe.  
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The objective of the research within ACCEPT PLURALISM as regards to tolerance in the political 
life was to investigate key questions. The main questions were:  
 What kind of cultural diversity is considered compatible with the 'secular” politics of European 
countries? 
 What claims or requests are tolerated? 
 What political practices are considered tolerant or intolerant?  
 What values and norms are considered to promote or undermine tolerance in political life? 
 
Each of these questions refers to asymmetrical relations and minority-majority relations. But all these 
dimensions must be placed in a dynamic perspective. Migrant or native minority claims and practices 
are perceived as the introduction of difference as regards to the norms and practices of the 
cultural/political majority. But this does not mean that cultural/political majorities’ norms and 
practices were and are homogeneous. The homogeneity of culture, practices and beliefs is constructed 
and used explicitly or implicitly to maintain the domination of the majority or its autonomy from the 
outside. In every national enterprise, the unity of culture is a strong component of making society. As 
such, the introduction of practices and beliefs which have not been understood so far as forming part 
of the majority culture is a challenge posed to majorities. Conversely, the homogeneity of minority 
culture and ethno-religious practices and beliefs is also constructed, positively or negatively, by the 
members of the minority or by the cultural majority itself. As such, two dynamics are important when 
it comes to cultural diversity challenges in the political life: on the one hand, the modalities of 
recognition and the modalities of representation; on the other hand, the dynamics of mobilisation and 
participation. In the first case, the cultural majority is engaged in the definition process of what is 
acceptable and the very definition of the perimeter of minorities and the definition of their 
culture/identity. In the second case, minorities engage in dynamics of unification and codification of 
their culture and linkage, as well as in attitudes directed at the majority, issuing claims of 
acceptance/respect and recognition.  
The studies carried out in the frame of ACCEPT PLURALISM empirically challenge the concept of 
tolerance and the three class concept of toleration, non-toleration and respect. The aim is to see in a 
particular social space such as politics - as it has been previously done with education (Maussen, 
Bader, 2012) - how these concepts can contribute to the analysis of diversity, difference and 
majority/minority relationship in European societies. 
 
2. Modalities of tolerance in the political field 
The lines of research on tolerance and political life have highlighted the diversity of the modalities of 
toleration. Toleration in political life refers to a continuous boundary drawing activity which appears 
to be central in complex society’s assemblages. Following Schiffauer, toleration as played in 
contemporary societies refers to three different boundary drawing activities (Schiffauer, 2012). The 
first one refers to the “limit between the accepted and the objected” and its modalities, which respond 
to the question how toleration/non-toleration is put in practice and justified. A second definition of 
boundaries refers to what is tolerated or not, and thus to the limit between the tolerable and the non-
tolerable. The third boundary drawing refers to the who. We have already said that toleration implies 
an asymmetrical relationship, and thus creates limits between the dominant and the dominated.  
The different studies presented in this report bring empirical evidence about how boundary-drawing is 
realized in the public life. 
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2.1. Who is entitled to tolerate or not-tolerate? 
In principle, actors with political power define the boundaries of toleration or acceptance. The most 
powerful actor is classically the State, which has the main power and legitimacy in defining the limits 
of tolerance over its territory. In the different studies gathered here, the state apparatus is still the 
major actor entitled to tolerate, in particular national governments, the legislative power and the 
judicial power. Other actors with an important political power, and who are increasingly defining 
tolerance boundaries, are local governments and European institutions. Other actors situated on the 
side of the cultural majorities and powerful agents such as political parties and party leaders, 
Administrations (police, local Administration) or courts are also important actors for the definition of 
the tolerable. On the other side, the ones who are susceptible to be tolerated or not, are the minorities, 
minority beliefs and minority practices. It should be said however, that the scope of who is tolerated or 
not is changing in function of the cases under examination. They may represent all migrants, “post-
migration”, native minorities, “culturally different” migrants, minority religions or “coloured people”. 
They may be a group within one of these categories. The focus of non-toleration in the European 
countries is placed predominantly on Islam and Roma people. It might depend also of other criteria 
than ethno-religious identities such as the class (low-income, homeless, unemployed immigrants or 
native minorities) and the status as regards to the law (unauthorized migrants). These are the 
dominated. But, without invalidating the definition of tolerance as an asymmetrical relationship, 
studies on collective action have shown that even the dominated are not powerless, and may come to 
be dominant in specific spaces and contexts. The studies show examples in which the relationship 
between the one who tolerates and the object of tolerance may be more complex and even reversed in 
certain situations. Studies on the mobilisations of minorities for example, highlight cases of minorities 
gaining toleration and even recognition, including within highly vertical configurations of power. The 
less powered may even have the power to not tolerate sometimes. 
 
2.2. What is tolerable and what is not? Justifications  
As regards to what is not tolerated in political life, Mouritsen and Olsen have defined different 
modalities of liberal intolerance which refer to different justifications for not tolerating what one 
disagrees with (Mouritsen and Olsen, 2012). These modalities can be found in the different country 
cases examined here. Firstly, intolerance is justified by a concern over the necessity of “cultural 
cohesion as a precondition of liberal-democratic societies and institutions” (idem, p.19). This concern 
has been especially highlighted in studies of political discourses and policies justifying the exclusion 
of those who are reputed to bring “too much difference” to the society and thus harm social and 
cultural cohesion. This justifies policies of exclusion, practices of securitization and anti-
immigrant/anti-minorities discourses. The second dimension of liberal intolerance is linked to the 
necessity of “neutrality or universalism of the public realm, and the proper form of the private-public 
distinction”. This has been examined especially through the reception of claims of minorities for 
representation or participation to the political life. Neutrality and universalism are major arguments to 
reject the political accommodation of minorities as they are asked to integrate the “normal” political 
system and respect its norms and practices which are applying to all citizens. In these reports, the 
authors argue that the rules of representation and participation to the political system introduce a bias 
in favour of the cultural majority. Finally, a justification of liberal intolerance lays in the requirement 
to manifest dispositions as a good and liberal citizen and to practice effectively liberalism. This has 
been especially identified in the doubts expressed toward Muslims' fidelity to the liberal-democratic 
system.  
Other intolerant practices and discourses have been identified, which do not rely on liberal intolerance 
and go far beyond intolerance. This refers to racism and prejudices expressed and practised towards 
migrants and native minorities. The justifications identified for these forms of intolerance, which are 
no longer in the realm of liberalism, are rooted either in biological racism and prejudices or in a 
principled nationalism (Triandafyllidou, 2012). As Triandafyllidou shows, national identity and 
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nationalism have been constructed as opposite to the “other”. Even if the other can be tolerated by the 
national group, and even if a self-reflexion on the intrinsically diverse nature of nations could be a way 
to accept the “new” diversity, the examples highlighted by the reports show that nationalism is still 
conceived as a source and justification for intolerance.  
In the side of the justifications to go beyond toleration, the claims expressed by minorities (and those 
who support their recognition and respect) are made also according to different justifications. In 
particular, several case studies show how migrant claims are rooted in liberal principles and/or how 
representatives of these minorities strategically use concepts and values of liberalism to justify their 
desire to go beyond toleration and enter in the space of the normal or respect as equals. “Laicité” 
(Kastoryano and Escafré-Dublet, 2012), human rights, religious freedom or the right to personal 
autonomy and freedom are major components of the claims of minorities and of their political 
mobilisation.  
 
2.3. How acceptance or objection is expressed and implemented? 
Here again, the case studies present diverse modalities for the implementation of acceptance or non-
toleration in the public space. In the sector of political life, our attention has been put especially on 
institutional arrangements which allow the recognition of minorities’ beliefs and practices and 
effective admission as equals. The attention to institutional arrangements, as demonstrated by Bader 
(2012), allow shifting from an excessive attention to the State and above all show that studies of 
tolerance benefit from not only analysing discourses and principles. In fact, as shown by the different 
studies covered by this report, the modalities and directions of institutional arrangements and 
modalities of governance are much more complex, dynamic and diverse than what discourses and 
public debates seem to manifest. Recognition might not be granted formally but practical 
arrangements and governance through administrations, local governments or other might contribute to 
the effective “normalisation” of minorities’ beliefs and practices. On the contrary, formal respect and 
formal equality granted to minorities might be contradicted in practice by institutional discrimination 
and policies which reduce the space of tolerance. 
The different modalities of acceptance or rejection/non-toleration have been organising the research of 
the different partners of ACCEPT PLURALISM on tolerance in political life. Political and media 
discourses, public policies and political mobilisation, and their translation into institutional 
arrangements are organising the findings presented in this report. 
 
3. Dynamics of toleration and acceptance: the clusters 
For the purpose of the research on tolerance and diversity in the political life, one aim or the ACCEPT 
PLURALISM project is to explore how comparable challenges are dealt with in different European 
countries. The comparative dimension of the case studies is one of the main interests of the project in 
order to provide results which challenge empirically the concept of tolerance and its usefulness in the 
study of the management of diversity, as well as for policy-oriented outputs of the project.  
For the purpose of comparison in the field of politics, the research carried out by the different partners 
of ACCEPT PLURALISM has been coordinated with the objective that all case studies be relevant 
and comparable challenges. This means that the case studies were conceived to be at the same time 1) 
relevant for the national context, which means that they must have been object of public debate and 
led to policies, forms of regulation, institutional arrangements or at least the implication of mainstream 
political actors; 2) relevant for the general European context, which means that the national challenge 
that was selected should be related in some way to political or social issues that are discussed at the 
European level, and 3) provide good examples of how different countries deal with common 
challenges. In addition, all challenges had to have been discussed in some way as a challenge for 
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toleration/non-toleration or recognition/respect as equals by one or more of the participants to the 
public debate. 
The different research projects within this work-package are based on one (or more) country-specific 
case study investigated with qualitative research methods. All the researches are empirically grounded 
and they aim at challenging empirically the concepts of tolerance. For the purpose of comparability, 
all research analysed how the dimensions presented above (which we can summarize as: 
who/what/how) were embedded in the case study as well as in the national public debates in general.  
The national case studies selected by the different partners have been clustered along three main 
dimensions: 
Cluster 1 is organised around the challenge of political discourses in relation with intolerance 
boundaries drawing activities. The key question of this cluster is: how are the limits of tolerance 
defined in the political discourses of European countries? The cluster seeks to explore reactions of 
political actors or institutions facing cultural and religious diversity in the society, by the entry of 
political and public discourses. Intolerance is expressed whether by political parties – and especially 
extreme-right parties – elected representatives, charismatic figures or organised political groups. Two 
types of discourses are studied within this cluster: xenophobic and anti-immigrants discourses on the 
one hand and liberal-intolerance discourses expressed in relation with beliefs and practices of 
minorities which are perceived as harming the principles of liberalism, on the other hand. These case 
studies investigate the mechanics of production of intolerant discourses (What is expressed? How is it 
expressed? Which means are used to make it public?), and the boundary drawing activity as displayed 
in contradictory debates in favour or against toleration/ respect.   
 
Cluster 2 is organised around the challenge posed by public policies of exclusion. It focuses explicitly 
on the institutional obstacles opposed to the rights and admission as normal of minorities. The key 
question of this cluster is: what are the institutional limitations for the respect of minorities’ rights? 
The case studies explore public policies which limit the rights of immigrants and minorities. They 
focus on political institutions (state, parliaments, local governments or public administrations) actively 
obstructing the possibility for immigrants to benefit from equal rights with the majority: political 
rights (right to vote or eligibility); civil rights (right to assemble, freedom of expression, religious 
freedom, right to no discrimination) and social rights (right to education, healthcare and social 
support). The challenges studied focus on the political and social debates that frame these limitations 
as an expression of injustice, non-toleration and disrespect. 
 
Cluster 3 is organised around the quests for recognition and the political mobilisation of 
minorities. The key question of this cluster is: what are the institutional limits of tolerance to minority 
claims? This cluster gathers case studies which seek to explore the claims expressed by organisations 
representing minorities that emerge from below and their recognition – or not – by political 
institutions. They analyse the scope of claims expressed by the minorities (such as ethno-territorial 
claims, claims regarding political rights and political representation at national level, or claims of 
laïcité), the modalities of the political mobilization of minorities and the response of political 
institutions to these claims (whether by setting up institutional arrangements for the political 
representation of the minority, by furthering its territorial autonomy or, conversely, by dismissing the 
claims or increasing repression). This cluster has been divided into two different chapters: one on the 
mobilization for recognition of native ethno-national minorities and one on a dialogue between the 
French and British experiences of Muslims organizations’ mobilisations. 
 
The report is divided into four chapters.  
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In the first chapter Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero present the challenges of intolerance in political 
discourses of five countries: Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Spain. Despite their difference 
in terms of experience related to migration and way of dealing with cultural diversity, these countries 
all experience important debates about migration and native minorities and political discourses are 
presenting increasingly migration and native minorities as a problem in terms of tolerance. They show 
that a common phenomenon of mainstreaming of intolerant discourses is at stake in the countries. The 
chapter presents then the framing processes in terms of tolerance toward diversity and the different 
discursive repertoires. It ends by highlighting the predominance of national patterns in the dealings 
with minorities in the public space.  
In the second chapter, Ambrosini and Caneva present the challenge posed for tolerance by public 
policies of exclusion in Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. They present how increasingly 
restrictive policies have been implemented at the European and national levels, especially as they 
conceive migrants as a threat to security. They then present the interactions between local and national 
policies in this framework of restrictive policies. The cases of the Netherlands and Italy show how 
local policies extend (in Italy) or oppose (in the Netherlands) the restrictive national policy 
framework. In the case of Bulgaria and Ireland they compare cases in which national policy 
frameworks have developed in more restrictive (Bulgaria) or more accommodating (Ireland) ways to 
the need of integrating native minorities (Bulgaria) or migrants (Ireland) in public life.  
In the third chapter, Kaya presents the findings on quests for recognition of native minorities in 
Poland, Romania, Sweden and Turkey. After discussing theoretically different modalities of response 
to minority claims in Europe, he proceeds to a comparison of the different cases along different types 
of interrogations: Firstly on the diverse modalities of dealing with minorities, secondly on the type of 
minorities involved and the interactions they engage with authorities. He ends by reversing the 
perspective and see how these claims are perceived from the state and public institutions. 
Finally, the fourth chapter is devoted to a comparison of the mobilisation of Muslim organisations in 
France and the United Kingdom. Escafré-Dublet and Dobbernack start by providing background 
elements on the participation, the representation and the content of claims in both countries. They then 
proceed by presenting the case studies in the two countries, highlighting the common features of these 
mobilisations but also particular elements which stress the singularity of each national context. They 
end by opening perspective on the contrasting configuration of identity politics between the two 
countries. 
 
References 
Bader, V. (2012, forthcoming), “Concepts of toleration. Moral minimalism and more demanding 
moralities”, in Dobbernack J., Modood T. (eds.), Hard to accept. New perspectives on tolerance, 
intolerance and respect.  
Dobbernack J., Modood T. (2012, forthcoming), “The acceptance of cultural diversity in Europe: 
theoretical perspectives and contemporary developments” in Dobbernack J., Modood T. (eds.), Hard 
to accept. New perspectives on tolerance, intolerance and respect. 
Dobbernack, J. and Modood, T. (2011). Tolerance and cultural diversity in Europe. Theoretical 
perspectives and contemporary developments. Drawing on contributions from Veit Bader, Iseult 
Honohan, Per Mouritsen, Tore Vincents Olsen, Werner Schiffauer and Anna Triandafyllidou. 
Florence: Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies Working Paper. Available online at 
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/19790. 
Kastoryano R., Escafré-Dublet A. (2012), Concepts and Practices of Tolerance in French Political 
Life, ACCEPT-PLURALISM 4. National Case Studies - Political Life; Final Country Reports. 
King, Preston T. (1976), Toleration. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Flora Burchianti and Ricard Zapata-Barrero 
16 
Maussen M., Bader V. (2012), Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Schools: Comparative report, 
ACCEPT-PLURALISM; 2012/01; 3. National Case Studies - School Life, Comparative Report. 
Mouritsen P., Olsen T. V. (2012, forthcoming), “Liberalism and the diminishing space of toleration” 
in Dobbernack J., Modood T. (eds.), Hard to accept. New perspectives on tolerance, intolerance and 
respect. 
Schiffauer W. (2012, forthcoming), “Tolerating the significant other: national identity, public fears 
and the limits of tolerance”, in Dobbernack J., Modood T. (eds.), Hard to accept. New perspectives on 
tolerance, intolerance and respect. 
Triandafyllidou A. (2012, forthcoming), “National identity and the challenge of diversity”, in 
Dobbernack J., Modood T. (eds.), Hard to accept. New perspectives on tolerance, intolerance and 
respect.  
 
 
  
Political discourses and the definition of tolerance boundaries 
17 
Chapter 1. Political discourses and the definition of tolerance boundaries. 
Flora Burchianti and Ricard Zapata-Barrero 
 
 
 
Introduction  
The rise of intolerant discourses toward migrants and the strengthening in many European countries of 
extreme-right and anti-immigrant parties is one of the main shared concerns among governments, civil 
society organisation and scholars. Radical-right parties are gaining ground since the 1980s in some 
countries like France, and are part of the political landscape of many since the 1990s. This has led to 
an extensive academic literature aimed at understanding the causes of such a renewal, portraying their 
electorate, and determining the nature of political parties which seemed to present characteristics 
different from the traditional far-right parties.  
A common feature of all these parties is the centrality of migration in their platform, and their 
exclusionary views on this phenomenon. That along with the fact that the political parties gained 
power in countries of immigration has linked in all ways migration and cultural diversity to growing 
forms of intolerance in European societies. Radical-right movements have also developed in Eastern 
Europe, in countries which are not experiencing large scale immigration but have important cultural 
minorities such as Roma people.  
However, the discourse of the radical right is not the only one to challenge definitions of tolerance in 
the different countries. In certain countries, it is certainly one of the main actors in debates on the 
possibility to receive immigrants and on what should be tolerated or accepted on part of resident 
foreigners and ethnic minorities. But public debates of tolerance in the political life have also involved 
many other actors: mainstream politicians and political parties, governments, media, social 
organisations and minority representatives. Over the last few years, several countries have experienced 
a series of events, incidents, public manifestations or declarations which have led to intense public 
debates in which the rules of toleration were discussed and redefined. 
This chapter presents five country cases of such debates. It focuses on political discourses in which 
tolerance/intolerance contributes actively to draw boundaries when it comes to define the place of 
migrants and minorities in the society. The discourses analyzed may present overtly anti-immigrant 
positions, while others seek to discuss the norms that enable the acceptance of cultural or religious 
difference. Others finally seek to oppose racism and anti-immigrant discourses and seek to limit the 
expression of such discourses publicly. The cases present how the boundary drawing activity is 
realized through political and public discourses and how political actors negotiate the limits of 
acceptance and/or tolerance of cultural diversity 
The chapter will start with an overview of the different country cases. It will then discuss the nature of 
the actors whose discourses are aiming at changing the limits of tolerance and highlight their main 
arguments. It will end by comparing the ways to stretch or redefine the boundaries of tolerance in 
politics in the different countries.  
 
1. The case studies 
The countries analysed have very different experiences of immigration. Two of the countries are old 
immigration countries (Germany and Denmark), two of them have experienced large-scale 
immigration flows only in the last 15 years but with certain intensity (Greece and Spain) and Bulgaria 
has an important ethnic-minority, the Roma. However, they have all experienced controversies 
regarding the acceptance of migrants and native-minority practices and views or debates challenging 
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tolerance of these minorities in the political life. All the controversies presented have received 
important media coverage and have been at the centre of the public and political debate.  
 
1.1 Thilo Sarrazin's pamphlet on immigration (Mühe, 2012) 
In August 2010 Thilo Sarrazin, a prominent member of the SPD (Social Democratic Party) and then 
board member of the German Federal Bank, presented his book “Deutschland schafft sich ab” 
(Germany does away with itself) which content created a major public debate. He defended in the 
book that migrants and Muslims threatened Germany by lowering general intelligence rates and 
having a higher birth rate. He had already presented these views in an interview for the magazine 
“Lettres International” in September 2009 and chose to apologize before the importance of the debate 
which followed. But in 2010, many saw the book of Sarrazin as breaking a taboo in place for too long 
in German society. The debate influenced greatly the discourse about integration, immigrants and 
Islam in the political life of the country since then, especially the open questioning of multiculturalism 
as a model.  
 
1.2. Public meetings of radical Islamic actors in Denmark (Lindekilde, 2012) 
The two case studies selected for investigation in Denmark are two recent episodes of public meetings 
involving ‘radical’ Islamic actors who expressed intolerant views that conflict with majority norms 
and values. They both questioned the limits of toleration in regard to Muslim minority articulation of 
controversial views in the public sphere in Denmark. 
In January 2011, an intense debate evolved around a public meeting arranged by the Danish branch of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir under the title ‘Afghanistan: Scandinavian Governments in the service of the US’. Hizb 
ut-Tahrir had previously held similar public meetings in Denmark, always generating an extensive 
public debate. This time the debate reached new heights because of the invitation which was perceived 
as a support to the killing of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan and because of the public and symbolic 
nature of the Danish National Library, chosen as the venue of the meeting. Despite the attempt to stop 
it, the meeting took place.  
In April 2011, the 'radical' Islamic preacher Bilal Philips was invited by a Muslim organization to give 
a public talk on ‘Islamophobia – is Islam a threat to the West?’ in Copenhagen. The controversial and 
intolerant views that Philips had continuously expressed publicly, notably on homosexuals, Shia 
Muslims, women's condition or violent Jihad, led to an important debate prior to his visit. An 
important debate was centred on the role of the Islamic Faith Community in inviting Philips to 
Copenhagen and on whether the opinions of the preacher were shared by the organisation. Unlike 
other countries, Denmark did not deny Philips' entry into the country. His arrival and debate were 
extensively covered by the media and the debate took place before 1000 persons.  
Both episodes highlight the kind of norms, attitudes and values Muslim actors, implicitly and 
explicitly, are asked to subscribe to and denounce in order to be accepted as legitimate actors in public 
debates. 
 
1.3. Tolerance and intolerance in Greek political life (Kouki and Triandafyllidou, 2012) 
The study on Greece examines the discourses adopted by political and social actors in reaction to two 
cases studies related to religious diversity and racist actions in the public space in Athens between 
2010 and 2011.  
The first case refers to a public prayer, organised in the public space in protest to the absence of any 
official Mosque in Athens. On 18 November 2010, Muslims gathered on the courtyard of the country's 
main university to pray publicly on the occasion of the Eid al Adha (the major Muslim festivity in 
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honour to the sacrifice of Abraham). The pacific protest was organized by the Muslim Association of 
Greece. The event was positively endorsed by authorities, political parties, media and even the Church 
that tolerated religious diversity as manifested on that day in the city centre. But anti-immigrant 
parties, LAOS and Golden Dawn, opposed the event. Members of Golden Dawn and other far right 
groups led violent incidents in Attiki Square in their attempt to cancel the event.  
Six months later, in May 2011, after the assassination of a 44 year-old man and without having 
evidence concerning the nationality of perpetrators, a series of violent and racist attacks against 
migrants took place in the very centre of Athens. They were led by ultra right wing groups who beat 
deprived immigrants while, in some cases, member of Golden Dawn filmed the aggressions and 
broadcasted it via Internet. These attacks were tolerated by both police forces and part of the residents 
of the area. Two days after the 44 year-old man assassination, a 21 year-old man from Bangladesh 
died after being stabbed. All parliamentary parties condemned both the event of the murder and the 
racist violence that erupted in the city centre. The media coverage followed also this line but the focus 
was put on the loss of control on crime and insecurity, linked to the influx of migrants. 
 
1.4. Local controversies about migration in Catalonia (Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero, 2012) 
Despite a fairly progressive and comprehensive policy toward migrants, Catalonia experienced several 
important local controversies about migration in the years 2010-2011. Three of them are analysed. 
In January 2010, the city council of Vic voted the ban of unauthorized migrants from the city census 
(padrón), which is the only way for them to access public welfare. This ban was later declared illegal 
but it raised an important debate about the role of municipalities in integration policies and about the 
rights of undocumented immigrants.  
Candidates of the Popular Party to May 2011 municipal elections have put the anti-immigrant rhetoric 
at the centre of their campaign. This was particularly the case in the city of Badalona in which the 
candidate and actual mayor of the town has based his campaign on targeting the Romanian Roma who 
have settled in the town for bringing insecurity, crime and incivility. 
Several towns in Catalonia decided to vote proposals banning the wearing of religious veils covering 
the face, such as burqa and niqab, in public buildings. The first and most publicized case has been the 
one of the provincial capital of Lleida, ruled by the socialist party, which raised contention across the 
country. In this case, the debate was whether the ban proposals were stigmatizing migrants or, 
conversely, decisions were based on human right values and on ensuring security. 
 
1.5. The Roma integration issue in Hungary (Vidra and Fox, 2012) 
Two case studies have been researched in Hungary. Both of them refer to murder cases between 
Hungarian and Roma, one perpetrated by Roma and one in which Roma are the victims. Both cases 
fed an important debate in Hungary about the Roma integration in the society. In 2006, a teacher who 
was driving in Olaszliszka, a small village in the North, with his two daughters, accidentally hit a girl 
crossing the road. The father of the daughter and other people of the village, all Roma, attacked the 
man who went to check on the girl. This one died as a result of his injuries. Within two days, the 
police arrested the perpetrators. The second case refers to a series of murderous attacks against the 
Roma that began in 2008 in the city of Tatárszentgyörgy. They were later revealed to be racially 
motivated. The initial debates and police investigation thought the murders were related to Roma 
criminal activity or family revenge. It is only after the murder of a man and his 5-year old son that the 
police considered possible racial motivations for the attacks. One year later in August 2009, four men 
were arrested by the police on suspicion of murder. The police found neo-Nazi symbols in the 
suspects’ houses, which established the racial motivations of the crimes. Their trial is ongoing. Both 
murder cases spurred on the ongoing debate about Roma integration, involving the media, politicians 
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and intellectuals. In the aftermath of the murders, a number of these actors stressed the need to 
abandon the politically correct discourse, as they viewed it as an impediment to engage in a ‘genuine’ 
dialogue on these important issues. This in turn legitimated the further racialisation of the Roma 
question by virtually all parties to the debate. 
 
2. The actors involved in the redefinition of the limits of tolerance 
 
2.1. The opportunity for radical right-wing parties and groups to extend intolerance. 
All countries under analysis have seen the radical right gaining position in the political landscape. But 
the weight of these groups in the political life as well as in the controversies is very different from one 
country to another.  
In Denmark, Greece and Hungary, radical-right parties are represented in the Parliament. The Danish 
People's party is the third political force in the country since 2001 with currently 22 MPs. In Greece, 
the radical right is represented at the parliament through the LAOS (The People's Orthodox Rally) 
party since 2007. LAOS participated in the provisional coalition which was meant to deal with the 
crisis between November 2011 and February 2012, which legitimized the party. Despite that, the party 
did not secure any seat at the Parliament at May and June 2012 elections. Nevertheless, another radical 
right party, Golden Dawn, entered the parliament in 2012 getting nearly 7% of the national vote. It has 
also one seat in Athens' city council. Its members have been repeatedly accused of carrying out acts of 
violence and hate crimes against immigrants, political opponents and ethnic minorities. The 
organization has a clear racist position and endorses Nazi symbols and political positions. In Hungary, 
Jobbik (The movement for a better Hungary) has gained electoral support and received 16% of the 
votes in the 2010 Parliament elections, representing 47 seats (out of 386). Jobbik was created in 
2003and its success is largely due to its successful exploitation of the Roma situation. The party 
contributed to put Roma issues on the political agenda and mainstream parties and representatives 
have engaged a dialogue with the ideas expressed by Jobbik on this issue, often in an uncritical way. It 
has close connexions to extra-parliamentary and paramilitary groups with which it participates to 
public protests and actions aiming at 'restoring order' in Roma settlements. This was the case with the 
Hungarian Guards, a paramilitary group which was dismantled by the Court in 2009. Jobbik was also a 
central actor in the 2010 demonstrations and riots demanding the resignation of the government, along 
with mainstream right parties.  
 
In other countries, the presence of the extreme right is weaker, but extreme-right groups and parties, 
even in marginality, manage to influence mainstream politics. 
In Spain, no important far-right party has existed since the democratisation and no seat at the 
Parliament has been won by such parties since 1979. The sum of the votes for the radical right does 
not even reach 1% at Spanish level. This situation is currently challenged to some extent in Catalonia. 
A new far-right political party named the Platform for Catalonia (PxC), averse to migration and, above 
all, to resident Muslims, was born in 2002. Its electoral support is mainly at local level, in specific 
cities, but its electoral scores at Catalan level are still very weak in comparison with other European 
countries (2,4% in 2010). But its score is growing fast, and the participation of PxC in street activism 
has sparked several incidents, received a large audience and is changing the political landscape in 
Catalonia. Germany is experiencing a re-composition of the extreme-right and of its discourse in the 
recent years. The traditional extreme-right party, NPD (National Democratic Party), as well as new 
parties such as “Die Freiheit” (Freedom) and “Bürgerbewegung Pro Deutschland” (People’s 
Movement Pro Germany), have focused their discourses towards the stigmatization of Muslims. NPD 
has no presence at Federal level but has seats in two regional parliaments. It employs overtly anti-
immigrant and anti-Muslim slogans, some of them referring implicitly to National Socialism, such as 
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the “GAS geben” slogan, which means ‘accelerating’ but literally taken means “giving gas”. The new 
parties created in 2011 deny being anti-immigrant parties but are overtly targeting the “Islamisation” 
of Germany and appropriated ThiloSarrazin's ideas.  
 
Table 1. Electoral scores of anti-immigrant parties (Most recent national elections) 
 
Countries and 
 main far-right parties 
Last national 
election (year) 
Seats in national 
parliament (nb) 
Share of vote 
(%) 
Denmark 
   Danish Peole's Party 
 
2011 
 
22 
 
12,3 
Germany 
   National Democratic Party 
 
2009 
 
0 
 
1,5 
Greece 
   LAOS 
   Golden Dawn 
 
2012 
2012 
 
0 
18 
 
1,58 
6,9 
Hungary  
   Jobbik 
 
2010 
 
47 
 
16 
Catalonia 
   Plataforma per Catalunya 
 
2010 
 
0 
 
2,4 (in Catalonia) 
0.24 (total) 
Source: Own elaboration with public data 
 
In all countries under analysis, one of the main and under-researched features is the relationships 
between extreme-right's overtly anti-immigrant discourse and mainstream politics and parties. The 
limit of tolerance drawing activity relies mainly on the use of migration issues by mainstream 
politicians during controversies.  
 
2.2. Mainstream actors and toleration boundary drawing  
The radical right alone cannot reconfigure the boundaries of toleration in the countries examined. 
Discourses and debates which intend to define or redefine what can or cannot be tolerated as regards 
to cultural and religious diversity are effective when they become central in the public arena. In all the 
controversies and events under examination in the country cases, the discourses effectively succeeded 
in making tolerance to migration and native minority a mainstream concern and subject of contentious 
expressions. This means that the participation of mainstream political actors as well as mainstream 
media and newspapers is crucial to transform isolated expressions of intolerance into a central society 
debate able to change effectively the limits of tolerance in the society. These studies explore how the 
discourse on tolerance/intolerance to cultural diversity has been mainstreamed. 
The Greek, German, Spanish cases stress the role of mainstream parties and politicians in debating 
tolerance. In the Greek context, the radical-right and its discourse has gained legitimacy in the ultimate 
years, especially thanks to its representation at the Parliament and its handling of the issue of security 
in the city centre of Athens. The country experiences a conservative unfolding of Greek identity since 
the 1990s which has been intensified by the deep economic crisis the country experiences. Intolerance 
and the blaming of migrants for the problems suffered by the country are thus not only a far-right 
discourse. It is also partially shared by mainstream actors and the public opinion. The study shows that 
mainstream politicians and other actors share the same discursive frames, notably the cultural/identity 
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framing and the threatening component of the majority/minority relationship. Being integrated in 
mainstream discourse on immigration, the report shows that the discourse of the radical right has 
gained legitimacy.  
A similar process has been analysed in the German case. However an important difference is the fact 
that the initial anti-immigrant statements which raised contention have been expressed by a SPD 
representative and representative at the Federal Bank, Thilo Sarrazin. While the Federal Bank decided 
to dismiss him after the release of his book, this led to a major debate on the freedom of speech in 
Germany. Even if major representatives expressed their disagreement with the content of Sarrazin's 
book, many of them nevertheless developed the idea that there was a strong relationship between 
integration, Islam and Muslims and German “leading culture” (Leitkultur). CDU representatives, 
followed by SPD representatives, developed the concept of the German “leading culture”, which refers 
to values of the Constitution, the rule of law and the inviolable dignity of human beings, which 
migrants and Muslims had to adopt to be part of the German society. Many political statements of 
mainstream representatives supported implicitly or explicitly the idea that “Muslims culture” had 
different values and norms from the German leading culture, and that the conflicting ones had to be 
abandoned. Even if she has taken distance firmly with Sarrazin statements, Chancellor Merkel made 
only a few weeks after the release of the book the famous discourse on the failure of multicultural 
society in Germany, stating that “This approach has failed, absolutely failed.” Another important 
leader of the CDU, the CSU chairman and Minister-President of Bavaria Horst Seehofer, presented a 
plan about integration policy demanding to add the criteria of the “willingness and ability to integrate” 
as a prerequisite for immigration, and sanctions for those who refused. These are examples of the way 
that even if mainstream political actors took their distances with Sarrazin's discourse, they reproduce 
and legitimize the idea that immigrants and Muslims present problems for the society. They coincide 
with more restrictive boundaries toward Muslim and migrants reflected notably in integration policies.  
The Catalan cases also highlight the participation of mainstream parties and politicians in the 
legitimisation of the debate on the duties of immigrants and the tolerance to values and practices 
which are deemed culturally different from the local one. Mainstream right-wing and left-wing 
politicians have sparked the different controversies, with or without the support of their own party. 
The Catalan Popular party representative in Badalona has led the campaign relating crime and 
insecurity with the Romanian Roma settled in the town. He received the support of the Catalan 
executive board of his party who also made of a tough policy on migration a key component of its 
platform. The representatives of the conservative Democratic Union of Catalonia also supported the 
ban on unauthorized migrants’ access to public welfare and contributed to the framing of migration 
from Muslim countries as an identity/cultural threat for Catalonia and its welfare system. Finally, 
many socialist representatives in city councils supported the ban on burqa and niqab in public 
buildings, but without the support of the national board of the party. Mainstream parties and 
politicians are the main actors who have engage in toleration boundary drawing about immigration and 
cultural diversity. Other political actors and notably the top of political parties tend to avoid the debate 
and refuse to position themselves in clear terms when it involves members of their own party but also 
when it involves other parties. The study shows that the autonomy within the party and the belief that 
a tough discourse on migration allow to gain votes are the main reasons that explain the dominant 
laissez-faire policy among political actors. 
The Danish case presents discursive strategies of mainstream actors when they are asked to cope with 
the controversial meetings and legitimize their positions. It identifies three main dynamics of relative 
positioning in the boundary drawing process. The first strategy is to displace the responsibility of 
drawing boundaries from the realm of the political to the realm of law. It has been adopted by the two 
main conservative ministers concerned by the organisation of the meeting on the Afghanistan war. 
This strategy enabled the minister to avoid politically controversial issues, while other political actors 
who were not in charge positioned themselves clearly in favour or against tolerance to gain legitimacy 
and score political points. The second strategy was to securitize the boundary drawing process, thus 
leading also to a de-politicization of the issue. Each meeting was suitable to such interpretation in 
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terms of security. The topic of the debate on Danish participation to Afghanistan and the alleged call 
for murdering Danish soldiers could be securitized. But the debate also tended to securitize the debate 
with Bilal Philips and the organiser, the Islamic Faith Community which was suspected to be disloyal 
to Danish democratic principles. The third strategy was used by Muslim actors to cope with the 
controversy. These ones, contrary to the cases examined in the other countries, have had an important 
voice during the Danish controversies. They have tried to counter-securitize the issue and also adopt a 
strategy to shift responsibility for boundary drawing. This passed by reframing opponents' discursive 
frames. It also tried to adapt to the boundary drawing of others, in order to ease the pressure, by 
recognising its errors and presenting itself as harmless. Finally these actors simply avoided to enter 
directly the debate about boundary drawing by declaring it irrelevant.  
Mainstream media also plays a major role in shaping public debates about migration and migrants 
attitudes. It reflects and constructs the process by which anti-immigrant statements or debates about 
the toleration of migrants' practices and values have been mainstreamed. As in the political arena, 
positions and opinions expressed in the media are controversial. But they offer a public space for 
contentious discourses which contributes in any case to present tolerance toward cultural diversity as a 
leading issue. The Hungarian study shows that newspapers have had a very important role in framing 
the different cases and organising the debate on Roma issues. It shows that radical-right media are not 
the only one to present Roma as a problem and put forward intolerant views relying on the 
“biologisation” of Roma difference, and that a great part of this discourse is also endorsed by 
conservative newspapers. The left-liberal newspapers, on the contrary, emphasizes tolerance through 
norms of human rights and non-discrimination. Yet, in the same left-liberal newspaper, the cultural 
distinctiveness of Roma is highlighted and tolerated, but this does not point towards the integration of 
migrants. This is the “right to difference” and the construction of special policies for Roma which are 
supported by the left wing. 
In Denmark, the debates about the public meetings have been extensively covered and organized 
through newspapers. The study shows that the media has presented “instances of toleration boundary 
drawing”, defined as “articulated positions by an individual either for toleration or intoleration of the 
meeting, accompanied by a discursive rationale or argument for the boundary drawing” (Lindekilde, 
2012, p.8). The media gave voice to actors expressing different views on the meetings and tend to 
balance tolerant and intolerant stances. But while tolerant expressions have been reproduced more in 
the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir meeting, expressions of intolerance have been presented in a greater number 
in the second case.  
 
In all countries the debate on the toleration of cultural diversity and “difference” has not been 
monopolised by the radical-right. The debates and the process of toleration limits drawing have gotten 
central in the public space and involved mainstream political actors as well as mainstream media, and 
sometimes representatives of minorities themselves.  
The discourses used by these actors during the controversies have been extensively analysed. The 
framing of what is at stake in the controversies and the elaboration of framed of tolerance/intolerance 
share many common features in the different countries. But national features also give more or less 
importance to certain dimensions.  
 
3. Framing the boundaries of tolerance 
This section focuses on the analysis of the discursive frames that contribute to toleration boundary 
drawing in the different countries. This pays attention to the content of the discourses, both the ones 
advocating for tolerance and the ones advocating for intolerance, depending on the cases analysed in 
the different countries. The objects of toleration or intolerance vary in function of the cases. 
Discourses may define how much non toleration must be allowed in public space, either through 
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discourses (Denmark, Germany, Spain) or practices (Greece, Spain, Hungary). Others may refer to 
how much toleration must be granted to the practices and expressions which are perceived as 
conflicting with the majority values and practices (Denmark, Hungary, Greece, Spain).  
The content of the public discourses can also be divided between explicit and implicit intolerance. The 
first rely on anti-immigrant or anti-minority discourses, use stereotyped representation of these ones 
and go far beyond intolerance to reach racism and active exclusion of minorities. These discourses are 
mainly put forward by radical-right groups in the different countries but can at times be retaken by 
mainstream actors (Thilo Sarrazin or the Popular party representative in Catalonia for example). The 
second type of discourse is more connected to intolerance embedded in political correctness. The 
targeted groups are not migrants or native minorities as a whole. This type of discourse targets 
determined practices or values that are associated with a (cultural, social, religious) difference between 
the in group/majority and the out group/minority. Another strategy is to target not practices and values 
associated to culture but to draw tolerance boundary in the minority group, separating the “extremist” 
or “radicals” who cannot be tolerated and the others. This kind of discourse has been put forward by 
all kind of mainstream actors during the controversies.   
Different ways of framing what is tolerable and what is not have been analysed in the different cases. 
We will outline the main common frames among the country cases and present briefly national 
particularities in the boundary drawing discourses.  
The main common discourse drawing boundaries between tolerable and non-tolerable refer to legality, 
securitisation and culture and identity.  
Discursive frames on legality have had a major place in the controversies in Denmark, Spain and 
Greece. This frame proposes a clear contribution to boundary drawing and justifies toleration or non 
toleration depending on the cases and controversies. In Denmark, legality has been employed mainly 
as a discursive strategy to justify the tolerance of public meetings. It has been used to depoliticize the 
debate on public meetings but it is also founded on liberal grounds that claim that same toleration 
boundaries must apply to all groups. The only equal boundary applying to all groups is the one stated 
by the law and intolerance must be correlated to the legal framework. But this “tolerance-as-a-legal-
must” does not mean that other members of society cannot protest publicly against the views 
expressed in the meetings. In Spain, the argumentation about legality has been used also to justify 
tolerance, for example to oppose the illegal ban of undocumented immigrants or the ban of the burqa. 
Conversely, legality has also been integrated to the opposition to racism and hate speech in the case of 
the stigmatisation of the Roma. The Courts are perceived at the same time as the ones which are 
entitled to make respect the boundaries of tolerance. The discontent about their effective action to 
condemn racism does not lead to their delegitimization but rather to the need for the political power to 
strengthen the capacities of the Courts. The frame on legality has also served as a justification for 
intolerance. In the Greek case, the unauthorised situation of many immigrants is a justification for 
intolerance. The fact that immigrants comply with the law is perceived as a precondition for their 
tolerance by the Greek society. This was also the argumentation of the actors in favour of the 
exclusion of undocumented immigrants from social rights in the city of Vic. The main characteristic of 
this frame is to consider that tolerance/intolerance is not a matter of moral judgement but of equality 
before the law. That said legality frames are also used to extend intolerance in many situations. The 
use of the “law and order” frame is often part of a discourse on the duties of minorities and the need 
for them to respect the same rules as the nationals. But this is part of an argumentation that essentialise 
the cultural traits of certain groups (such as polygamy, genital ablation or violence against women) to 
justify intolerance toward the minority group.  
Secondly, law and order frame or security frame have been dominant in the majority of the 
controversies.  In Denmark, the securitization of the debate and the perception of the public meetings 
as a potential threat for the Danish society and state, especially for the debate on the war in 
Afghanistan, have been the main justification for intolerant stances. In Hungary, Roma culture is also 
constructed as a threat for the security of Hungarian people. The popularisation of the term “Gypsy 
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crime” has been a (successful) attempt to frame Roma as bringing insecurity to the Hungarian society. 
For the extreme right, this essential threat must not only not be tolerated but also actively fought, by 
substituting state forces if necessary. The same justification exists in Greece, especially among 
radical-right representatives. Xenophobic attitudes are justified as reaction against insecurity and for 
the safeguarding of public order. In Greece as well as in Hungary, this discursive frame allows 
reversing the roles of the victim and the perpetrator. Even in crimes against the minority, this 
discourse turns the local into the victims of a previous general crime (the insecurity felt because of 
migrants/national minorities) which justify reactions of self-defence. 
The third main discursive frame common to the country cases is the frame about culture and identity. 
This frame is in general a justification for intolerance toward minority practices. This frame stresses 
explicitly or implicitly the existence of a “leading culture” with its own rules and values that members 
of the minorities have to adopt in order to be part of the national (and local) society. The stances on 
the leading culture have been central to the recomposition of discourses and policies about migrants 
and Muslim integration in the ultimate years in Germany. This was connected to the stretching of the 
limits of intolerance, notably because of the discursive strategies to reinforce the perceived difference 
between the in group/majority and the out group/minority. The same process of differentiation 
between the majority and the minorities has been at the play in Hungary. It has been endorsed notably 
by left-wing media, experts and politicians who stressed the right to difference of Roma. But the study 
shows that despite this tolerant approach, the “right to difference” has led in the country to a 
disinterest for the integration of Roma in the Hungarian society. The question of the compatibility 
between cultures and their implicit or explicit hierarchy is also a major component of the discourse of 
the conservative parties in Catalonia, notably in relation to Roma and migrants from Muslim countries. 
Intolerance expressed through cultural/identity frames present cultures as incompatible and reinforce 
the differentiation between 'us' and 'them', as demonstrated in the Greek case. Either cultures of the 
majority and the minority are perceived as homogeneous and exclusive. In that view, the boundary 
between what is tolerable or not tolerable is clear-cut and not subjected to negotiations and change. 
The only way to be tolerated is then for individuals to comply with the rules of tolerance.   
Other discursive frames have had a prominent role in one (or more) of the national case but was less 
present or even absent of others. This shows the particular configuration of discourses and the 
differences between intolerance boundaries drawing in the different countries. They will be briefly 
presented.  
A major intolerant frame is characterized in Hungary by the “biologisation” and essentialisation of 
difference. This frame is connected to securitization but present the threat of Roma population as 
being biological and essential. Roma are thus neither deserving respect nor tolerance because of their 
innate inclination to crime. Radical-right media and parties establish a clear hierarchy between the 
Hungarian and the Roma cultures and genetic. This is the most explicit form of racism among the 
country cases under analysis. The major issue comes from the progressive penetration of such 
discourse into mainstream politics, notably conservative media. The idea of an irreducible difference 
between Roma and Hungarians, whether due to genetic or culture, is one of the main components of 
the debate on the definition of the limits of tolerance. In Germany, Sarrazin's stances about immigrant 
from Muslim countries also relied on biological stigmatisation and racism. He notably stressed the 
alleged difference of IQ between these migrants and Germans, which, in his view, is one of the main 
dangers for the economic and social development of Germany. 
An important frame in Spain and Greece is related to welfare and the economic crisis. In both 
countries, many actors explain the need to expand the limits of intolerance in order to preserve the 
local population in times of crisis. This form of welfare protectionism or welfare chauvinism is not 
only related to the current economic situation of the countries. Rather, the crisis has led to a clear 
reduction of tolerance toward migrants, especially so among poor migrants living in the city centre of 
Athens and undocumented immigrants. The “crisis frame” contributed to expand the limits of 
intolerance in both countries.  
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Finally, another transversal frame refers to the damage that intolerance can cause to other minorities. 
This frame, in-between the security and liberal intolerance frames, can be summed up as “intolerance 
for intolerance”, especially when intolerance can harm psychologically another group. We already 
presented the rhetoric of the extreme right who in certain countries such as Hungary or Greece 
strategically reverse the positions of the victim (presented as the majority group) and of the offender 
(presented as the minority group) to justify non toleration. But in other cases, the justification of 
intolerance is to preserve minority groups. This was the case in Denmark when the opposition to the 
public meeting on Afghanistan was justified by the risk that such a public debate would harm Danish 
veterans. But it is also an important component of the rhetoric of anti-racist organisations and 
opponents to anti-immigrant discourses and racist statements that advocate for intolerance towards 
such discourses.  
These frames are not exhaustive and others have had important roles in shaping the debates on the 
limits to tolerance toward cultural and religious diversity. Nevertheless, many of the discursive frames 
or positions on the controversies have been identified as central in the majority of the countries, 
despite the difference of nature of the cases. This shows that the way in which issues related to cultural 
diversity are understood in the different countries has many similarities, notably in the content of the 
stances. However the dynamics of toleration-boundary drawing reveal differences between the 
countries.  
 
Conclusion: the national dynamics of toleration- boundary drawing. 
Finally, some differences among the toleration-boundary drawing in the country cases will be 
presented. Even if much of the content of the discourses on tolerance has been common to several 
cases, the definition of the limits of tolerance during the public debates refer to dimensions which are 
particular to the national context, the culture, the history of migration and the definition of citizenship 
in each country.  
 
Breaking the taboo and political correctness 
In two countries, Germany and Hungary, the main dynamics in relation to the limits of tolerance has to 
do with the perception that intolerant (and racist) statements about minorities have broken a taboo on 
important issues faced by the country. Even actors who oppose anti-Muslims or anti-Roma discourses 
and publicly condemned them, acknowledge the “positive side” of such discourse in unbinding 
political expressions. The criticisms to the discourse of Thilo Sarrazin address the way in which he 
presented his ideas rather than the validity of the content. Criticisms to the naturalisation of Gypsy 
crimes are accompanied with a major discourse on the need to get rid of political correctness and talk 
about “real problems”. In both countries, there is a common tendency to blame liberal-leftists, 
researchers and human rights or anti-racist associations for stopping any discourse on the limits of 
tolerance toward migrants. Stances on the relativity of cultural differences and the need of equal 
treatment of majority and minority are perceived as an imposition of political correctness. This 
remembers also the important frame on anti-establishment in Greek cases. This process is 
accompanied with a re-centring on the majority group / in group and its interest, while the needs, 
rights and interests of the minority are disregarded. In relation to boundary drawing, this dynamics 
clearly points toward an extension of the limits of intolerance.  
 
Liberal intolerance and minority participation in Denmark 
The dynamics of the Danish intolerance boundary drawing clearly rely on a deliberative process. This 
deliberative process in the public space has to be linked with the deep liberal culture of the country. 
Either tolerant or intolerant positioning was mainly driven by liberalism. The principal arguments for 
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tolerance were related to the centrality of free speech considerations, its guarantee by law and the 
preference to discuss the ideas which one disapproves in the public place rather than forbidding them. 
One of the two main intolerant positions defended during the public debates was also in relation with 
the modalities of “liberal intolerance”. But the authors show that the modalities of “liberal intolerance” 
are reinforcing mechanisms of “othering”. The opposition is expressed not only towards the illiberal 
views of minority representatives, but also to their “illiberal identities” which are put in opposition to 
the Danish liberal and democratic principles.  
This explains the effect of the boundary drawing process on Muslims and migrants’ political 
participation. Liberal intolerance tends to inhibit the participation of actors from minorities, even the 
more moderate ones. The suspicion of illiberalism and the need to publicly demonstrate their adhesion 
to central liberal values, while this prerequisite is not asked to Danish natives, discourages the 
participation of immigrants. Boundary drawing is made differently in function of the groups. This 
consideration applies to all country cases and not only to Denmark. The suspicion towards “radical” 
Muslims has been extended to all Muslims, which inhibit their political participation. This negative 
effect on political participation has also been highlighted in the analysis after the debates on Thilo 
Sarrazin's book and its perception by young immigrants.  
 
Boundary drawing from below and redefinition of citizenship in Catalonia. 
In Spain, the culture/identity frame has been a major component of intolerance-boundary drawing. 
However, its particularity is to not provide a clear definition of the “leading culture” migrants have to 
respect. In the Spanish context, there is no consensus on a national culture or in its components. In the 
Catalan context, however, the building of a common national culture has effectively been at the centre 
of political mobilisations and of Catalan policies. But intolerant frames about identity and migration 
are poorly connected to the “Catalan common culture” which has been historically defined as a land of 
migration and in which residence citizenship prevails. In that sense, identity frames are aiming at not 
only changing the boundaries of intolerance but also at changing the meanings and principles of the 
Catalan citizenship, from a civic definition to a cultural/ethnic definition of citizenship. But this 
process is fundamentally made from below and, despite the laissez-faire attitude of the government 
and of mainstream parties’ leadership, this has not yet led to extend radically the limits of intolerance. 
 
New nationalist intolerance in Greece  
Despite the presence of conflicting frames in the public debate on the limits of tolerance in Greece, the 
authors show that these competing positions are reconciled by the depoliticization of intolerance, 
presented as a logical reaction and realism. This leads to a naturalisation of the differences between 
the in-group and the out-group, as well as the justification of the preservation of the in-group members 
and their self-defence. This led the authors to categorise this form of intolerance as a “principled 
national intolerance”, which subscribe to the idea that the world is naturally divided into nations, 
which need to preserve their autonomy as well as their cultural and ethnic cohesion. This form of 
intolerance relies also on a securitization of migration, as it considers that the violation of principles of 
cohesion and “purity” is a threat for the society.  
 
A depoliticisation of tolerance? 
Despite these different national dynamics in drawing boundaries of tolerance, one common dynamics 
is important to stress as a conclusion: the tendency to consider that tolerance and intolerance are not a 
political matter and therefore should not be politicized. Diverse strategies of de-politicisation have 
been underlined, such as securitisation, “new realism”, legalism or techniques to avoid entering the 
boundary drawing process or to shifting the responsibility on others. The depoliticisation is mainly a 
Flora Burchianti and Ricard Zapata-Barrero 
28 
strategy of government leaders and persons in charge to resist the attempt of other actors in the 
opposition to challenge their power. But in all countries this depoliticisation has given the opportunity 
to certain actors to test – and extend – the limits of intolerance. 
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Chapter 2. Local and national policies of exclusion 
Maurizio Ambrosini and Elena Caneva 
 
 
 
Introduction  
For a certain period of time, in the 1970s and 1980s, it might have been assumed that the recognition 
of cultural diversity and the rights of minority groups was destined to be gradually imposed in the 
liberal democracies in Europe. For a few years, however, the issues of tolerance and of respecting 
diversity have to be considered alongside the restrictive tendencies of admission and asylum policies 
(Zetter 2007), of the efforts to combat unauthorised immigration (Triandafyllidou 2010) and of the 
tendency to make the civic integration of new immigrants compulsory, including through the 
prescribed use of procedures to be followed and tests to be passed, especially in the fields of language 
and knowledge about the national cultural heritage (Goodman 2010): this was defined by Joppke 
(2007) as “repressive liberalism”, while Grillo (2005) spoke of it as a “backlash against diversity”. 
The economic crisis and anxiety related to globalisation are worsening the situation: in various 
countries, these factors reinforce estrangement from governments and from traditional political forces, 
they create scepticism towards the European model and cosmopolitan perspectives and they nurture 
votes in favour of new political organisations which are generally defined as “populist” and whose 
success is largely based on opposing immigration (Albertazzi and McDonnel 2008). The issues of 
legitimate belonging, citizenship and physical and symbolic borders have once again become present 
day concerns. To sum up, as the economy becomes increasingly globalised, the policies tend to 
renationalise. 
One of the emerging core issues is that of tension between the resurgence of nationalism and the re-
assertion of identity of both old and new minority groups. 
The second question concerns the relationship between the national and local contexts: if and to what 
extent local policies reflect and even reinforce the emerging restrictive orientations at national level, or 
whether they stay away from them, thereby favouring the goal of including the various resident 
populations. 
Finally, the third problem concerns the relationship between political institutions, minority groups and 
civil society: to what extent civil societies sympathise with policies of exclusion and approve of the 
limitation of minority groups’ rights, or whether they side with minority groups and with immigrants 
and asylum seekers in particular, forming advocacy coalitions which can influence the formation and 
implementation of policy decisions. 
 This report will analyse these topics by comparing four National cases: Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy and the 
Netherlands. For some purposes other countries will be mentioned such as Greece and Spain. 
The report is structured as follows: first of all, there will be a review of the general context of the 
progress of restrictive policies applied to new and neo-assimilationist immigration from a cultural 
perspective (Section 1). There will then be an analysis of the relationship between national and local 
policies, with particular reference to the policies of the exclusion of immigrants, asylum seekers and 
the Roma minority (Section 2). Thirdly, there will be a discussion on the role of civil society actors 
and the importance of the part they play in the defence of immigrants’ and minority groups’ rights 
(Section 3). 
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1. The European context and the increase in restrictive policies 
The issue of governing migration has grown in importance over the last few years, and it has become a 
priority on the political agenda of all European countries. The backlash against multiculturalism has 
spread throughout all European countries and many national leaders, such as Blair, Cameron, Merkel 
and Sarkozy, have openly criticized this concept and talked about the “end of multiculturalism”.  
The belief that multiculturalism has failed has contributed to the diffusion of a kind of neo-
assimilationist approach. The most meaningful example of this is the introduction of special 
“integration agreements” (Joppke 2007) which immigrants have to formally sign in some countries in 
order to prove their commitment to learning the national language, their political loyalty to the host 
country and their adaptation to some types of national values.  
Besides that, in the last few years, European countries have managed the issue of migration based on 
two principles: the closure of national boundaries and the hardening of national rules that concern both 
resident and irregular immigrants. 
In relation to the first issue, the importance of boundaries and national belonging has been emphasized 
by governments (Balibar 2012), as has been the importance of entry and resident permits (Duvell 
2006), and of the agenda of civic integration (Goodman 2010). While the flows of capital, goods, 
information and cultural products grow, the governments respond to increased human mobility by 
reaffirming their national sovereignty (Wihtol de Wenden 2009), and their role as defenders of the 
borders against the entry of outsiders from poorer countries.  
Strict policies of the control of migrants have been realized reinforcing not only external but also 
internal controls (Faist 2002; Mitchell 2002). Regulations that limit minorities’ rights or obstruct their 
claims have been recently introduced in order to protect the national identity. A tendency towards "re-
ethnicization of citizenship" (Bauböck et al 2006) has been observed in several countries which draw 
the boundaries between insiders and outsiders by reaffirming a supposed unit of culture, territory, 
language and religion in contrast to the diversity of immigrants.   
The countries considered here, i.e. Bulgaria, Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy show this neo-
assimilationistic tendency in various ways. Some of them apparently adopt a liberal approach, such as 
Ireland, where EU and non-EU citizens who are resident in the country can vote at local elections, 
non-citizens can work in the public service sector and they are eligible for naturalization after 5 years 
of residence. However, this open-minded attitude contrasts with some recent developments. Instances 
of intolerance and racist discourses have emerged over the years, particularly towards the African 
community. An emblematic case of the assimilationist attitude occurred in 2007, when a Sikh man 
applied to join the Garda (Police) Reserve. Before being commissioned, the man was informed that he 
would not be allowed to wear a turban with his uniform. The man refused to accept this, and did not 
take up his post. The issue sparked a significant media and political debate, involving journalists, 
politicians, NGOs and Sikh communities. The case of the Sikh man is a clear example of the difficulty 
of recognizing and respecting minorities’ claims, beyond the declared inclusive approach. The efforts 
to engage with the ethnic and religious minorities have often been superficial (Honohan and Rougier 
2012). 
Unlike the other three countries discussed here, the minorities in Bulgaria are not of immigrant origin, 
but represent historical communities living in the Bulgarian lands for centuries. As such, the people 
belonging to minorities enjoy the same rights as the majority population (Bulgarian speaking 
Orthodox Christians). And yet, despite the nominal equality before the law, in practice the minorities 
(above all, the Roma community) suffer from discrimination in many areas. In the recent years, the 
Bulgarian politics made a clear turn in the direction of nationalism and populism, and under the 
current government (in power since 2009), the intention to limit some rights of the Bulgarian 
minorities was openly stated. One of the areas that came under attack were the political rights of the 
Turkish minority. In 2011, the government has  passed the new Election Code, which limited the 
voting rights of those  Bulgarian Turks, who have emigrated to Turkey and have dual (Bulgarian and 
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Turkish) citizenship.2 Different authors give different figures about the number of people with dual 
Bulgarian-Turkish citizenship, but the highest estimate is around 380,000 people (Özgür-Baklacioglu, 
2006, p. 322; Smilov and Jileva, 2010, p. 19). The 2011 Election Code  introduced a six-month 
residence requirement in order to vote in local elections. The residency requirement and some other 
restrictive provisions in the Code have drawn criticism from international institutions, Bulgarian 
human rights watchdogs and other civic organisations, and some political actors. Although the 
regulation seemingly affects in the same way all Bulgarian dual citizens regardless of their ethnic 
background, it in fact has much more serious consequences for the political representation of 
Bulgarian Turks. The reason is that the Bulgarian emigrants of Turkish origin are considerably more 
active and organised voters than the ethnic Bulgarians in emigration. For example, results from the last 
few elections show that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the main political party 
representing the Bulgarian Turks, received between 50 and 60% of all votes cast abroad. The attempts 
to disenfranchise Bulgarian-Turkish dual citizens therefore have a very practical goal – to decrease the 
electoral success of the MRF. 
The approaches of Italy and the Netherlands towards immigration are less explicit but generally we 
can say that assimilationistic concerns are now prevailing. Italy has only recently become an 
immigration country and has never planned its own model of integration. The citizenship code remains 
strict (ten years of residence), even towards the second generation. The shared approach among civil 
society actors (and also educational staff) is that of interculturalism, which is aimed at recognizing and 
appreciating diversities (not only tolerating). Nevertheless, there is great discrepancy between the local 
and the national approaches and between the social actors and the institutions. At national level a 
policy of recognition of cultural and religious differences does not exist, but a sort of assimilationist 
approach prevails. The involvement of immigrants in civil, social and political life is very weak or 
absent. The only accepted integration is the economic one, in the low ranks of the labour market: a 
kind of “subordinate integration” (Ambrosini 2011). In addition to this, in the last few years a 
restrictive approach has spread in some contexts at local level. The meaningful examples of this 
approach are the “local policies of exclusion”, i.e. local measures introduced to clarify in various ways 
the difference between "us" (the native citizens endowed with full rights) and "them" (the immigrants), 
who are assumed to be a threat to security, welfare and cultural identity. 
The aim of these local policies was apparently to protect general interests (e.g. urban standards, which 
were compromised by the presence of annoying beggars), and to suppress behaviours that were 
considered inappropriate. Nevertheless, most of these measures have actually resulted in limiting 
immigrants’ rights, directly or indirectly, and favouring their exclusion.  
The Netherlands has changed its approach to immigration in the last few years. In contrast with the 
previous image of the country as one of the most tolerant in Europe, the demand to restrict 
immigration has recently increased and Dutch migration policy now has a reputation as one of the 
strictest in Europe. Among the most meaningful examples of this change are the recent rules about 
asylum seekers. These regulations have hardened to distinguish between those who (a minority) 
actually are “true” refugees and are granted residential permits on humanitarian grounds, and those 
(the majority) who have no right to live in the country because they are irregular or rejected asylum 
seekers. The Dutch asylum policy has provoked opposition and protest, especially for the expulsion of   
asylum seekers, a matter which became the centre of public and political debates. 
                                                     
2
 According to the 2011 census, there are 588,318 Turks in Bulgaria. Considering the large number of people who did not 
declare their ethnicity, the experts estimate that the more accurate number is around 700,000. The number of Turks who 
have emigrated from Bulgaria between the establishment of the Bulgarian state in 1878 and today exceeds 1 million. If 
we look only at the 1989-2011 period, over 400,000 Bulgarian Turks left Bulgaria and now reside in Turkey. A large part 
of people from this most recent emigration wave hold dual Bulgarian and Turkish citizenship (Zhelyazkova, 1998; 
Maeva, 2006).  
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In this European context characterized by increasing difficulties in recognizing and managing the 
diversity of populations, the political parties that emphasize a closure to migration in their 
programmes have gained ground (Swank and Betz 2003; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). The 
closure of national boundaries, stricter controls within the national territory in order to guarantee 
public security and combat irregular flows and the hardening of immigration laws are seen as 
important objectives for the public and politicians. Nevertheless, they also contribute to the growth of 
populist and xenophobic attitudes and behaviours, particularly towards those who are in an irregular or 
dubious situation, or who are perceived as completely different, such as Roma minorities. Research 
done by Jaworsky in the United States (2011) identifies three public frames associated with the 
irregular flow of migrants. In the first irregular migrants are described in the public discourse as 
invaders, who do not respect the boundaries and the property of the natives; in the second they are 
seen as criminals who do not respect native women and children; the third frame represents them as 
people who do not respect democracy, native culture and lifestyle. Even though in this research these 
kinds of frames concern irregular migrants, the representation of them as invaders/outsiders also 
occurs in the case of foreign (regular) residents and it is used by populist parties to obtain political 
consensus. Indeed, these frames have sometimes infiltrated the language and programs of more 
moderate and institutionalized political forces (Cento Bull 2010). 
Populist parties have grown in importance and won voters in the last few years in many European 
countries. In Italy, the Northern League party obtained 8.3% of votes in the last political elections and 
entered the right-wing government in 2006-2011. Its leading representative, Mr. Maroni, was assigned  
to the Ministry of Home Affairs and, under the right wing government, different measures gathered 
together under the label of “Security Package” (various rules aimed at controlling immigration and 
particularly irregular migrants) were approved in 2008-2009.  
In Bulgaria, in the second half of the 2000s two populist parties shattered the typical left-right bipolar 
model. The GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) was established in 2006, and the 
extreme nationalist party Attack in 2005. The victory of GERB in the 2009 election made it possible to 
introduce the Election Code to limit the voting rights of the Turkish minority.  
The spread of populist parties has also occurred in other countries, such as Greece, where the party 
Golden Dawn has obtained a large consensus among the public, despite its openly racist and 
xenophobic stances. In Spain the problem is more limited, but the Platform for Catalonia emerged in 
2003 with its anti-immigrant discourses. But the presence of populist parties has increased in many 
European countries in the last few years, such as Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark or Belgium.  
In Ireland the situation is quite different, because there is not a real populist party. Nevertheless, some 
anti-immigrant social movements or discourses have spread, such as the Immigration Control Platform 
(ICP), an anti-immigrant voice which is not registered as a political party but which ran candidates in 
the 2002 and 2007 Irish general elections . Besides that, some instances of intolerant and racist 
discourses emerged over the years in Ireland, involving the African community in particular.  
This anti-immigrant climate, with its shared perception of the failure of multiculturalism, is common 
in all European countries and influences national and local policies regarding immigration.  
 
2. The local policies and their responses to the national policies 
In the governance of migration, local policies now have a significant degree of autonomy with regard 
to national policies. Indeed, they have often tried to compensate for the limitations and shortcomings 
of national policies, moving away from the national models (Alexander 2003) or even contradicting 
them.  
Many services and resources for citizens are delivered locally, so the possibility of using them for 
immigrants depends on decisions, organizational processes and ordinary practices that are developed 
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locally, in the education system, in housing policies, in assistance to families in difficulty and in 
employment services (Ambrosini 2012).  
Some scholars have noted a discrepancy between the official positions taken at national level and local 
practices. In France, for example, at national level the myth of cultural homogeneity prevails, but 
locally the mayors implement multiculturalist policies (Martiniello 1997).  
Local policies are usually seen as more inclusive, aimed at promoting measures and interventions for 
the benefit of immigrant populations (Pennix et al. 2004). Nevertheless, local governments often 
encounter difficulties and obstacles in implementing policies of inclusion, because of the lack of 
resources and regulatory frames. In addition, in the last few years new political discourses have risen 
at the local level too, emphasizing urban security, social cohesion, assimilationist instances and 
generally a more hostile attitude towards migrants, particularly irregular ones. Consequently, besides 
local policies which try to move away from, oppose or compensate for national policies, in the last few 
years we can observe the growth of local policies that reinforce the restrictive or assimilationist 
approach of the national level policies.  
As local policies that are openly hostile to minorities can hardly be promoted in democratic regimes, 
city governments react in two ways: either they do not implement immigrant integration measures 
without taking a clear stance, or they introduce local policies which do not overtly appear 
discriminatory but which actually are. To do this they adopt measures which are apparently 
universalistic and aim to protect general interests (e.g. security, urban decency, hygienic conditions of 
cities), but actually damage or exclude specific components of the foreign population, such as 
residents with an irregular status, vagrants, Islamic minorities, or the Roma minorities (Ambrosini 
2012).  
So, besides the traditional concept of the local policies as more open approaches than the national 
ones, constraining policies have recently increased in many European contexts, promoted by populist 
parties and often supported by other right wing parties, and sometimes also by left wing parties.  
Among the case studies considered here, the Netherlands is the only country where the local level 
reacted positively to the exclusive national policies. It follows the pattern we were used to, i.e. local 
policies which are more willing to promote the inclusion of minorities than the national ones. The 
restrictions introduced to the Dutch asylum policy by the national governments from 1998 onwards 
were cushioned by several local governments. In contrast with the indications of the Linking Law 
(1998), which excluded irregular migrants from social services and work, some municipalities offered 
shelter and support to immigrants. They also wrote a letter to the Secretary of State that they would no 
longer exclude rejected asylum seekers from facilities and accommodation. In the following years, 
because of the continuing restrictions (e.g. the so-called Return project in 2003) imposed at national 
level, and following incidents related to the asylum issue (see Versteegt and Maussen 2012), the local 
level reacted once again: 40 local aldermen and mayors of the Green party showed their willingness to 
continue offering support for irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers, writing a manifesto and 
organizing a demonstration.  
These mobilizations “from the bottom”, even though they involved a small number of municipalities, 
demonstrate that the local governments do not always follow and implement the national guidelines, 
but bypass them in order to manage their multiethnic cities and favour the integration of minorities.  
The Italian context is different, because at local level intolerant positions have emerged, supported and 
promoted by the Northern League party but also by other right wing parties. City governments, 
particularly those ruled by Northern League mayors, introduced stricter measures than the national 
rules, which were already constraining. We called them “local policies of exclusion”, to refer to those 
measures introduced to guarantee urban safety and suppress any behaviour that is considered 
annoying, indecent or ill-mannered (e.g. begging, public gatherings e.g. to play cricket in public parks, 
eating in parks, praying in rooms which are not specifically designed this purpose, etc.). Even though 
the declared aim is to protect general interests (e.g. urban standards, hygienic conditions of cities, 
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restoration of city centres), they actually limit immigrants’ rights indirectly or directly and favour their 
exclusion. In Italy several local policies, therefore, “go beyond" national policies, thus hindering the 
process of integration for immigrants. 
Nevertheless, the reasons why these measures have to be introduced are often well-structured and they 
can impress Italian citizens favourably. They play upon the interests and rights of natives, intervening 
in issues that affect the daily life of people and their lives in the local community. Firstly, the local 
policies of exclusion respond to the demand for security and social order on the part of the citizens. 
Thanks to them, places of worship are controlled, the construction of mosques is banned, the 
concentration of immigrants in specific areas of the cities is monitored. Secondly, they regulate access 
to social benefits and welfare provisions. Because of the scarcity of the economic resources needed to 
meet social demands, these measures give priority to the rights of Italians before those of immigrants: 
Italians have rights because they are citizens, whereas immigrants are guests, they are not part of the 
nation, so their rights are secondary to those of Italians, or in extreme cases immigrants have no rights. 
Finally, the local policies of exclusion are useful tools for defending the Italian identity, history and 
culture. The ban on “non-traditional activities” in the city centre (e.g. the opening of kebab shops), or 
on opening mosques and Islamic cultural centres,   speaking languages which are different from Italian 
in public places, are all measures aimed at preserving Italian history and culture from the invasion of 
immigrants. Foreign people are in fact seen as a threat to the Italian culture, traditions and values, and 
their customs pollute Italian cities. Exclusion here takes on a more symbolic meaning linked to 
identity.  
The issue of preserving the identity of a nation is becoming fashionable again and it is often used in 
anti-immigrant discourses. People are used to thinking of their country as a unit of language, culture 
and religion. This unit and homogeneity is the rationale behind the construction of the modern states 
and the basis of nationalism. Faced with globalization and the transformation of societies in a 
multiethnic sense, this principle has been reinforced and has become the basis of nationalist 
movements and anti-immigrant political discourse. These movements and parties reinforce their anti-
immigrant positions on the grounds that immigrants’ cultural and religious practices are incompatible 
with the national culture and values, and with the homogeneity of the nation. Like the Northern 
League party in Italy, the Spanish far right party Platform for Catalonia has used the issue of identity 
to justify its hostility towards immigrants. It is interesting to highlight that the intolerant discourses 
used in the Spanish context by the far right party are the same as the discourses used by the Northern 
League Party in Italy: besides the issue of the defence of national identity, both parties build their 
political programmes and actions on the need to guarantee urban security and to safeguard access to 
social benefits for natives. The topic of security, welfare and identity, are the main frames used by the 
populist parties both in Italy and in Spain.  
The similarities between the two countries are striking and show that the issue of local policies of 
exclusion regards not only the Italian context but also other European contexts. Like in Italy, in Spain 
some measures were taken at local level in order to exclude migrants. The decision of the city of Vic 
to exclude undocumented migrants from the municipal registers and consequently from the right to 
access basic social rights is a case in point. But other cities have taken similar measures, such as the 
ban of the full veil in public buildings in other cities in Catalonia. Besides that, the intolerant 
discourses are used not only by the populist parties Northern League and Platform for Catalonia, but 
they have also become part of the programmes of other parties, which think they can obtain public 
consensus through these discourses.   
In Ireland the topic of identity is the most popular of the three, and it is the reason why the Garda 
Uniform is kept alive and preserved, as Honohan and Rougier explain (2012). The police uniform is a 
strong symbol of identity, and the standards of dress and behaviour are part of the Police’s tradition. It 
also projects an image of impartiality and represents not only the police but also the state, and its 
secularism. For this reason the case of the Sikh man who was not allowed to wear his turban with the 
uniform (see paragraph 1) sparked debates in Ireland.  
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It is interesting to note that the Irish national policies on immigration are considered inclusive, 
compared to other European countries. The citizenship law in one of the least restrictive in Europe and 
in the political arena anti-immigrant parties do not exist. The country was also one of the leading states 
to put a National Action Plan Against Racism in place (2005-2008), followed by the Migration Nation 
document (2008) in order to provide instructions for a inclusive society. Besides that, a national 
institution was set up in 2007 to develop and co-ordinate integration policy across Government 
departments, agencies and services, i.e. the Office of the Minister for Integration (OMI). The task of 
this office, which became the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI) in 2011, was 
the promotion of the integration of immigrants.  
Even though Ireland seems inclusive in principle, there is a gap between good intentions and practices.  
and some claims for recognition have not been accommodated, such as in the case of the Sikh man. 
But this case reveals that the issue at stake is not only the accommodation of cultural and religious 
differences, but also the definition of Irishness (Honohan and Rougier 2012). The emphasis on the 
importance of the Garda uniform reflects the fear of losing identity. Ireland shows an inclusive 
approach but also the need to maintain control and sovereignty.  
The issue of identity is very important in Bulgaria and it is related to the political participation of 
Bulgarian minorities. In contrast with Ireland, where Irishness can be reconciled with  diversity, even 
in principle, in Bulgaria there are strong positions against Bulgarian minorities, which are perceived as 
a threat to national identity. This is particularly evident in the case of Bulgarians with dual Bulgarian 
and Turkish citizenship who have voting rights both in Bulgaria and in Turkey. The demand to limit 
their voting rights has increased since 2005, because of the populist parties GERB and Attack. It is 
worth noting here that this intolerant position towards Bulgarian Turks gained popularity (and not only 
among the populist parties) because it was linked to “election tourism”, a phenomenon which is 
largely condemned. “Election tourism” is the practice of organizing trips of large groups of voters 
residing in Turkey to their native towns in Bulgaria, in order to cast their votes. This strategy of 
obtaining votes is used by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a party which represents 
the rights and interests of Muslims in Bulgaria. The resentment over the MRF, which many ethnic 
Bulgarians perceive as yielding too much political and economic power, has produced a negative 
attitude towards Turks in general. Beyond these political aspects, intolerance towards Turks is rooted 
in the perception of their diversity. Indeed Turks resident in Bulgaria are a close and well-organized 
community, they usually live separately in specific areas, but at the same time they participate in the 
social and political life of the country. They distinguish themselves from the majority through 
different cultural traditions, ethnic origin and religion. For these reasons they are perceived as aliens, 
people who are not part of Bulgaria (even though they also have Bulgarian citizenship) and who 
should not have rights there. Moreover, their activism in the social and political sphere is seen by 
some as an attempt to sustain the interests of Turkey. 
The Bulgarian Turks are, therefore, a minority who come up against tolerance issues because of their 
diversity. Their identity is a challenge to national identity, and the majority reacts by limiting their 
rights – especially trying to diminish their participation in the political life. In this case the policies of 
exclusion are national, formulated “from above” and aimed at excluding those minorities which 
represent a threat to national identity. 
The issue of identity, therefore, emerges in all four countries, showing that the common aspect in the 
approaches to minorities is the new trend towards assimilationism: those who demonstrate that they 
have been assimilated (in the sense of “becoming similar”, see Brubaker 2001) and do not want to 
question the fact that national identity can be accepted and integrated. If the intruders (in the 
Netherlands), the guests (in Italy), those who claim the imposition of identity markers in the public 
arena (in Ireland), those who want to be loyal to two countries and maintain dual citizenship (in 
Bulgaria) do not assimilate, and put aside their cultural backgrounds without making claims for 
recognition, they will have to face various forms of political exclusion. They will be expelled 
(Netherlands), their integration will be impeded by local policies of exclusion (Italy), their voting 
rights will be limited (Bulgaria) or their claims will not be accommodated (Ireland). 
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In conclusion, the Irish national policies are more inclusive than the other three. The Netherlands, on 
the other hand, has restricted its national policies on immigration (particularly on asylum seekers) in 
the last few years but the city governments have reacted by opposing or bypassing them. Italy and 
Bulgaria are the countries where the interplay between the local and national level has led to most 
restrictive outcomes in recent years. Besides the fact that Italy has restrictive national policies on 
citizenship, in the last few years several local policies have adopted a particularly exclusionary 
overtone, aimed at separating Italian citizens from “the guests”. Finally, in Bulgaria the local 
responses to the restrictive national policies are highly diverse. In municipalities dominated by the 
governing GERB party, they are accepted and shared, but in municipalities where other political 
parties (especially the Movement for Rights and Freedoms) are in power, these policies are opposed 
and resisted. Of course, in every country civil society actors have reacted to the national and/or local 
policies of exclusion in different ways, depending on their power and visibility as well as the 
constraining structural factors.  
 
3. The responses of civil society actors  
In the relationship between national and local policies, a third actor often intervenes, i.e. organizations 
and movements within the civil society which usually fight for the rights and claims of minorities. 
They include a broad range of forces: religious institutions, charities, NGOs, anti-racist social 
movements, ethnic associations and trade unions. 
These groups and movements are able to intervene in the public arena and sometimes can affect the 
local policies. In some cases city governments rely on these groups and movements, or collaborate 
with them in order to implement actions for the integration of minorities. Furthermore, civil society 
actors are particularly active in supporting irregular migrants and asylum seekers, so local 
governments often delegate the issue to them. In other cases these civil society actors oppose local 
governments because of their restrictive policies or their discriminatory measures. In any case these 
civil society actors fill the gap  between laws and regulations that produce exclusion, and social needs 
to which society has to respond, for humanitarian reasons or because of general interests (e.g. health 
care). 
In the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and Bulgaria these civil society actors have different roles and can 
influence the local policies using various degrees of power. It is worth noting that in every country 
considered here, these movements and organizations consist mostly of natives, whereas immigrant 
communities and minority associations have little influence in the public and political arena. This 
depends on many factors, which differ from country to country and are affected by the characteristics 
of the immigrant populations living there. Nevertheless, the national policies on immigration have 
considerable influence on their presence and their potential to be active socially and politically.  
It is no coincidence that in Ireland immigrant communities can intervene in the public arena. As 
mentioned above, in Ireland the legislation on immigration is more inclusive than in other countries 
and allows non-citizens to participate in political life. For example, in the case of the Sikh turban in 
the Garda Reserve, the Sikh community intervened and publicly expressed its opinion, openly 
opposing the decision of the Garda. The Irish Sikh Council was founded in 2004 in order to provide 
various services to the community: information services, education and training, cultural events, etc. 
The Council is usually engaged in public Irish events, e.g. St Patrick’s Festival Parades, and 
collaborates with several Irish institutions. After 9/11, with the increasing racist events involving 
Sikhs, the Council also began to offer support for the victims and acted as an advocacy group in 
disputes.  
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Some obstacles to the participation of minorities in public and political life occur in Ireland, too. 
Political parties do not encourage their political participation, while minorities lack information about 
the rules and have difficulty in creating political networks. Ethnic communities and organizations act 
in this regard by organizing campaigns to encourage migrants to vote. 
The Dutch and Italian cases are completely different, because minorities do not intervene in the public 
and political arena. Their claims and rights are defended by native associations and organizations, such 
as NGOs, operating on behalf of migrants, Churches and religious or humanitarian NGOs involved 
with charity. In the Netherlands, NGOs involved in specific issues (i.e. rejected asylum seekers, 
refugees and/or undocumented migrants) and international organizations (i.e. Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch) have also intervened following the introduction of restrictive policies on 
asylum seekers. In Italy, trade unions supported migrants in their fight against the local policies of 
exclusion, joining other organizations in the advocacy. In addition to these organizations, both in the 
Netherlands and in Italy there are some civil society actors who have expertise in legal issues and who 
actively defend migrants’ rights in court. In Italy an association of volunteer lawyers, called Avvocati 
per Niente (transl.: Association of Pro-Bono Lawyers) was founded to guarantee justice for the weak, 
and is usually called upon by trade unions and charities when providing legal aid to defend migrants. 
The lack of ethnic organisations which represent migrants’ interests and rights is counterbalanced by 
these active actors in civil society both in the Netherlands and in Italy. The main discourses they use to 
justify their support for minorities are: the necessity to guarantee human rights to everyone and to fight 
against discrimination (in Italy), the need to recognise the refugee status for those who are real 
refugees, to offer solidarity because of global injustice, to support particularly vulnerable people and 
finally to favour the inclusion of those who feel they belong to the country (in the Netherlands).  
Advocacy groups and human rights watchdog organisation in Bulgaria were among the most vocal 
critics of the 2011 Election Code. Their pressure, in combination with the opposition of some political 
actors (most notably the president Georgi Parvanov), actually forced the government to amend the 
Election Code in June 2011 and shorten the residency requirement for participation in local elections 
from twelve (in the first version of the Code passed in January 2011) to six months. Such views, 
however, remained a minority. Many civil society actors, even though they generally show tolerant 
views, saying that minorities should be politically represented, also express positive opinions about the 
Election Code, thereby supporting national policies of exclusion and intolerance.  Most civil society 
actors are highly critical of the political parties and believe that they are not  interested in working for 
the minority integration and political participation, but only want to manipulate minority groups in 
order to obtain votes. This general distrust in state institutions and the political class most likely also 
influences the attitude and behaviors towards minorities and their political participation. 
Regardless of their opportunity to influence national and local policies on immigration, the active role 
of civil society actors shows that the assimilationist approach is not generally shared and cannot be 
successful. It also shows that good practices of accommodating diversity at local level should be taken 
into account in order to improve local/national policies on minority groups’ issues. 
 
4. The policies of exclusion and the issue of intolerance 
The national and local policies of exclusion in the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and Bulgaria are forms of 
intolerance which are introduced and shared by national and/or local institutions. This is the most 
worrying aspect: intolerance is legitimized and promoted by institutional bodies which in principle are 
liberal and democratic.  
The forms of intolerance that emerge in the four countries are grounded on two different justifications. 
In the Netherlands and Bulgaria intolerance is justified by national policies based on the legal status of 
people.  
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In the Netherlands, illegal migrants are not tolerated or even accepted, so they have to be removed 
from the country. Those who try to enter the country as asylum seekers, but are not recognized as such 
by the receiving State, cannot be accepted as   often happened in the past. In these cases strategies 
such as detention, fines and expulsion have to be used. Intolerance against those who have no legal 
rights to live in the country becomes tolerance when migrants await the outcomes of an appeal or 
because they are under age. In these cases tolerance is manifested through assistance in order to 
prevent homelessness and destitution for asylum seekers, especially for vulnerable groups like 
children, the sick and the elderly. Even though they are seen as “intruders”, the national and local 
governments have a duty of care towards them. Acceptance occurs only when migrants are recognised 
as “victims” (Anderson 2008, Fassin 2005).  
In Bulgaria the legal status which affects the level of tolerance/intolerance is related to citizenship, not 
to legal residence in the country (as is the case in the Netherlands). Although the intolerant attitudes 
against the Bulgarian Turks are manifested in many areas, the intolerance is most openly displayed in 
case of those members of the community who reside in Turkey, but have a Bulgarian citizenship, 
which gives them the right to vote on the elections in Bulgaria. Besides the fact that they are perceived 
as culturally and ethnically different, their dual citizenship is considered incompatible with loyalty to 
the Bulgarian nation.  
The kind of discourses used in Italy and Ireland to justify intolerance is based on the ethnic and/or 
religious differences of migrants and minorities. People are tolerated or not tolerated because of their 
‘difference’ and their cultural or religious claims, whereas their legal status is less important.  
In Italy, public and political campaigns against illegal migrants have also been made, but the local 
policies of exclusion have been mostly introduced to exclude people who were legal residents but part 
of specific ethnic/religious groups. We are referring above all to Muslims, whose claims (such as their 
demands to build mosques or recognise some places as places of worship) have been opposed by the 
local governments. Intolerance is grounded on the fact that certain actions and practices are potentially 
harmful to society, and they can threaten public security and social order. But it is also based on the 
consideration that certain cultural and religious practices are too different from the Italian ones and   
can damage   “social cohesion”. The basis of social cohesion is in fact solidarity and solidarity is based 
on uniformity:  when values, norms and beliefs are (supposedly) shared. 
In Ireland intolerance is also grounded on a vision of national identity which is threatened by 
migrants’ claims. In this case intolerance emerges when cultural and religious claims are made within 
the state institutions. This produces a sort of “selectivity” in tolerance and the accommodation of 
diversity, depending on who or what is tolerated, where it is tolerated and why. Accepting the wearing 
of the hijab in Irish schools is a case in point. The issue concluded with broad acceptance within most 
Irish schools, with the incorporation of the hijab into the schools’ uniforms. By contrast, intolerance 
towards the claim of the Sikh man to wear his turban with the Garda Reserve uniform is explained by 
the need for individual religious and cultural backgrounds to be invisible and irrelevant in a state 
institution. The difference in accepting the hiajb at school and not accepting the turban in the police is 
due to the fact that the majority of Irish schools are not state institutions, whereas the police is a state 
institution. Besides that, most schools are religious (mainly Catholic) and it is a great challenge for 
them to accommodate different religious groups. By contrast, the police is not a religious organization, 
so it is not obliged to deal with accommodating religious diversities. The police has to be neutral 
because it is a state institution. Ireland is therefore selective in the nature and the amount of diversity 
accommodated.  
Bearing in mind the whole attitude spectrum which goes from intolerance to tolerance, acceptance, 
respect and recognition, it seems that in the four countries under study the political arena is 
characterized by signs of growing intolerance. This approach on the part of the state institutions shifts 
to tolerance when the diversity of migrants and minorities is not a threat for national identity and 
social cohesion. In order not to be perceived as a threat, minorities have to avoid making specific 
cultural claims (e.g. not asking for places of worship or not wearing turbans), they should become 
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similar to the majority of the population, showing that they have adopted national customs, traditions 
and the language, and they should be loyal to the state. In the Netherlands, for example, a discourse on 
“rootedness” has emerged in the last few years, alongside the introduction of stricter asylum policies: 
it is wrong to evict a person who is well integrated into Dutch society and feels they belong to the 
country. Migrants are therefore tolerated if they are culturally assimilated and if they show willingness 
to “embrace Western values”. In Bulgaria, loyalty to the state is required in order to become integrated 
into the society. To have only one citizenship, i.e. Bulgarian, is the first step to being tolerated, 
whereas integration occurs when people are no longer perceived as aliens but prove they want to be 
part of the state. 
Despite the fact that Ireland has declared that it has adopted the model of interculturalism (based on 
which cultural diversity should be acknowledged and catered for), when minorities demand to follow 
their traditions or ask for their differences to be respected in public services, these demands are not 
easily accommodated. Minorities are tolerated when their diversity is not apparent in public places and 
when they do not claim recognition. Similarly, in Italy, migrants who do not come to Italian urban 
areas with their different symbols and practices, who do not ask for the same rights as Italians and who 
do not claim  recognition might be tolerated.  
To sum up, it seems that in the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Ireland and Italy the accommodation of 
diversities is evolving towards a policy of limited tolerance and within a broader discourse based on 
assimilation. 
 
Conclusion 
From our analysis we can first of all confirm that there is a trend towards restrictive and neo-
assimilationist tendencies in European policies on immigrants. The spirit of accepting the recognition 
of cultural diversity seems to be taking a step backwards (Irish case). Long-standing distrust of 
resident minority groups and their loyalties have resurfaced and have been institutionalised under new 
forms (Bulgarian case). The long-standing practice of accepting asylum seekers has become more 
selective and less tolerant (Dutch case). Local policies’ traditional pragmatism and liberalism are now 
questioned and at times overturned, thereby following and nurturing xenophobic attitudes (Italian 
case). 
There appear to be three reasons for this exclusion. The first concerns security issues: the fight against 
international terrorism is closely linked to requests to defend the national territory from invasion by 
unauthorised foreigners. The second reason consists of the claim to be given priority on the part of 
national citizens in terms of the distribution of welfare benefits, whereby immigrants and refugees are 
seen as potential exploiters of the generosity of the receiving countries. The third reason concerns 
defending national and local cultural identity against claims for settlement, legitimisation, and public 
visibility of minority groups which are considered outsiders in terms of the country and its history. 
These policies of exclusion all share a common underlying feature: they reaffirm the boundaries of 
belonging and the legitimate community, they distinguish between “us” (national citizens who feel 
they are the legitimate owners of the territory) and “them” (the threatening outsiders), they thus 
rediscover a kind of community cohesion which reasserts the precedence of the majority over the 
claims of the minority. These minority groups are increasingly required to conform to the norms of the 
majority if they want to be accepted or they are required to be less visible or troublesome.  
For these reasons, many political battles and initiatives have an eminently symbolic value. Norms 
might even be contradicted by court judgements, may prove to be inapplicable or may have very 
limited impact on the living conditions of immigrants and minority groups. What counts is the 
message they send out: that a majority community feels threatened and intends to defend itself against 
intrusion and claims. Social order is restored with the aim of recreating a kind of internal homogeneity 
and rejecting the forms of “superdiversity” (Vertovec 2007) which threaten it. Policies of exclusion 
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are more threatening because of their cultural significance than because of their actual content: they 
tend to indirectly justify other more serious forms of xenophobia and discrimination (Ambrosini 
2012). 
The cases analysed have shown that the democratic vote, which rewards the wishes of the majority, 
can become an instrument of exclusion. It is important, therefore, to consider the antidotes to the 
possible shifts in the absolute power of the principle of the majority.  
The first consists of reinforcing anti-discrimination norms and institutions. European institutions in 
particular could take on an even more incisive role in the defence of liberal values in the European 
framework. 
The second antidote consists of supporting and activating civil societies. This requires educational 
investment, seats for debate and the opportunity for dialogue with the relevant political institutions. 
The third important response to the growth of policies of exclusion regards the need to give 
immigrants, their representatives and their association networks more say in matters. Those most 
affected by the issues often run the risk of being left out of the discussions that concern them. Like the 
emancipation of the working classes in the past, the battle for the respect for human rights, let alone 
for cultural pluralism, will depend on the degree to which minority groups under pressure manage to 
take control of their own destiny. 
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Chapter 3. Quests for recognition by Sámis, Silesians, Hungarians and 
Circassians 
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Introduction 
Western European states have so far generated various ways of dealing with their minorities be it 
ethnic, national, linguistic, or religious minorities. One needs to reveal the main features of the 
management of national minorities by the western states in order to decipher the perception of the 
claims of minorities. Management of cultural diversity in Western Europe has followed up the ways in 
which national minority claims have been perceived by the respective states. As regards the ways in 
which the modern states interpret minority claims, Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski (2002) make a 
two-fold separation: perceiving minority claims as a challenge for national security, or as a quest for 
justice and fairness. They argue that the claims of national minorities are assessed primarily in terms 
of justice in the West, and on the other hand they are assessed in terms of security in former Eastern 
and Central Europe.  
According to Kymlicka and Opalski (2002), while in the West the goal is to find an accommodation 
that is more or less fair to both majority and minority, in the East the goal is to ensure that minorities 
are unable to threaten the existence, or territorial integrity of the state. Accordingly, many democratic 
states accepted that justice requires some form of self-government for minorities, and most of non-
democratic states believed that self-government for minorities poses a threat against the state. In other 
words, Western states tend to consider the demands raised by ethno-national minorities as a matter of 
justice, which minorities have the legitimate right to enjoy as well. On the contrary, former Eastern 
and Central European states interpreted the demands vocalized by ethno-national minorities as a threat 
to the security of the state. The primary reason of treating minority claims in non-democratic countries 
as such is that minorities were believed to be collaborating with the neighboring countries (e.g. 
Serbians in Bosnia are believed to be collaborating with Serbia; or Kosovar Albanians with Albania). 
Apparently there is a great discrepancy between the two positions summarized above. Justice and 
fairness discourse on the one side, and loyalty and security discourse on the other. After making such a 
comparison, Kymlicka and Opalski (2002) state that the discourse of justice is of course more 
favourable than the security discourse. Then, what is to be done to refrain from the security discourse 
in the former Eastern and Central European countries? The answer to this question is easy: to 
desecuritize the discourse of minority rights by turning that into the discourse of justice and tolerance. 
However, the implementation of this answer seems rather to be a difficult task. Kymlicka and Opalski 
(2002) also try to explain if it is possible to export the western model of management of minority 
rights to relatively non-democratic countries. Making such a proposal, their assumptions were that 
Western European values have lately become dominant all around the world; Western discourse of 
justice is apparently more efficient; Western model would work well if adopted in the then candidate 
countries to the European Union; and Western model is quite logical and reasonable. They further 
claimed that it is possible to export the western model to other countries as well.  
The peculiarities of the Western model based on the discourse of justice and fairness are that the 
model has generally been competent enough in managing major minority claims, which are threefold: 
territorial autonomy, language claims, and institutional completeness (i.e. sustaining their own 
universities). At the beginning of the twentieth century, only Switzerland and Canada had adopted the 
combination for territorial autonomy and official language status for substate national groups. Since 
then, however, virtually all Western democracies with sizable substate nationalist movements have 
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moved in this direction. The list includes the adoption of autonomy for the Swedish-speaking Åland 
Islands in Finland after the World War I; autonomy for South Tyrol in Italy, and for Puerto Rico in the 
USA, after the World War II; federal autonomy for Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain in the 
1970s; for Flanders in Belgium in the 1980s; and most recently for Scotland, Wales and Corsica in the 
1990s. These changes correspond to the fact that Western democracies have turned out to be 
multinational federalisms in one way or another. The success of Western democracies does not only 
lie in granting minority groups the right to territorial autonomy, but also in granting them the right to 
enjoy their culture through bilingualism and universities. Consequently, what makes Western 
democracies more reasonable and successful is the right granted to minorities for effective political 
participation by eliminating the threshold system and letting almost all national minority groups 
mobilize along political lines. 
Former Eastern and Central European states respond rather distinctly to such minority demands. In 
Macedonia, the minority’s demand for a private university is considered as a threat to the existence of 
the state. For example, in East and Southeast Europe the objection to the idea of collective rights is 
that they can be invoked as a basis of secession, or a threat to national security. Any claim for 
territorial autonomy, minority language higher education, collective rights or official language status 
triggers the security discourse in the East. On the contrary, in the West, the concern with collective 
rights is that they can be invoked to supersede individual rights. In the West, quest for collective 
rights, or minority nationalisms, only become securitized when they involve terrorism, as in Northern 
Ireland or the Basque Country. As long as it remains peaceful and democratic, then minority 
nationalism is not securitized, even if it explicitly aimed at secession. Nonetheless, the Western ways 
of managing ethno-cultural and religious diversity should not be idealized and essentialized as there 
are also various examples, which can be translated into the denial of collective rights of various groups 
in the European countries. For instance one should remember the ways in which the Roma 
communities have been treated by the Sarkozy government in France in 2010, and the ways in which 
Muslim origin migrants and their descendants have been treated in several European countries. 
 
1. Multiple Forms of Managing Diversity 
In proposing the Western democracy as a model for the former East and Central European states, 
Kymlicka and Opalski (2002) actually keep in mind that minority nationalism discourse in search for 
secession has lately changed its colour. European Union has evidently displayed a stronger political  
unity since the Tindemans Report  submitted to the Commission in 1975, which prompted the member 
states to form a unified political entity with her own flag, antheme, myths, memories, regions, and 
rights and duties granted to the EU citizens.  Thus, an implicit assumption that Kymlicka and Opalski 
(2002) have in proposing to replace the Eastern discourse of security with the Western discourse of 
justice is that a strong European Union vision may encourage the national minorities in East and 
Southeast European countries not to challenge the state with secessionist or irredentist claims. Then, in 
return, the states can be expected to give up the discourse of security. The whole debate here 
corresponds to the discourse of ‘unity in diversity’.   
It is beneficial to substantiate the discourse of ‘unity-in-diversity’ by referring to the works of Will 
Kymlicka - a discourse which has dominated the ways in which most of the European countries have 
construed the claims of minorities including migrants and their descendants in the 1990s. There are 
several political philosophers who have recently tried to provide some conceptual and philosophical 
tools in order to lay out a framework around the discussions on diversity. As stated earlier, Will 
Kymlicka (1995), a liberal-communitarian, attempts to combine ideas of liberal democratic principles 
as a basis for a cohesive societal structure (unity) with recognition of communitarian rights for cultural 
minorities (diversity) within the multinational state (Unity-in-diversity). Kymlicka claims that 
collective rights for minority groups do not contradict the liberal notion of politics, as they are pivotal 
for enabling individual freedoms for the members of the minority group in question (Kymlicka, 1995: 
46).  
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On the other hand Brian Barry, a liberal, warns the reader about the cleavages springing from a 
multiculturalist approach, since respect for diversity threatens the unity necessary for promoting equal 
distribution among citizens. This is not wholly an economic issue, but also one of distributing equal 
rights. Barry points to the negative consequences of Kymlicka's emphasis on ‘group rights’ when it 
comes to sectarian religious groups. He argues that such groups could never be granted group specific 
rights, if the (liberal) state is to remain true to its ideal of impartiality and neutrality (Barry, 2001: 
165). This approach is characterized by a commitment, first, to basic liberal civil and political rights. 
Second, Barry endorses the idea of state neutrality or impartiality. Third, Barry’s position is egalitarian 
in the sense that his norm of equal treatment requires equalizing the resources that individuals possess 
in order to pursue their chosen goals. Fourth, his position underlines that claims made on behalf of 
culture cannot be justified in the name of liberal justice, and that the norm of equal treatment requires 
rights that are insensitive to those differences that multiculturalism prompts us to observe. His 
priorities lie at the rule of the majority with respect for individual rights over the principles of group-
centred multiculturalism, a kind of “Unity-over-diversity”. 
However, Iris Marion Young (2000: 215), a communitarian, questions this ‘unity’ as a necessary 
ground for a modern pluralistic society. Instead she promotes a ‘politics of difference’, which aims at 
recognizing cultural and social differentiation among people settled in a particular region. The people, 
then, do not necessarily need to share the same basic ideals; rather they ought to focus on reaching 
agreements and coalitions for political problem solving (Young, 2000: 216–217). In contrast to 
notions of segregation and even ideals of assimilative integration, Young (2000: 206) postulates a 
principle of ‘together-in-difference’. Young’s perspective is in tune with the Levinasian view 
proposing a deontological ethics to replace the ontological warfare between self and the other. The 
main rationale of this stance is to respect the uniqueness of the other without trying to assimilate 
him/her into mainstream culture. 
Kymlicka’s perspective of ‘unity-in-diversity’ stands somewhere between the two perspectives, 
namely ‘unity-over-diversity’ and ‘together-in-difference’. What Kymlicka implicitly proposes by 
‘unity-in-diversity’ is somewhat similar to what Charles Taylor offers by the model of ‘politics of 
difference’. Charles Taylor argues in favour of a dialogical model of justification based on the 
recognition of the uniqueness of collective identities. He calls this model the “politics of recognition” 
to distinguish it from the standard liberal model which he terms the "politics of equal dignity". He 
characterizes their difference as follows:  
"With the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical 
basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of recognition, what we are asked to recognize is the 
unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else. The idea is that it is 
precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority 
identity" (Taylor, 1994: 38).  
Thus, while the politics of equal dignity "fought for forms of non-discrimination that were quite 
‘blind’ to the ways in which citizens differ, the politics of difference often redefines non-
discrimination as requiring that we make these distinctions the basis of differential treatment" (Taylor, 
1994: 39). In other words, what Taylor calls ‘politics of equal dignity’ is identical with Brian Barry’s 
assimilationist perspective of ‘unity-over-diversity’.  
The example Taylor cites in defense of the politics of difference is that of the French speaking 
community of Quebec. They should be granted special rights and immunities so as to be able to 
preserve their unique collective identity and to maintain their cultural distinctness from the majority of 
English speaking Canada. Taylor’s model of the politics of recognition is neither neutral nor 
perfectionist: it rests on the Herderian presumption of equal worth, namely, that "all human cultures 
that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important 
to say to all human beings" (Taylor, 1994: 66). It is dialogic, insofar as it promotes cross-cultural 
exchange among different groups and collectivities. The aim of such an exchange is to enlarge our 
understanding of other cultures, so that we and they may learn something from the dialogic encounter. 
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The aim, in other words, is to achieve a "fusion of horizons" (Horizontverschmelzung), to use Hans 
Georg Gadamer (1999)’s well-known formulation, or in other words, to experience a “process of 
heterogenesis”, to use Guattari (1989)’s formulation.  
In what follows four different case studies will be discussed in a comparative way in order to find out 
the convergences and divergences between the ways in which Sámi minority claims are responded by 
the Swedish state, Silesian minority claims by the Polish state, Hungarian minority claims by the 
Romanian state, and Circassian diasporic claims by the Turkish state. What kinds of means, 
institutions and techniques do they use to raise their political claims? Who are they? How are they 
defined by their respective states? These are the questions to be answered in the first place. The 
comparison will be made in accordance with the data provided by four different teams who conducted 
their own individual studies using different research techniques ranging from discourse analysis of the 
official documents, speeches of politicians, media coverage of the relevant issues to interviewing the 
members of minority groups, politicians, scholars, journalists, and bureaucrats. 
 
2. Types of minorities? 
The term minority is a rather contested term. It has legal, political, sociological and anthropological 
connotations. Hence, the cases studies compared in this work display different characteristics with 
regard to the definition of the term minority. While Sámi minority in Sweden and Hungarian minority 
in Romania are legally defined minorities with the rights granted them with regard to their political 
representation at both local and national levels, Silesians in Poland and Circassians in Turkey are not 
accepted as legal minorities by their respective states.  
 
2.1. Sámi Minority in Sweden: 
The Swedish Sámi people were given a special status and constitutionally recognized as a minority for 
the first time by the Swedish Parliament in 2010 (SFS, 2010:1408).  In the introductory chapter it was 
stated that the “opportunities of the Sámi people and ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to 
preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own shall be promoted” (SFS, 1974: 152, Ch. 1, 
Art. 2). Already in 1993, however, the popularly elected Swedish Sámi Parliament (Sametinget) was 
established in order to grant cultural autonomy to the Sámi people, and today the parliament is 
considered to be the main body to ensure Sámi self-determination. In many ways, the situation and 
status of the Sámi people is highly acknowledged and recognized in Sweden through the Sámi 
Parliament. The Sámi people have also been granted special language and educational rights through 
Sweden´s ratification of the European framework conventions concerning the rights of national 
minorities. Members of the Sámi people are granted the right to communicate in their own language 
with courts and other important state authorities in the northern parts of Sweden where the bulk of the 
Sámi population are living. Sámis have been struggling for the following claims: to strengthen the 
Sámi culture, to raise the knowledge of their own language, to represent the interests of the hunting, 
fishing and reindeer industry and to increase the unity among the Sámi. 
However, the recognition of the Sámi people seems to be challenged, or undermined, by different 
forms of discrimination and intolerance in Sweden. For the first time in history, the Swedish state 
formulated an apology for the discrimination and injustice that the Sámi people had experienced 
throughout history by the Minister of Agriculture, Annika Åhnberg, in 1998. Questions of 
discrimination and injustice are still salient in the public debate. For instance, there have been several 
conflicts during the last few years on the right to use land and water for the maintenance of Sámi 
reindeer on private property, where the Swedish Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Sámi for the first 
time in the case of Nordmaling in 2011  (HD, 2011). In its decision, the Supreme Court also 
acknowledged that the Sámi people is indigenous, which means that the members of the group are the 
first inhabitants in the territories at stake. In addition to these conflicts, there have been severe 
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conflicts on the construction of wind power parks in traditional reindeer grazing areas. In its 
observations concerning how Sweden fulfils the conventions concerning the elimination of all forms 
of racial discrimination, the United Nations (UN) is regularly voicing concerns over these kinds of 
issues with regard to the fact that the issue of ownership of land and water has not yet been 
investigated (UN, 2004, Art. 12-14; UN, 2008, Art. 19-22).  
 
2.2. Hungarian Minority in Romania:  
Romanian population is composed of mostly ethnic Romanians (88.6 percent), Hungarians (6.5 
percent), Roma (1.7 percent) and some others groups. Hungarians constitute the largest national 
minority in Romania. After the Second World War, the Hungarians tried to integrate their minority 
status and obtain the individual and collective rights they were promised at the 1918 Union. The 
upsurge of the Communist regime in Romania brought about hope for the Hungarian minority. In 
1952, the Popular Republic was creating, under the pressure of Moscow’s autonomous policies, the 
Hungarian Autonomous Region, which was later cancelled in 1968 as a result of an 
administrative/territorial reorganization. After Bucharest abandoned Moscow’s policy favorable to 
minorities, Hungarians became "cohabitant nationalities" or "Hungarian-speaking Romanians", in 
other words, second class citizens. Although the Hungarian leaders continued to feature in the 
Communist party leadership until the fall of Communism (Pippidi, 2000), it did not spare the 
community of persecutions. The clustering and cancellation of Hungarian schools, the mandatory 
assignments after graduation from university, the change in the ethnic composition of Transylvania 
through the industrialization process, they are all the coordinates of Ceausescu’s assimilationist project 
(Andreescu, 2004; Gallagher, 1999).   
The Romanian revolution of December 1989 against the Communist regime, with its start in 
Timisoara by the persecutions of the secret police against a Hungarian pastor, meant a new starting 
point for the Hungarians to renegotiate their arrangements with the state: the negotiation of its status 
and the definition of the institutional framework meant to protect identity and administer it (Robotin, 
2005). The first and last violent Romanian – Hungarian inter-ethnic conflict burst in March 1990 in 
Targu Mures in the post-revolutionary confusion. The international background, Romania’s aspiration 
to accede to EU and NATO, as well as the domestic political events turned this process into a more 
refined one, if not actually entirely abandoned. Thus, the Hungarians gained significant political, 
cultural and linguistic rights.  
 
2.3. Silesians in Poland: 
Silesians have often been considered as a centrifugal force by the Polish state threatening the unity and 
security of Poland, and right-wing populist parties such as the Law and Justice Party have named them 
as “camouflaged German”. Silesia is a borderland region, and the Silesians attempted at creating an 
independent polity immediately after the WWI, and declaring their autonomy during the interwar 
period. Ethnographically speaking, Silesia was a trilingual, and prevailingly Catholic region. German 
was used in secular public spaces such as schools, offices, and business, while Polish was the language 
of religion. In everyday life and in their private spaces, Silesians usually used their own dialect, which 
constitutes a Slavic language permeated with many German words and often structured according to 
the German grammar. Being located at the border, Silesians experienced often harsh policies of both 
Polonisation and Germanisation since the World War I (Linek, 1999). 
Silesians are not recognized as an official minority by the Polish state. They have often been perceived 
as traitors and collaborators by the Polish nationalists. Silesians have become more outspoken during 
the European integration process of Poland in a way that has eased the declaration of ethno-cultural 
differences of minorities in public space. Popular reconstruction of the Silesian identity is also 
correlated with the growing impact of the internet, which makes the dissemination of identities 
Ayhan Kaya 
48 
possible across the national borders. Historically speaking, the Silesian minority in Poland has often 
been perceived by the Polish state as a threat against the national security, or as “camouflaged 
Germans” collaborating with Germany. The Law and Justice Party, which has a strong populist 
tendency, has openly portrayed them as traitors challenging the Polish national unity due to their 
ethno-cultural and linguistic claims.   
The communist past in Poland was repressive towards the politicization of ethno-cultural and religious 
claims of minority groups. However, several ethnic and religious organisations – most often called 
‘cultural associations’, had a centralised structure, and they were both financed and controlled by 
central authorities. Ethno-cultural and religious minorities were hardly perceptible in everyday life. In 
the process of democratic change they were allowed to form independent associations and express 
their identities. The Treaty with Germany signed in1991 gave political rights to the German minority 
who have self-organised themselves into various associations whose members had ‘miraculously’ 
risen to hundreds of thousands despite several waves of migrations in the past. Due to a special 
election law for ethnic minorities stating that ethnic organisations’ candidates do not have to meet the 
requirement of crossing a 5 percent threshold of votes nationwide in order to be elected to the 
parliament, as well as its concentration in the Opole region, this minority has managed to have its 
representatives in the lower chamber of parliament – Sejm. However, so far only German minority are 
able to mobilise themselves enough to have at least one representative in the national parliament.  
 
2.4. Circassian Diaspora in Turkey 
The term ‘minority’ has a delicate history in Turkey, as it often has negative connotations in the 
popular imagery. There are three legally recognized minorities in Turkey according to the Lausanne 
Treaty signed between Turkey and the Allied Powers in July 1923. Non-Muslims such as the Greeks 
(Roumi), Jews and Armenians were officially recognized as minorities. In Turkish popular memory, 
minorities are often believed to be the causes of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as they were 
believed to have collaborated with the European powers to dismantle the Empire. The best way to 
explain the sources of such a kind of scepticism and fear among the state elite vis-a-vis minorities is to 
refer to the “Sèvres Syndrome”, which is based on a fear deriving from the post-World War I era 
characterized with a popular belief regarding the risk of the break-up of the Turkish state (Öniş, 2004: 
12).    
Despite being a ‘constitutive element’ of the Turkish nation, the Circassians became subject to various 
discriminative policies in the nation-building process especially after the 1930s when the spectre of 
Fascism and National Socialism was roaming around in Europe. In the current Turkish political 
context, the Circassians, who have been mobilized along with ethno-cultural claims, protest against the 
suppressive and discriminative policies and practices implemented by the state throughout the history 
of the republic. By mobilizing through ethno-cultural associations, protests, conferences and 
campaigns, along with the other cultural minorities, the Circassians aspire to be one of the driving 
forces of the democratization process whereby they vocalize their claims for the elimination of 
discrimination against ethnic minorities, and for the respect for individual rights as well as for the 
cultural rights. Therefore, although the political mobilization of Circassians contributes to the 
democratic consolidation of Turkey, the Circassians cannot yet raise their voices through legitimate 
political channels as much as they wish to. Rather, the Circassian challenge vis-á-vis the nation-state is 
prevalently handled by the government policies making a specific reference to all-encompassing 
principles and concepts such as constitutional citizenship, equal citizenship rights, and respect and 
recognition for cultural differences.     
Since the deepening of the European integration process in the early 2000s, the Circassians have 
become more vocal in raising their claims on the recognition of their right to education in mother 
tongue, recognition of their ethno-cultural identity, right to dual citizenship, recognition of their 
contribution to the foundation of the Republic made by the politicians, military officers and 
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bureaucrats of Caucasus origin, and removal of descriptions of Çerkes Ethem as a “traitor” from 
school textbooks (Bilmez, 2011; Yılmaz, 2011). Circassian claims for constitutional citizenship, 
recognition and respect, and the government’s initiative for a constitutional reform and legal 
arrangements to secure political and cultural rights can be categorized as a good example of 
accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity challenge referring to tolerance in political life.   
 
3. Types of institutions to present minority claims? 
Case studies also differ in accordance with the types of institutions presenting their claims in public 
space. As the Sámis and Hungarians are officially recognized minorities they have the local and 
national parliamentary facilities to present their claims. However, the Silesians and Circassians 
generate some civic, cultural and folkloric associations to present their claims to the state. European 
integration process, transnational networks and internet also become strategically important for both 
communities to raise their claims in public space. Unlike the Circassians, the Silesians are inclined to 
generate political movements aiming at cultural, educational and linguistic autonomy.  
 
3.1. Sámis in Sweden 
Contemporary Sámi policy has its origins in the politics formulated during the end of the 19th century 
around an image of the Sámi as reindeer herders, and a belief that they were physically adapted to this 
industry and unable to support themselves through any other profession. In the changing political 
climate in the aftermath of World War II, the Sámi were to be assimilated into and integrated in the 
full-blown Swedish welfare state. Moreover, by the formation in 1950 of the first national Sámi 
organization, Svenska Samernas Riksförbund (SSR), the Sámi movement was strengthened. SSR 
challenged the Swedish policy in their claims that the Sámi had older usage of the land than the 
Swedish state, and that Sámi reindeer herding was based on the Sámi rights to land and water. During 
the 1960’s SSR started to justify Sámi rights in their capacity of being an indigenous people. 
Sámi Parliament was established in 1993. The newly formed parliament was given both an 
administrative and a representative status. The idea behind this construction was to guarantee the 
cultural autonomy of the Sámi people, while making obvious to them that the parliament was not 
completely autonomous. However, with the status as an administrative authority, the parliament is not 
granted any actual political power, such as a right of participation in decision-making, veto-rights 
concerning administrative decisions, or independent sources of income. The parliament’s opportunity 
to act on its own initiative is thus limited by the grants from the Swedish state, and as an 
administrative authority it ought to observe objectivity.  
 
3.2. Hungarians in Romania: 
Hungarian minority is mainly represented by the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 
(DAHR). The organization was established in December 1989 for the purpose of “defending and 
representing Hungarian community’s interests”. As a parliamentary and as a ruling party, DAHR 
initiated and contributed to the law-making process that resulted in the improvement of the Hungarians 
and of other minorities’ status. The Hungarians, as well as the other minorities, obtained the right to 
association, to participation and representation on a national and local level, the right to signage in 
mother tongue in the localities and counties where the minority reaches, or exceeds, 20 percent of the 
population, to use mother tongue in the local public administration, in justice and in relation to the 
state institutions from the localities where minority reaches or exceeds 20 percent of the population, 
and the right to education in the mother tongue on all education levels, including universities. 
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3.3. Silesians in Poland: 
Silesians are very much engaged in the activities of the Ruch Autonomii Śląska (RAS, the Silesian 
Autonomy Movement), which is a regional organization with an educational, cultural and political 
profile fighting for the restoration of the regional autonomy of Upper Silesia based on historical 
grounds. RAS's activities are primarily based on the Internet, which is an extremely popular tool 
reshaping the Silesian identity at both national and transnational level disseminating the Silesian 
claims to those Silesians residing across the national borders such as Germany. There are virtually no 
printed versions of the charter of the organisation, no flyers or manifestos – a very broad access to the 
Internet in Silesia has prospered the RAS, which would be otherwise difficult due to the lack of 
external funding. 
RAS, an officially registered organisation, has a clearly defined political aim of creating an 
autonomous region in Poland. In 2011, RAS became successful in local elections and entered the 
ruling coalition in the local parliament of Górny Śląsk/Upper Silesia voivodship. This success and a 
coalition with the local branch of the currently nationwide ruling party, the Civic Platform / Platforma 
Obywatelska, stirred discussions about the administrative and political constitution of Poland, the 
ethnic composition of the ‘nation’, and the limits of democracy and tolerance. RAS members have so 
far raised their arguments, opinions and discourses with a persistent reference to the turbulent past, but 
with a tangible focus on the constitutional democracy meeting all formal standards of the European 
Union. What is also remarkable for the Silesian minority is the ways in which they try to mobilize the 
transnational Silesian communities who live across their national borders, particularly Silesian migrant 
communities residing in Germany. 
 
3.4. Circassians in Turkey: 
Circassians have so far been mobile in public space by means of their ethno-cultural associations. The 
rise of the number of ethnic associations (derneks) in the urban space indicates that they often use such 
means to raise their cultural and political claims. Ethnic associations provide diasporic subjects with a 
safe haven from capitalist urban life. All associations in every city are alike. Each has similar aims 
such as organizing language courses, cultural evenings, folk dances and trips to the homeland. Ethnic 
associations play an instrumental role in the processes of construction and articulation of Circassian 
diasporic identity. Historically speaking, Dost Eli Yardimlasma Dernegi (1946), Kuzey Kafkasya 
Kültür Derneği (Northern Caucasia Culture Association, 1964), Kafkas Derneği (Kaf-Der, Caucasian 
Association, 1993), Kafkas Vakfı (the Caucasian Foundation, 1995) and Birleşik Kafkasya Derneği 
(the United Caucasian Association, 1995), and Kaf-Fed (Kafkas Dernekleri Federasyonu, Federation 
of Caucasian Associations, 2004). Nowadays, there are approximately 80 different associations 
throughout the country. 
Circassians have recently become more politicized due to their rising expectations from the European 
integration process of Turkey, which has become more intensive since 1999 Helsinki Summit of the 
EU. Circassian associations try to refrain themselves from using a minority discourse due to the 
negative connotations of the term in the Turkish context. Instead, they underline the efforts of their 
forefathers in the establishment of the Turkish Republic as the “constitutive elements” of the nation 
similar to the Turks, Kurds and Alevis. Circassian associations such as Kaf-Der and Democratic 
Circassian Platform abandoned minority politics in the early 2000s to contribute to the 
democratization process of Turkey on the way to the European Union. As known, the post-Helsinki 
period was very decisive in the expansion of societal movements ranging from employers’ 
associations to labour unions, or from ethnic groups to religious groups. Kurds, Alevis, Circassians, 
Armenians, Romans and Assyrians are some of these groups that vocalized their concerns in the 
aftermath of the Helsinki Summit. Such attempts were consequential in weakening the oppressive 
hegemony of the Turkish state vis-à-vis non-Sunni, non-Turkish, and/or non-Muslim groups.  
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One of the important elements which differentiate the Circassian diasporic communities from the 
former indigenous communities is the ways in which they have recently discovered the power of 
transnationalizing their cause in order to make a pressure on the Turkish state for extending political 
and cultural rights to the Circassians. European Parliament and the Council of Europe have become 
important venues for the Circassian diaspora to express their concerns in international platform. 
Transnational connections and global communication channels have shaped the ways in which 
Circassian diaspora have recently started to raise their claims in a way that transcends the hegemonic 
power of their countries of settlement such as Turkey.  Circassians are no longer content with the ways 
in which they are perceived by the Turkish state. They want to be recognized by the Turkish state as a 
collective group, but not only as individuals. The research also reveals that transnationalization of the 
Circassian social movements and the use of the social media impact the ways in which their claims are 
recently being raised in a way that challenges the traditional patriarchal structure of the Circassian 
communities. 
 
4. Their perceptions by the states? 
Finally, a third way of making comparison among these cases is to see the dynamics of recognition 
and mobilization of their claims. One should try to understand if these minority groups (a) are not 
tolerated and discriminated, hence they mobilize themselves for the search of tolerance and 
acceptance; or (b) if they are socially and culturally accepted minorities who are mobilizing 
themselves for the search of political recognition through the right to self-determination, or 
incorporation into the institutions; or (c) if they are already institutionally recognized and respected 
minorities, who are mobilizing themselves to halt social-economic discrimination, or the deterioration 
of their situation. It seems that the Sámis and the Hungarians fit into the third category as they are 
officially recognized, but still exposed to discrimination and intolerance. However, their political 
integration does not necessarily mean that they are note discriminated by the state and society. The 
Silesians fit into the second category as they are in search of political recognition. On the other hand, 
the Circassians seem to be fitting into the first category as they are in search of recognition and respect 
by the state. 
 
4.1. Sámis in Sweden: 
In spite of the demonstration of acceptance on a national and constitutional level, an intolerant and 
stereotypical understanding of the Sámi people seem to prevail. The research conducted on the 
representation of the Sámi shows that the Sámi are still being discriminated by the state and society in 
general. The analysis shows that the media discourse has both direct and indirect consequences for the 
political representation of the Sámi, delimiting their recognised right to self-determination. Directly, it 
affects the construction of a Sámi public sphere, indispensable for the parliament to function in its role 
as a representative body. The news reporting is limited in scope as it privileges reporting on internal 
conflicts and individual behaviour and tend to neglect or ignore fundamental political problems of the 
Sámi people, thus it contributes to a de-politicisation of Sámi politics. Furthermore, it contributes to a 
conception of the parliament as problematic and dysfunctional, thereby undermining the potential 
level of trust of its constituency. Indirectly, the emphasis on the democratic and administrative 
immaturity of the Sámi parliament reproduces stereotypical images of the Sámi as unable to handle 
their own affairs, thus framing the problem in a specific way and limiting the range of possible 
political options for the Sámi. 
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4.2. Hungarians in Romania: 
Despite the fact that Hungarian minority in Romania is politically integrated, they are still accused by 
the Romanian nationalists of generating a dual loyalty towards Romania and Hungary. That is why, in 
public imagery they are not seen as trustworthy citizens, being more attached to their own ethnicity 
than to the Romanian state. Furthermore, Romanian majority have generated some fears about the 
Hungarian minority with regard to their irredentist inclinations towards the neighboring country, 
Hungary. Despite the entry of Romania into the EU in 2007, conflicts between the Romanian majority 
and the Hungarian minority have not yet calmed down. One should not also underestimate the impact 
of the Hungarian state on the Hungarian minority in Romania. The passage of a citizenship law by 
Orban government in Budapest now enables the Romanian Hungarians to acquire Hungarian 
citizenship; the escalation of claims by relatively small but highly vocal groups of local Hungarian 
politicians of a special status in the counties of Harghita, Covasna, and Mures in Szeklers Land also 
reinforces Hungarian minority nationalism; and eventually the representative office of the Szekler land 
in Brussels in 2011 contributes to the dissemination of Hungarian claims across the national borders. 
 
4.3. Silesians in Poland: 
Primarily because of the trauma of the past, the Polish state is still far away from identifying the 
Silesians as an officially recognized minority. The Polish Parliament accepted the Act on Minorities in 
2005, making a distinction between ethnic minorities and national minorities. A national minority is a 
group: a) less numerous than the rest of the state’s inhabitants; b) differentiated by language, culture or 
tradition and aiming to maintain the differentiation; c) possessing consciousness of a historical 
national community; d) inhabiting Polish territory for at least 100 years; e) and identifying with the 
nation organized in a state. Several groups were defined as national minority including Germans, 
Belarussians, Ukranians and Lithuanians but not Silesians. Similar to all these national minorities, 
Silesians also use their right to organise themselves. However, the paradox is that Silesians are not 
recognised by the authorities as a minority.  
 
4.4. Circassians in Turkey: 
Circassians embody one of the largest ethno-cultural minorities living in Turkey. Though they are not 
legally defined as a minority like the non-Muslim minorities (Jews, Greek-Rums, and Armenians), 
sociologically and anthropologically they constitute a minority. So far, they have not been considered 
by the majority society to be facing any major obstacle since their arrival in Anatolia in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century. However, recent studies carried out in Turkey demonstrate that it is not only 
the non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevis who have been subject to a kind of structural exclusion with 
regard to having equal access to political and cultural rights, but also the Circassians have been 
through the discriminatory acts of the state and the majority society since the early days of the 
Republic in 1920s (Kutay, 2004).  
Circassians have been exposed to some acts of discrimination by the Turkish state, and that while 
having a strong orientation towards their homeland most of the Circassian population in Turkey still 
feel themselves to be guests (Ülker, 2007; Kaya, 2004 and 2005). The fact that the voices of the 
Circassians have not been heard so far in the public space reflects to some extent the power of both 
formal and popular majority nationalisms to which they have been subject. The current Turkish state 
policies generated to respond to the Circassian claims cannot be considered as a discourse and practice 
of respect and recognition. On the contrary, the policies of the contemporary government (Justice and 
Development Party, AKP) spring from a discourse of toleration towards the Circassians, who are 
actually in search of a constitutional citizenship, equality, and respect with regard to their ethno-
cultural differences. The state actors are not yet tolerant towards the politicization of minority claims 
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as in the case of the Circassians. However, cultural and folkloric forms of representations 
demonstrated by ethno-cultural minorities are tolerated by the Turkish state.  
 
Conclusions 
Four case studies display various characteristics, which are sometimes converging, sometimes 
diverging, with each other. Swedish case study reveals that Sámis have so far gained a full-fledged 
right to political representation in both national and local levels. However, Sámis are still far from 
experiencing an egalitarian treatment by the state, society and media as they are still being 
stereotypically coupled with backwardness, bad-temperedness, and being traditional. It seems that 
Sámis still need the parental authority and benevolent tolerance of the Swedish state and society to be 
able to raise their claims through legitimate political grounds, which are believed to be far from being 
internalized by the Sámis. On the other hand, the Silesians in Poland, the Hungarians in Romania, and 
the Circassians in Turkey face similar problems when they raise their claims in regard to the ways in 
which they are perceived by the respective states. Their cultural and political claims encounter a 
relatively strong resistance of the state due to the common stereotypes produced about the minorities, 
who are believed to be challenging the security and indivisibility of the nation, which is based on a 
myth of homogeneity.  
Rather than perceiving the claims raised by ethno-cultural minorities as a quest for justice and 
equality, Poland, Romania and Turkey are more inclined to perceive them as a challenge against 
national unity, which was believed to be secured by the majority against all the odds deriving from 
former neighbouring colonial powers. Circassians set out a different example in the sense that they are 
a diasporic kind of community, whose cultural and political claims have also become more vocalised 
during the European integration process of Turkey in a similar way to the rise of the claims of 
Silesians and Hungarians as an outcome of the transformative power of the European Union. The 
research indicates that Silesian and Circassian claims have become more outspoken in line with the 
European integration of Poland and Turkey. EU is certainly perceived as an anchor by these 
communities, which help them raise their cultural and political claims through democratic forms of 
participation in politics.  
Hungarian claims in Romania and Silesian claims in Poland are partly perceived by the state as acts of 
secessionism and irredentism. Historical conflicts between Germany and Poland on the one hand, and 
Hungary and Romania on the other hand, are still being reproduced by some of the state actors in a 
way that securitizes those minority claims. However, technological innovations such as the internet 
make it easier now for the dissemination of those claims in and across the national boundaries. 
Silesians and Circassians efficiently use these tools in order to make their voices heard in transnational 
space, thus to make an impact on the decision making processes of the respective states. Transnational 
element seems to be one of the driving forces of those minorities that are not yet recognized by their 
states as officially recognized minorities. 
To recapitulate, one could make a comparison among these four cases in several different ways. First 
of all, these cases can be compared with regard to the nature of their claims for autonomy, equality, 
justice and fairness. It is displayed that the Silesians and Hungarians raise their claims along with a 
quest for autonomy, the Sámis and Circassians raise their claims along with political, cultural and 
economic lines in order to acquire equality and justice vis-à-vis the majority nation. Secondly, it 
becomes apparent that these cases are also comparable with regard to the patterns of mobilization 
which they generate through either international resources, or new technologies such as Internet, or 
elite or grass-root politics. The Silesians, Hungarians and Circassians have certainly become 
politically more active along with the European integration process of their states. Silesians and 
Circassians have also used internet to a great degree to vocalize their claims across the boundaries of 
the nation-states, and to make their claims heard by the international community. Sámi claims are 
rather expressed by the newly emerging Sámi elite. The ways in which the aforementioned minorities 
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are perceived by their respective states and majority nations differ to a great extent. It seems that the 
Sámis and Circassians are perceived by their respective states as the constitutive elements of the 
Swedish and Turkish national identities, whereas Hungarians and Silesians are not due to their 
ambiguous loyalty to the state.  
Eventually, one could observe that there are two competing forms of managing diversity in the 
European countries: multiculturalist form, and republicanist form. The former corresponds to the 
‘unity-in-diversity’ approach, which recognizes ethno-cultural, linguistic, national and religious 
differences of minorities. The latter translates into the ‘unity-over-diversity’ approach, which is 
difference blind and assimilationist. It seems that the EU is going to continue to be witnessing the 
competition between these two models, each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages for 
the minority communities. It is not easy to estimate the winner of this race. However, what is certain is 
that the democratic consolidation in the European space depends on the states’ capacity and ability to 
interpret the minority claims as a quest for justice and fairness, but not as a challenge against the 
national security.  
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Chapter 4. Minority Mobilisations in France and the United Kingdom: the 
Case of Muslim Organisations 
Angéline Escafré-Dublet and Jan Dobbernack 
 
 
 
Introduction 
France and the United Kingdom allegedly display contrasting opportunity structures with regards to 
the political mobilisation and representation of post-immigration minority interests. In line with its 
pluralist ‘national model’, British politics is said to embrace group representation and to endorse 
ethno-religious identities as legitimate basis for mobilisation. By contrast, French politics is seen to 
confine identities to the private sphere and to only allow for the representation of general concerns. 
While such characterisations have some basis in reality, stark contrasts between the two country cases 
appear overdrawn. Individual cases of minority-mobilisation reveal pressures that exist in both 
countries as well as opportunities for migration-related minorities to insert themselves into political 
life. This report considers and contrasts Muslim mobilisations around the British General Election of 
2010 and the mobilisation during debates about laïcité in France as examples of minority claims-
making in two “old immigration countries”. 
The report focuses on minority organisations and their attempts to articulate claims in the national 
context. In ‘multiculturalist’ Britain, minority representatives can be portrayed as divisive and in 
‘integrationist’ France, organisations struggle to make their claims seem acceptable in Republican 
terms. Their ability to express specific concerns as members of minorities may be considered as an 
indicator of the level of acceptance within each country’s political life. Yet organisations also seek to 
test and extend the boundaries of acceptance. We will argue that in each national case study, minority 
organisations face the challenge of particularism by highlighting the compatibility of their claims with 
the respective national framework. Rather than considering the level of acceptance as a given, this 
report suggests that it should be explored as a result of interactions, symbolic claims and the extension 
of boundaries in which minority organisations are often centrally involved. 
First, the report identifies the differences between French and British political opportunity structures. 
Second, it briefly presents each case. Third, it discusses the implication of each analysis for an 
assessment of tolerance in each country. 
 
1. Background Elements  
 
1.1. Political participation and citizenship 
Full political rights in Britain as in France are secured by obtaining citizenship. In both countries this 
currently requires a minimum of five years legal residence. By international standards, these formal 
requirements are seen to be fairly liberal. The comparatively easy access to British citizenship has 
increasingly been regarded as a problem and measures to make naturalisation conditional upon 
command of the English language and knowledge of British history and culture were introduced. In 
France, naturalisation is conditional upon a criterion of assimilation. Until recently, this was assessed 
by an administrative officer during a meeting with the applicant. Since July 2012, all applicants must 
pass a French language and culture test (decree 2011-1265 of 11 October 2011).  
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In France, 40% of the foreign-born population hold French citizenship and are thus eligible to vote. In 
the UK, immigrants coming from former British colonies (India, Pakistan and the Caribbean) are a 
special case: they were eligible to vote in national parliamentary elections upon their arrival (even 
though immigration flows coming from this area were restricted starting 1962). In comparison with 
France and other post-colonial migration countries (such as Belgium or the Netherlands), the United 
Kingdom has one of the highest ethnic minority populations with a right to vote in Europe (Cracknell 
2012).  
Despite significant mobilizations of British South Asians for labour rights, political participation 
among British minority groups remained low in the immediate aftermath of their arrival. Yet in recent 
years there have been significant civil society mobilizations with ethnic minority involvement. Even 
within formal politics, there has been some movement. For the first time, ethnic minority turnout at the 
British General Election 2010 exceeded the majority average. By contrast, despite significant 
mobilisation for immigrant rights in the 1970s and 1980s in France, the participation of immigrants 
and descendants of immigrants in France remains low. Surveys demonstrate the low rates of voter 
registration among French people with immigrant parents as opposed to those with no immigrant 
background (Richard 1998). 
 
1.2 Political representation  
Recently, there has been some effort made to increase the number of ethnic minority representatives in 
British politics. The first six non-white MPs in post-war Britain were elected in 1986. The 
Westminster parliament now includes 27 ethnic minority MPs, the House of Lords 48 peers, Scottish 
Parliament 28 MSPs and the Welsh Assembly 2 AMs. Minority representation in local government 
has remained relatively stable, between 3% and 4% (Parsons 2009; Cracknell 2012). In France, the 
National Assembly includes 10 minority MPs in 2012, that is 1,8% of the total MPS for an estimated 
12% of the population with an immigrant background. Even though this is a notable increase as 
compared with 2002, when only one representative of the National Assembly was non-white, France is 
evidently still lagging behind the UK or the Netherlands where minority members represent 8% of the 
lower chamber. 
Minority representatives in France and the UK are mainly left-wing. All minority deputies in the 
French National Assembly belong to the Socialist Party. As for British minority MPs, most of them 
are Labour MPs although the number of Conservative MPs is increasing. Historically, there was a 
clear alignment of interests between Labour and immigrant groups, and the Labour Party became the 
near-exclusive entry point for ethnic minority citizens into politics well into the 1980s.  
Some disenchantment in particular about Labour’s foreign policy record has made this link appear 
more tenuous. Labour’s Roy Hattersley remarked that up to 1997 when he “heard of a Khan, Saleem 
or Iqbal who did not support Labour I was both outraged and astonished.” Such assumptions about 
political loyalties have been put into question in particular by considerable disenchantment among 
Muslims about Labour’s foreign policy record. Other parties increasingly appeal to ethnic minority 
constituents and at the 2012 election the Conservatives increased their non-white MPs from 2 to 11. 
As for France, President Sarkozy decided to appoint a number of minority politicians to his 2007 
government (Rachida Dati, Justice Minister; Rama Yade, Human Rights State Secretary and Fadela 
Amara, Urban Development State Secretary); yet these appointments were short-lived. In the last 
presidential campaign, Sarkozy’s UMP avoided any discussion about the political representation of 
minorities. As for President François Hollande, he appointed seven minority government members out 
of 38 that is 20% (notably: Christiane Taubira, Justice Minister; Najat Valaud Belkacem, Women’s 
Rights Minister and Victorin Hurel, Overseas Minister). He made a point in respecting a gender 
balance in the formation of the government (19 women and 19 men) so as to respect parity and to 
increase the representation of diversity in the government in comparison with the Sarkozy government 
of 2007. 
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1.3 Political claims-making  
French and British political structures display contrasting features with regard to political claims-
making on the basis of ethnic minority identities. There is no general rule in Britain that would prevent 
minority groups from articulating specific concerns, although it may well be the case that such 
mobilizations on the basis of ethno-religious minorities will be negatively perceived and thus remain 
unsuccessful. 
France is certainly more averse to ethnic demands. Article 1 of the 1958 French constitution states that 
the Republic: “shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law regardless of their origin” and 
this has been generally understood as invalidating any mobilisation on the basis of ethnic or religious 
belonging. In Britain, the Labour Party has been a vehicle for post-immigration groups to articulate 
their interests. Although Labour provided channels into formal politics, it has not unconditionally 
welcomed ethnic minority assertiveness and minority politicians within Labour often faced 
accusations of sectarianism and generally needed to undertake additional efforts in order to 
demonstrate their concern for the ‘common good’. In both countries, ethnic minority mobilizations 
face comparable obstacles that pertain to the fundamental challenges of identity politics: the difficulty 
to conciliate the defence of particular interests with the universal ideal of liberal democracy.  
In France, despite the difficulty to articulate ethnic claims, there has been a tradition of mobilisation in 
immigrant-based organisations. They have learned to articulate their claim in terms that are acceptable 
in the French Republican context, by avoiding to being specific and by appealing to French common 
values. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, specific interests can be articulated. In practice political 
elite still consider ethnic minority assertiveness as threatening and minority politicians can be 
suspected as particularistic or sectarian. Minority representatives need to undertake extra efforts to 
convince the majority that they are not only serving the interest of their co-ethnics. Thus, despite 
different conditions in each country, minorities face the similar challenge that their ‘identity politics’ 
is suspected of threatening the common good. This creates pressures and particular conditions for their 
political agency, which are explored in the following. 
 
2. Muslim Mobilisations in France and the UK: Two Case Studies 
 
2.1 Justification for the case studies 
Both case studies deal with minority mobilisations. In France, the mobilisation around the issue of 
laïcité was selected as an exemplary case for situations where organisations cannot openly express 
their religious belonging (namely their identity as Muslim) and, thus, mobilise around the French 
value of laïcité to articulate their concern over Muslim discrimination in France. In the UK, the focus 
on initiatives that mobilized British Muslim constituents in the run-up to the General Election 2010 
allows analysing a situation where Muslim advocacy groups struggle to repudiate misperceptions of 
Muslim claims as sectarian and impossible to accommodate. Although the two mobilisations take 
place within contrasting political frameworks, both cases explore how minority actors challenge 
narrow boundaries of acceptance that threaten to exclude what they consider to be legitimate demands. 
Both cases in question thus involve claims for acceptance as well as the attempt to redefine standards 
of acceptability so that it will become possible to legitimately make political demands.  
 
2.2 The Muslim Vote in the British Election of 2010: Misrecognition and Political Agency 
The case study explores how different mobilizing organisations that specifically addressed Muslim 
voters conceive of a number of issues, such as the act of political representation, the ‘Muslim vote’, 
and significant concerns about political neutrality and partisanship. It draws on in-depth interviews 
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with significant actors of the mobilisation of Muslim voters in 2010, focusing on the construction of 
political messages and strategic considerations. Organisations and initiatives investigated are the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) for its ‘Muslim Vote 2010’ campaign, the Muslim Public Affairs 
Committee (MPAC), Operation Black Vote (OBV), Engage and the Youelect initiative. 
The case study provides an account of the environment for Muslim agency in British politics. 
Although political rights for British post-immigration groups have long been established, their 
participation in mainstream politics is not unproblematic. Minority citizens that run for elections or 
highlight issues of concern for their communities often do so cautiously. Muslim political actors are 
faced with special circumstances as their claims are seen to be exceptional, potentially sectarian and 
impossible to accommodate. 
The analysis draws on the concept of misrecognition, which has recently been appropriated for 
identity claims by post-immigration communities (Meer 2012). Misrecognition is understood as a 
distortion that may be based on a partially correct perception but which ignores features that are 
important to the group in question. It reflects a significant dissonance between how an individual or 
collective identity is experienced and how it is socially understood and acted upon. When it 
systematically shapes the experience of particular social groups with shared ‘interpretive frames’ and 
claims for (a particular type of) recognition, misrecognition can motivate collective action.  
Three contested issues invited particular reflexivity by Muslim advocacy groups and illustrate how 
they respond to the experience of misrecognition. Firstly, among the actors of the 2010 mobilization 
there was a measure of concern regarding dilemmas of the representation. This concern was about the 
way Muslim political actors felt boxed in: they felt that they were either forced to abjure their 
Muslimness in favour of more encompassing political identities, or that they were only visible as 
Muslim actors and thus unable to articulate claims on the basis of other identities, next to their 
religious identity, that were as important to them. 
The notion of the ‘Muslim Vote’, and how organizations consider or problematize its weight and 
coherence, highlights a second challenge. Their aspiration is to ‘normalize’ the participation of British 
Muslims – to emphasize that a ‘block vote’ no longer exists or to argue that block-like voting instincts 
need to be overcome in favour of informed political decision-making. At the same time, respondents 
are apprehensive about what they consider to be the disempowering effects of an individualizing 
perspective on shared concerns and identities. They suggest that Muslim identity politics is usually 
perceived as markedly different from other types of political mobilizations that highlight shared 
concerns or identities.  
Thirdly, how to forge relationships with mainstream parties and candidates is a concern among 
Muslim political actors. Some organisations see themselves as ‘service facilitators’ and refrain from 
offering recommendations on who to vote for as this would contradict their idea of self-reliance and 
sophistication among Muslim voters. Others offer specific advice and recommendations on the basis 
of evaluations of candidates’ policy record. With such considerations the organisations respond to a 
problematic environment for political positioning where mainstream actors consider Muslim claims to 
be toxic and refuse to associate with them.  
The case study thus identifies five types of misrecognition of Muslim claims that can be identified as 
distinctive topoi in the rhetoric of various advocacy organisations.  
1. Misrecognising Muslim identity politics as markedly different in kind to other identity 
politics (Muslim claims are exceptional) 
2. Misrecognition the dynamic positioning and complexity of Muslim identities and concerns 
(Muslim claims are homogenous) 
3. Misrecognising Muslim agency as purely reactive, grievance-based of pariah politics 
(Muslim claims are reactions to stigma) 
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4. Misrecognising Muslims concerns not compatible with an orientation towards the common 
good (Muslim claims are sectarian) 
5. Misrecognising Muslim political actors as toxic and refusing political association (Muslim 
claims are exclusive) 
 
Perhaps most significantly, Muslim political actors see the diversity of opinion within their diverse 
community scarcely acknowledged and find themselves suspected of sectarianism and other problems 
that are associated, often wrongly, with the political agency of post-immigration groups. While some 
groups assert themselves against such misperceptions, it is more common for actors to counteract 
misrecognition by emphasizing the compatibility of their ideas with elements of the mainstream 
political framework. The emphasis on the civic maturity and sophistication of Muslim voters is one 
such example. The Muslim Council of Britain consistently highlights its ‘main goal’ of ‘working 
towards the common good’.  
 
2.3. Minority Claims of Laïcité in the French Republican Context 
The case study explores how minority organisations adopted the notion of laïcité to defend their 
interests. Laïcité is the French understanding of secularism that ensures the strict separation of church 
and state, and confines religious expressions to private matters. It is considered as a Republican value. 
However, the discussion of laïcité has been repeatedly used to respond to the perceived growth of 
religious diversity in France, and more specifically to the challenge of Islam. This was the case in 
2004 when a law in the name of the principle of laïcité banned the wearing of the Islamic veil in 
French public school . This was also the case in 2011 when Interior Minister Eric Besson decided to 
launch what he called an “Official Debate on Islam”: the debate was quickly relabelled an “Official 
Debate on Laïcité”.  
In response to such uses of the term, minority organisations such as immigrant-based associations or 
Muslim organisations, struck back with a mobilisation in “defence of laïcité”. They argued that the 
governmental use of the principle was a distortion of its original meaning and was not protective of 
religious freedom. For instance, a collective of associations – including Muslim associations – 
gathered on 2 April 2011 to demonstrate against the “Official Debate on Laïcité”. It is interesting to 
note that minority activists chose not to oppose laïcité but rather to reclaim laïcité and therefore 
articulate their demand in Republican terms.  
The case study investigates claims of organisations that mobilised in relation to the issue of laïcité in 
general. They include old organisations that addressed this issue (The Human Rights League and the 
Education League) and new organisations that encompass activists with an immigrant background: 
organisations that are specifically mobilised against the passing of restrictive laws pertaining to laïcité  
(All Equal Moms); organisations whose mobilisation on the issue of laïcité is part of a larger objective 
to defend Islam and French people associated with the Muslim faith ( Collective Against Islamophobia 
in France, Coordination against Racism and Islamophobia, Muslim Participation and Spirituality). 
However, such mobilisations generally involve few people and some activists participate in several of 
these organisations. 
The case study consisted in interviewing activists about their understanding of laïcité as a value and if 
they saw laïcité as a necessary frame to articulate minority-related claim in the French context. The 
point was not to define laïcité through these interviews, but rather to analyse the discursive and 
strategic use of the notion as a means for mobilisation. By applying discourse-analytical methods with 
the aim to identify interpretative frames for claims-making, the case study led to the following 
findings: 
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Minority organisations that are mobilised on the issue of Muslim discrimination and anti-Islam 
discourse articulate their claim for equal treatment in terms of laïcité to make themselves heard in the 
French context. Although Muslim people in general may be reluctant to adopt the notion (perceived as 
anti-religious and also systematically used by the media to condemn their practices), Muslim activists 
identify laïcité as a French tradition and use it to render their mobilisation compatible with French 
political life. Beyond the strategic use of the term laïcité to articulate claims in Republican terms, 
minority organisations are reclaiming laïcité and participating in a larger discussion on the definition 
of the notion and its link with the fundamental value of religious freedom.  
In this discussion, they are joined by majority organisations such as human rights associations and 
feminist groups. How did this happen? In fact, the initial framing of the first headscarf affair of 1989 
was essential in linking the issue of Islam with laïcité and feminism. The wearing of the veil was 
interpreted as a sign of religious extremism and the oppression of women, which prompted 
organisations to mobilize for the defence of laïcité and women’s rights, respectively. However, with 
the growing stigmatisation of Islam and the systematic use of laïcité to pass laws restricting the 
practice of Islam, some defenders of laïcité and feminist activists shifted their position to rally behind 
Muslim organisations and denounce an intolerant interpretation of laïcité.  
French feminist positioning on the issue of laïcité is complex. Most French feminists support a 
restrictive interpretation of laïcité because they interpret the wearing of an Islamic veil as a sign of 
discrimination against women. Only a limited number of feminist activists contest the manipulation of 
a discourse on laïcité to discriminate Muslim women and situate the issue at the intersection of gender 
and racial discrimination. 
What is more, by rendering their mobilisation adapted to the French context, Muslim organisations 
have contributed to the articulation of a Muslim consciousness. They are highlighting the specificity of 
a Muslim identity in France and the post-colonial construction of Islam in France. 
In conclusion, the participation of minority organisations and Muslim organisations to the mobilisation 
in defence of laïcité is a way to articulate claims for acceptance of Islam as a component of French 
religious diversity, on an equal footing with Protestantism and Judaism. In doing so, minority 
organisations are able to propose claims for acceptance that are more difficult to ignore by the 
majority population. 
 
3. Comparative Perspectives on Muslim Claims-making 
 
3.1. Similar Challenges 
Muslim organisations, as representatives of minority constituencies in France and the United 
Kingdom, face comparable challenges in the articulation of their political claims. In each context there 
is a tendency to be less tolerant towards Muslim claims on the ground that they are seen to be sectarian 
and particularist. In France this is justified by the general suspicion towards religious expressions in 
the public sphere. The articulation of claims by groups of people that share one religious belonging 
(real or perceived) is seen as infringing upon the principled separation of state and religion. Moreover, 
the focus on the veil that is intepreted as a sign of religious extremism tends to overshadow other 
Muslim claims. Even though the United Kingdom is seen to be more acceptant of minority claims-
making, there still is considerable suspicion of the alleged sectarian character of Muslim claims in 
British political life. In both cases, Muslim claims are seen as exceptional in comparison to other types 
of claims – a suspicion that a number of scholars have recently tried to confirm (e.g., Koopmans et al. 
2005, Joppke 2010).  
Yet from the perspective of our research, which is not concerned with aggregates or the media 
coverage but with two particular cases, it is striking that Muslim adovcacy organisations seek to 
emphasize the compatibility of their claims with existing political frameworks. An important 
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discursive element in their claims-making is the emphasis on normality and the request to be treated as 
any other minority, interest or identity group would. For instance, in France, an important element is 
the comparison of Islam with other religious minorities that are recognised as such (Lochak 1989). 
Muslim activists ask that Islam be recognised as a normal component of French religious diversity, on 
an equal footing with Protestantism and Judaism. In the United Kingdom, Muslim political actors 
request a type of socio-political recognition that would acknowledge the comparability of their self-
conceptions with other identities on the basis of which political requests can legitimately be made.  
 
3.2. Contrasting Strategies 
However, Muslim organisations in both countries face dissimilar obstacles that they seek to overcome 
in different ways. In the UK, the link between post-immigration groups and the Labour Party, and in 
some cases the exploitation of this link through forms of patronage politics, means that negative 
conceptions of the ‘Muslim Vote’ need to be overcome. Interviews show that the emphasis of maturity 
and sophistication among Muslim voters is perhaps the most widely shared point of reference in the 
rhetoric of the various initiatives. On the one hand, this can be seen as a claim for acceptance of 
Muslim voters as normal. Robert Dahl argues that ethnic political integration process is achieved when 
ethnic groups vote for all parties, on the left and on the right, just as the mainstream population (Dahl 
1961).The emphasis of maturity among Muslim voters may be seen as a way to reclaim this 
integration in the political process. On the other hand, it could also be suggested that the class interest 
of British Muslims align closely with the Labour Party. A a preference for Labour among Muslims – 
rather than an affinity with the Tories because of the proximity between conservative and religious 
values  – indicates normality then, not an exceptional status.   
As for Muslim minorities in France, they are in the process of negotiating the terms of their visibility 
in political life. The framing of their claims is an instance of such negotiations. They are struggling to 
render their claims acceptable by French political standards, yet the difference with Britain is that they 
insert themselves into a language of universalist politics and draw on core Republican values, such as 
laïcité, in their claims-making. Their understanding of political integration is that they are being seen 
as equal citizens of the French Republic, without having to abandon their sense of religious belonging.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Conceptual Remarks: Identity politics and acceptance 
It is important to take notice of problems that have been associated with the involvement of post-
immigration groups in the political process (such as communal hierarchies or the position of old and 
unelected spokesmen). Yet problems evidently do not apply in all cases, or may pertain in equal 
measure to majority groups, and there is the risk that problems are invoked to disqualify mobilizations 
even when these are bottom-up or civil society-based.  
Such biases stifle the civic normalization that most post-immigration groups desire. In the United 
Kingdom, the insistence that political claims have to be proposed in universalistic terms and without 
highlighting minority identities creates a burden that particularly affects newcomers to the polity. They 
are expected to live up to particularly high and possibly unrealistic standards of commitment to the 
‘common good’.   
Regarding France, there are claims that it may not be possible to articulate within existing political 
frameworks. The case illustrates particularly well how minority groups respond to the ‘challenge of 
particularism’ by “transform[ing] their claims from mere expressions of self-regarding interests to 
appeals to justice” (Young 2000, 115). In reclaiming laïcité for the protection of their religious 
freedom, French Muslims do not claim acceptance within the narrow understanding of the term. Their 
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request for acceptance involves the re-making of such understandings in order to extend the 
boundaries of acceptance and respect.  
Facing similar challenges of not being tolerated by mainstream politics or political elites, minority 
groups do not articulate claims for toleration but rather take the discourse on citizenship and equality 
at face value and ask to be accepted as equal, arguably a more demanding request than the claim for 
mere tolerance. One could therefore argue that when facing intolerance, minorities do not reply with a 
claim for tolerance but move on directly to a claim for acceptance and civic recognition.  
 
Recommendations 
Obstacles faced by Muslim activists result from the alleged exceptionality of their identities and 
claims and can be considered as forms of stigmatisation, intolerance and discrimination. In both cases, 
there is a need to raise awareness regarding this intolerance and to highlight the issue of religious 
discrimination in political activities. 
• In France, it is necessary to raise awareness among French citizens and politicians about the issue of 
religious discrimination. As public expressions of religious identity are considered illegitimate, there is 
a tendency to justify or downplay the importance of this discrimination, which significantly impairs 
the contribution that it is possible for minority citizens to make. 
• In the UK, the popular perception of Muslim political actors as ‘toxic’ is a form of stigmatisation that 
would be unacceptable if applied to other minorities. For mainstream politicians to go with such 
characterisations is damaging. All political parties should develop better relationship with Muslim 
organizations, and reach out and encourage participation in a manner that would facilitate a conduit for 
the mainstream presence of Muslim actors. 
 
The wish for a certain normalization of Muslim claims and identities is evident in both case studies: 
• The centrality of the notion of laïcité in the French value system makes it fitting for Muslim activists 
to articulate their claims along this line and secure support among French social movements. Muslim 
organisations adopt the discourse of laïcité to make themselves heard as Muslims in France. The 
mobilisation of Muslim people for the defence of their interests (namely the fight against 
discrimination) is operating within the framework of French politics and demonstrates their ability to 
adopt the standards of French political life. 
• In the UK, the wish for certain normalization can be conceived as a desire for hyphenated British-
Muslim identities to be recognised as ‘normal’, just as it is normal among the majority to combine 
English, Welsh and Scottish identities with Britishness. Hyphenated identities are in this 
understanding a legitimate basis for political mobilisation and lobbying, not divisive or disloyal.  
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APPENDIX. Political challenges to tolerance: Country cases 
 
Texts of country profiles to be attributed to the authors mentioned at the beginning of the summary. 
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Voting Rights Of Bulgarian Minorities: Case of Roma and of Bulgarian Turks with Dual 
Bulgarian-Turkish Citizenship 
Maya Kosseva and Marko Hajdinjak, IMIR 
 
Executive Summary 
The debate about the political participation of Bulgarian minorities and especially about their allegedly 
disproportionately strong influence on the election results is among the most disputed and polarising 
issues in Bulgaria. Populist and nationalist political actors have periodically raised demands to limit 
the voting rights of Bulgarian minorities. Their intentions were partially realised in 2001 with the 
passing of the new Election Code.  
While introducing numerous positive changes and bringing some much needed clarity and order into 
the previously fragmented and confusing electoral legislation, the Code is highly controversial and has 
drawn criticism from international institutions, Bulgarian human rights watchdogs and other civic 
organisations, and some political actors. The most problematic issue is the six-months residency 
requirement for participation in local elections, which is an infringement on voting rights of numerous 
Bulgarian citizens. This restriction is aimed above all at the large community of people holding a dual 
Bulgarian and Turkish citizenship (estimated at up to 380,000). 
The new Election Code also tries to prevent or discourage some of the most notorious illegal and 
illegitimate practices that regularly accompany the elections in Bulgaria. One such practice is the so-
called vote buying – a process when people vote for a certain party or independent candidate in 
exchange for money or other type of bribe. Roma are most often accused that they sell their votes and 
in this way distort the election results. A 2009 survey has shown that 40% of Roma are prepared to 
vote for those who pay them. The measures are therefore disproportionally targeting the Roma 
community. The media reporting on alleged Roma vote selling also strongly contributes to the 
prevailingly negative public attitude towards Roma. 
The key question the following report therefore tries to answer is how the populist and nationalistic 
political agenda on voting rights of Bulgarian minorities influences the relations between different 
ethnic communities in Bulgaria. The debate on voting rights is an excellent catalyst for evaluating the 
attitudes towards minorities – ranging from extremely intolerant demands for full revoking of existing 
political and voting rights to calls for genuine acceptance and respect of diversity. 
The fieldwork was conducted between October 2011 and February 2012. It included both desk 
research and empirical fieldwork. The most important event that marked the period in which the 
fieldwork was conducted were the presidential and local elections, which took place in October 2011. 
During the fieldwork, 14 semi-standardised interviews were taken. The interview guide was divided 
into two main groups of questions. The first one focused on the new Election Code and its restriction 
of the voting rights of people with double citizenship. This topic very directly concerns the political 
representation of the Bulgarian Turks. The second topic centred on the so-called vote buying – a 
notorious practice which seems to spread with each successive elections. The issue is connected with 
the voting of the Roma community, as Roma are most often believed to participate in such schemes.  
The main part of the desk research consisted of collecting and analysing the media coverage of the 
main political challenge analysed in this report: the 2011 Election code and its consequences for the 
voting rights of Bulgarian Turkish and Roma minorities. In addition, statistical data, legal texts, policy 
documents, and proceedings of the National Assembly and relevant parliamentary committees were 
also examined. 
One of the main findings of our research is that the changes introduced by the new Election Code have 
tainted the pre-election process and the election campaign. They also intensified the inter-ethnic 
distrust and confrontation.  
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The research has shown that the declarative support for the democratic and tolerant arrangements 
where all Bulgarian citizens have equal political rights is quickly cast aside when it comes to the 
concrete cases concerning ethnic and religious otherness. The fact that Bulgarian Turks have been 
directly affected by the new Election Code has caused a barely concealed relief among the majority 
population, rather than an open indignation over the undemocratic arrangement. Such an attitude is an 
indication of a low level of tolerance towards the minorities and of immature civil consciousness of 
the society.  
Three main discourses on the state of inter-ethnic relations in Bulgaria can be identified: 
1) inter-ethnic relations are not on a downward curve, but follow a cyclical pattern – 
deterioration in the election period after which they return to normality; 
2) inter-ethnic relations are steadily deteriorating, not just because of the political games and 
manipulation, but because of the economic crisis and worsening standard of living 
3) not only inter-ethnic relations are worsening, but relations among all people in Bulgaria in 
general 
The notorious practice of vote buying and selling in not confined to Roma, as the popular stereotypes 
would have us believe. The October 2011 elections have shown that this malicious practice is 
spreading. As a result, the majority of the Bulgarian voters are becoming increasingly disillusioned 
and disappointed over the state of the Bulgarian political system and prefer not to vote at all, which is 
playing straight into the hands of the corrupt and dishonest economic-political actors. Despite that, the 
media and the public perceptions continue to attribute this malpractice to Roma, who are therefore 
accused that they influence the election results in an illegal and illegitimate way. 
The current research has again highlighted the significant discrepancy between the official political 
and public discourse on perception and application of democratic norms and values, and the reality. 
While the public speech is focused on notions of tolerance and acceptance, the concrete examples and 
everyday practices testify about entrenched intolerance that can be easily mobilised in the critical 
moments like political, social and economic crisis.  
Despite the fact that the central government periodically comes up with different programmes and 
strategies for integration of minorities, the practical implementation is either lacking or is flawed and 
inadequate. The research has shown that the regional solutions tailored to the ethnic, cultural and 
religious structure of the population on the local level can be far more successful than the solutions 
proposed on the national level. The largest problem is to find a way to transfer the functioning 
everyday tolerance from the local level into the national context, which continues to be dominated by 
intolerant stereotypes and prejudices. A larger regional and municipal autonomy to address the needs 
and problems of the local population according to its specific features would be a positive step in 
turning the unsuccessful top-down approach into a more appropriate two-way process. 
The research has also established that many people are either ignorant of or tend to disregard the 
numerous problems that could provoke or intensify tensions between different ethnic, cultural and 
religious groups. Forming and changing the collective matrix is a long and contradictory process. Our 
recommendation is to intensify the research of inter-ethnic relations – not just in Bulgarian context, 
but also in the European one. The disclosure of good practices and popularisation of results from 
similar studies increase the sensitivity of the society for such topics. They also stimulate the 
willingness of state institutions to look for and implement more adequate and comprehensive policies. 
Keywords 
Political participation of minorities; Bulgarians; Turks; Roma; Bulgarian-Turkish dual citizens; vote 
buying; Election Code; populism and nationalism; voting rights; Movement for Rights and Freedoms; 
intolerance, tolerance, recognition and respect. 
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Negotiating Limits of Tolerance in Public Debates in Denmark: The Case of Political Meetings 
arranged by ‘Radical’ Muslim Actors  
Lasse Lindekilde , Aarhus University  
 
Executive Summary 
This report analyzes negotiations of toleration-boundary drawing as they play out in two recent public 
debates in Denmark, both concerning political meetings arranged by or involving controversial 
Muslim actors. The two meetings – one arranged by the organization Hizb ut-tahrir, and one involving 
the Canadian Islamic preacher, Bilal Philips – generated intense public debate about the limits of 
tolerance and the room for illiberal and anti-democratic views and practices in the public sphere.  
First, the report maps and compares the different toleration positions and arguments in the two 
debates, building on analysis of the media coverage. This analysis finds that while the debate 
surrounding Hizb ut-tahrir’s meeting was skewed towards toleration, the debate about Bilal Philips’ 
visit to Denmark was skewed towards intolerance. The reason for this difference in toleration-
boundary drawing is explained with reference to important differences in the sender-message-audience 
triad in the two selected cases. Despite these differences the analysis also shows that the same 
toleration positions and arguments of boundary drawing are found in the two debates. These recurrent 
positions include: ‘toleration-as-a-legal-must’, ‘toleration-but-protest’, ‘toleration-because-
intervention-is-counterproductive’, ‘intolerance-due-to-threat-and-harm’, ‘intolerance-because-of-
liberal-perfectionism’. The analysis shows how the support of these different positions of toleration 
boundary drawing cut across the traditional political spectrum in Denmark.  
Second, the report investigates the discursive strategies put forward by different actors in pushing 
exactly their version of boundary drawing and the coping strategies of dealing with pressures of taking 
a stand on the limits of tolerance in the two cases. This analysis, building on media data as well as 
interviews with engaged actors, identifies three significant and recurrent strategies; 1) the strategy of 
pushing boundary drawing from the political to the legal arena, 2) the strategy of securitization, which 
pushes boundary drawing into the realm of the extra-political and extra-ordinary, and 3) the strategy of 
reframing, adaptation or avoidance of boundary drawing. The central argument in this section is that 
the interactive nature of public debates generates relative positioning of actors, which co-determines 
the toleration boundary drawing of actors and the discursive strategies used to legitimize it and cope 
with pressures.  
As a last step, the report focuses on how toleration boundary drawing in public debates may affect 
Muslim actors’ possibilities for engaging in political debates in the Danish context. The report argues 
that although the controversies regarding the two meetings did not generate any concrete policy 
implication, which directly altered Muslim actors’ possibilities of using public meetings as a platform 
for political claims making, there seems to be important indirect effects. This has to do, it is argued, 
with the fundamental interdependence of tolerance-boundary drawing and processes of othering. 
Toleration boundary drawing implies othering, as it functions to differentiate the realm of the 
recognizable normal and tolerable from the foreign and intolerable. When drawing toleration 
boundaries we are at the same time constructing in-groups and out-groups. In the analyzed debates 
Muslims in general are often designated as the ‘other’, covering up important differences within the 
Muslim community, which may potentially serve to delimit the possibilities of being tolerated as 
legitimate participants in public debates and political life also for ‘ordinary’ Muslims.  
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Concepts and practices of tolerance in French political life 
Riva Kastoryano and Angéline Escafré-Dublet, CERI-Sciences Po 
 
Executive Summary 
 
Background Elements on the Political Mobilisation of Minorities in France 
French political life is relatively immune to ethnic demands and claims for group rights, should they 
come from immigrant or native minorities (such as regional minorities or the Roma community from 
France). Article 1 of the 1958 constitution reads that the French Republic “shall ensure the equality of 
all citizens before the law regardless of their origin, race or religion” and this has been generally 
understood as invalidating any mobilisation on the basis of ethnic or religious belonging. This is 
regarded as opposed to the civic understanding of French citizenship that guarantees a vertical 
relationship between the state and the citizen. Any political claim articulated in ethnic or religious 
terms is considered favouring the pursuit of particular interests over general interest.  
Moreover, non-nationals do not hold political rights (to the notable exception of European citizens 
who can vote in local and European elections since 1992) and cannot participate formally to political 
life. As for immigrants who acquired French nationality and French people of immigrant descent, they 
hold political rights but surveys have demonstrated their low participation and lack of presence in 
French political life. 
However, there has been a tradition of immigrants’ mobilization in organisations since the post war 
period that can be seen as instances where to study the articulation of ethnic interests. France counts 
numerous immigrant associations that have learned to articulate their claim and negotiate their identity 
in Republican terms. In this process, the state has played a significant role in channelling the 
articulation of their claim. By drawing a line in between what could be considered as a reasonable 
claim from a minority group and what was regarded as leaning towards a separatist claim that would 
contradict Republican universalism, public institutions and policy makers greatly impacted the 
expression of minority interests. Activists have learned to navigate French political life and articulate 
their claim in Republican terms. 
 
The Focus of the Study on Minority Claims of Laïcité 
The mobilisation of associations defending the interest of Muslim community in terms of laïcité is an 
instance of the adaptation of minority group to Republican universalism.  
Laïcité is the French understanding of secularism that ensures the strict separation of church and 
states, and confines religious expressions to private matters. It is considered as a Republican value. 
However, the discussion of laïcité has been repetitively used to respond to the perceived increase of 
religious diversity in France, and more specifically to the challenge of Islam. This was the case in 
2004 when a law recalling the principle of laïcité banned the wearing of the Islamic veil in French 
public school . This was also the case in 2011 when Interior Minister Eric Besson decided to launch 
what he called an “Official Debate on Islam “and that the debate was quickly relabelled an “Official 
Debate on Laïcité”.  
In response to this, minority organisations such as immigrant based associations or Muslim 
organisations, stroke back with a mobilisation in “defence of laïcité”. They argued that the 
governmental use of the principle was a distortion of its original meaning and was not protective of 
religious freedom.  For instance, a collective of associations –including Muslim associations – 
gathered on 2 April 2011 to demonstrate against the governmental “Official Debate on Laïcité”. It is 
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interesting to note that minority activists chose not to oppose laïcité but rather to reclaim laïcité and 
therefore articulate their demand in Republican terms.  
Minority claims of laïcité pertain to claims for equal treatment and tolerance. However, from a 
research point of view, investigating minority claims of laïcité, as such, appears as a valuable angle to 
discuss the state of tolerance in French political life. First, the direct link of this principle with notions 
of equality and tolerance allows for a direct entry into a value discourse that is not as easily discussed 
otherwise. Second, the frequent use of the term in link with Islam is a convenient topic to announce 
when contacting interviewees while the issue of religious diversity or tolerance to Muslim identity 
could be seen as infringing Republican correctness (namely the neutrality of the public space where 
religious expressions are not to be discussed).   
 
Methodology 
The case study on minority claims of laïcité consisted in a literature review, a press review, a 
collection of secondary sources on the issue and material collected during fieldwork.  
The fieldwork consisted in the attendance to meetings organised in reaction to the governmental 
decisions regarding laïcité (demonstrations and public meetings) and a selection of interviews (n=7). 
Interviews were conducted with activists of different organisations in an effort to keep an equal 
repartition in terms of gender, origin and religious belonging.  
The organisations were selected so as to keep a balance in between old organisations mobilised on the 
issue of laïcité and new organisations (organisations that are specifically mobilised against the passing 
of restrictive laws pertaining to laïcité; organisations whose mobilisation on the issue of laïcité is part 
of a larger objective to defend Islam and French people associated with the Muslim faith). However, 
the mobilisation involves few people and some activists participate in several of these organisations, 
which explain the limited number of interviews.  
Interviewees were asked about their understanding of laïcité as a value and if they saw laïcité as a 
necessary frame to articulate any minority-related claim in the French context, and if this was the case, 
what other options they would see. We paid attention not to impose the frame of laïcité on the 
interviewee and interviews also dealt with resources of mobilisation and individuals’ understanding of 
issues pertaining to diversity. The point was not to define laïcité but to analyse its use to articulate 
claims with respect to the acceptance of religious diversity in French political life. 
 
Main findings 
1. Minority organisations that are mobilised on the issue of Muslim discrimination and anti-Islam 
discourse articulate their claim for equal treatment in terms of laïcité to make themselves heard in the 
French context. Although Muslim people in general may be reluctant to adopt the notion of laïcité 
(perceived as anti-religious and also systematically used by the media to condemn their practices), 
Muslim activists identify laïcité as a French tradition and use it to render their mobilisation compatible 
with French political life. 
Beyond the strategic use of the term laïcité to articulate a claim in Republican terms, minority 
organisations are reclaiming laïcité and participating in a larger discussion on the definition of the 
notion and its link with the fundamental value of religious freedom.  
2. In this discussion, they are joined by majority organisations such as human rights associations and 
feminist groups. 
How did this happen? In fact, the initial framing of the first headscarf affair of 1989 was essential in 
linking the issue of Islam with laïcité and feminism. The wearing of the veil was interpreted as a sign 
of religious extremism and women oppression, which prompted the mobilisation of organisations 
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mobilised on the defence of laïcité and feminists, respectively. However, with the growing 
stigmatisation of Islam and the systematic use of laïcité to pass laws restricting the practice of Islam, 
some defenders of laïcité and feminist activists shifted their position to rally with Muslim 
organisations and denounce an intolerant interpretation of laïcité.  
3. French feminist positioning on the issue of laïcité is complex. Most French feminists support a 
restrictive interpretation of laïcité because they interpret the wearing of an Islamic veil as a sign of 
discrimination against women. Only a limited number of feminist activists contest the manipulation of 
a discourse on laïcité to discriminate Muslim women and situate the issue at the intersection of gender 
and racial discrimination. 
4. By rendering their mobilisation adapted to the French context, Muslim organisations have 
contributed to the articulation of a Muslim consciousness. They are highlighting the specificity of a 
Muslim identity in France and the post-colonial construction of Islam in France. 
As such, minority claims of laïcité also qualify for claims of acceptance and recognition of Islam in 
France. 
 
Concluding remarks 
By focusing on the mobilisation in the defence of Muslim rights in France, the case study 
encompasses a limited number of activists. It allows analysing the implications of a mobilisation in 
terms of laïcité for individuals who distinguished themselves from the rest of the population by their 
religious belonging (real or perceived). However, this should not overshadow the restrictive turn in the 
interpretation of laïcité in the current French discourse and the fact that both right-wing and left-wing 
parties tend to follow this path. The change in positioning that we observed among a number of 
activists of the Human rights league and eminent specialists on laïcité such as Jean Baubérot, could 
inaugurate a broader change in discourse. However, the politicisation of the issue of laïcité in reaction 
to the Muslim presence is pervasive and appears as the most favoured strategy by politicians right 
now. 
 
Policy recommendations 
	 Policy makers should give more audience to NGOs and organisations that are organised on the 
defence of Muslim rights in France.  
	 It is necessary to sensitize the population on the issue of religious discrimination and the 
construction of racism on the basis of people’s religious belonging (real or perceived). A tendency to 
see the articulation of religious identities as illegitimate in France has contributed to undermine the 
understanding of discrimination on the basis of religion, or even, to justify discrimination on the 
ground that religious expressions are incompatible with French society.  
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Extending the Limits of Intolerance. The Sarrazin-Debate and its effect on members of the targeted 
minority 
Nina Mühe, Europe-University Viadrina, Frankfurt  
 
Executive Summary 
This report analyses the national debate about the book “Germany does away with itself” by the 
former politician Thilo Sarrazin, that draws a future scenario of the German nation being 
overwhelmed by Muslims, who lower the national levels of intelligence and economic performance. 
The arguments of the author draw on already existing images of Muslims as the significant other in 
society and take them even further to a point, where tolerance towards this other and its religious 
practices does not seem appropriate any more. Although the book does not open a new debate, but 
connects to similar discourses in other European countries, it takes this debate further and supports the 
social boundaries towards Muslims being drawn narrower. This survey is interested in how this debate 
developed and how it can be seen as supporting the construction of a significant other against whom 
fears and anxieties are awaken that are hardly open any more for rational deliberation but support 
intolerant and even racist attitudes towards Muslims with a large part of the German population. Apart 
from the analysis of the Sarrazin debate, the report also looks at possible effects this national 
discussion has on members of the targeted minority.  
The main questions of the present study are thus: Has the overall effect of the debate been to make 
intolerance towards a specific minority more socially acceptable? For this purpose we look into the 
development of the debate its effects on social and political life. Has the political debate about 
Muslims and/or minorities and maybe also political measurements changed during and after the 
debate? And how do these developments, especially the changed acceptability of intolerance or 
intolerant speech affect the people involved? How does it change both their everyday life, their self-
perception as entire part of the German society and their also their engagement in political life? 
The analytical frame for analysing these questions is the interest in discursive mechanisms of 
boundary drawing and the construction of a significant other. The study seeks to collect insight into 
these mechanisms as well as their effects on changing (in-)tolerance towards Muslims in Germany and 
Europe. 
The methodological tools of the analysis are a short discourse analysis of two major national 
newspapers and expert interviews with members of the Muslim community and professionals, who 
work within the community. For the media analysis the left-liberal Die Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and 
the rather conservative Die Welt were followed between the 30th of September and the 20th of 
November 2009 after Sarrazin had already given a widely noticed interview in the magazine Lettre 
International, and between 23rd of August and the 9th of November 2010 right after the publication of 
the mentioned book, that quickly became a bestseller. Additionally individual articles were taken into 
consideration that appeared about a year after the debate.  
The second part of the analysis deals with the perception of the Sarrazin debate by members of the 
targeted minority groups and reactions of individual Muslims towards it. It consists of 6 expert 
interviews and one group discussion with a political group of 5 young Muslims and one of their group 
leaders, who had invited Thilo Sarrrazin in order to meet the person behind the book and personally 
discuss his views with him.  
The specific anti-Muslim discourse in Germany of which Sarrazin is a spokesperson, has an important 
function for the construction of a national identity especially in times of fundamental changes of the 
country turning into an immigration country and witnessing steadily growing (religious) diversity. The 
immigrants and/or Muslims and their apparent cultural or religious difference is created as the absolute 
‘other’ to German society by attributing with them every negative aspect that Germans want to 
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distance themselves from - from Homophobia to anti-Semitism and misogyny. Following this 
ascription of negative attributes and values the group is then quite justifiably positioned outside the 
borders of ‘what can still be tolerated’ by German society. At the same time this exclusion of the other 
helps to construct a common national identity that is otherwise hardly to be found regarding the strong 
inner diversity of Germany and other European nations. Drawing the border towards the significant 
other and to what one is not however gives some kind of common identity and unifies interests from 
very different political persuasions. This process of exclusion becomes stronger with the degree of 
public fears that the discourse raises. The worse a future scenario is constructed, in which the 
significant other becomes the dangerous other and takes over important parts of society, the more 
irrational the public fears become.  
One of the factors of Sarrazin’s success were the already existent anti-Muslim debates in other 
European countries and especially the growing populist parties, warning the European citizens against 
an apparent Islamisation of their societies and through this scenario creating a common European fear 
of the Muslim other, that is like the Sarrazin discourse quite untouched by rational deliberation. This 
significant other takes over a similar role on the European level as it does on the respective national 
levels, as it helps to define Europe through its perceived borders and ‘limits of tolerance’ and thus 
supports the unification process of the diverse European countries. 
The Sarrazin debate reflects many of those arguments that turn around the ‘limits of tolerance’ 
towards the marked minority. In the case of Muslims it is mainly the visibility of religion through 
mosque buildings, headscarves or prayers in public that is negotiated as a limit of tolerance where the 
still tolerable other, Muslims who do not obviously identify as such and/or exclusively practice their 
religion in private, transgresses the boundary into public visibility and therewith the boundary to what 
can still be tolerated. Those issues typically become public debates in which those boundaries towards 
the tolerable other are negotiated. 
Regarding the effects of the Sarrazin debate and the general construction of Muslims as significant 
others on members of the Muslim minority, this survey found, that it caused detrimental social 
divisions by enforcing the perception of many Muslims not to be welcome in German society. Some 
young Muslims obviously reacted with drawing back into their smaller communities and looking for 
other possible identity concepts than the German one, even if they were German citizens. Especially 
young people, who had already been active in civil society organisations and projects however 
managed to empower themselves and strengthen their self-confidence by learning more about both 
their own religion and German politics and how to handle both and engage into critical debates and 
even social activism. 
Besides the empowerment of members of the minority that is targeted by the intolerant discourse, 
political conclusions could be the countering of the construction of a significant other through stronger 
counter discourses and national debates about this construction of others and its effects in racist 
attitudes that have already reached large parts of the population also within the middle of society. 
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Migrants and (In)tolerant Discourses in Greek politics  
Hara Kouki and Anna Triandafyllidou, European University Institute  
 
Executive Summary 
During the last 20 years the country has been rapidly transformed from a migrant sending to a migrant 
receiving country and currently about 0.8 million of its 11 million population is of foreign origin. 
Moreover, during the last three years Greece has been faced with a European and international 
migration crisis: while increasing numbers of people are fleeing war and poverty from Asia and 
Africa, the Greek Turkish border has become the main gate to Europe. The onset of the current 
financial crisis in early 2010 has deteriorated the situation. Unemployment grew dramatically among 
long term settled immigrants and working class natives. There has been an important increase in the 
crime rate and a generalized sense of insecurity in the centre of the capital of the country, while adding 
to this, extreme right wing groups have taken the situation ‘in their hands’. Departing from images and 
incidents taking place in the centre of Athens, an all the more xenophobic discourse started spreading 
and dominating the way public opinion interprets the ‘other’ living in the city. Large parts of society 
appear as prone to morally accept incidents of racist violence and hate speech.  
Central to this change has been the unprecedented rise of far right parties, actions and discourse in the 
public sphere. LAOS (The People's Orthodox Rally), is considered to be an extreme right wing 
formation that won 5.63% of the vote in 2009 national elections and 7.14% for the elections for the 
European Parliament. LAOS has participated in the provisional grand coalition government formed to 
deal with the crisis (from November 2011 till February 2012) thus further legitimising its position in 
the Greek political system. Golden Dawn, on the other hand, is a nationalist far right organization, 
whose members have been repeatedly accused of carrying out acts of violence and hate crimes against 
immigrants, political opponents and ethnic minorities. Golden Dawn, with a clear racist and Nazi 
political position, operates in certain ‘troubled’ urban areas in terms of ‘field work’ and establishes a 
state within a state offering security to local residents. This radical organization won a sit in municipal 
elections in the city of Athens (5.3%) and entered the parliament in 2012 national elections getting an 
6,97% of the national vote.  
This re-composition of the extreme right in the country runs in parallel with a conservative unfolding 
of Greek identity and a generalized political crisis unfolding in the 1990s, since when sensitive issues 
of national identity have re emerged and national particularities surfaced as the opposite pole to reform 
and globalization. Such a tendency appears severely intensified during the current crisis. However, the 
relationship and dynamics between the extreme right discourse and mainstream public opinion, party 
and official state discourse in Greece has not been thoroughly studied.  
This study explores the recent discourses on diversity and tolerance in Greek political life. It 
investigates what has been defined by different political actors as intolerable, tolerable or acceptable 
cultural difference – hence it questions what intolerance/tolerance/acceptance means for each actor 
and how they re-define and use it to draw boundaries in Greek society. These boundaries cut across 
and overlap with different dimensions: natives/nationals and Others/aliens, tolerant and intolerant 
people/parties, racist and non-racist, democratic and authoritarian, right wing vs. left wing forces.  
We examine here the political and discursive deployment of toleration in two different case studies 
and see how tolerance relies on the construction of images of ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’. Our main 
scope is to gain a better understanding of why and when some aspects of difference are rejected. We 
seek to answer the question what kind of difference is tolerable/acceptable in Greek society and why? 
We also examine whether Greek society is becoming more or less tolerant towards specific groups and 
why. Case studies  
The first case analysed in this study refers to the public prayer of Muslim inhabitants of Athens on 18 
November 2010 on the occasion of the ‘Id festivity (end of Ramadan) before the sprawling courtyard 
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of the country's main university as a peaceful protest for the non existence of an official mosque 
(Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2009; Antoniou 2005); this protest event provoked a public debate, the 
first on the issue to acquire visibility at the national level and took place without problems.  
The second case study concentrates on a tragic event that took place a few months later. In May 2011, 
in the very centre of Athens a 44-year old man, Manolis Kantaris, was cold blood assassinated by 
unknown people, believed to be irregular migrants. This murder triggered a series of violent and racist 
attacks against migrants in the city centre, and especially the 6th city council district that were led by 
far right wing organizations, such as the Golden Dawn, and tolerated by both the police and part of the 
residents of the area. These incidents, our second case study, produced a polarised political discourse 
focusing around the crisis in the city centre as linked with the issue of irregular immigration.  
In those two cases, the social practice of toleration was played out in the historical centre of the 
capital, where deterioration of living conditions has been followed by considerable irregular migration 
flows. The above events have generated discussions and conflicts in national politics regarding more 
generally migrants and the immigrant ‘Other’ in Greek society and the limit of his/her presence in 
public. While the political and symbolic exclusion of the immigrant Other is nothing new in Greek 
society, what is new is how concepts of tolerance/intolerance and actions of toleration or lack of 
toleration are newly negotiated amidst a generalized economic and political crisis. The emergence of 
migration as a centre-stage political issue in the last two years and the spectacular rise of the far right 
wing vote ( role of far right parties brings these questions and by the emergence of far right parties 
strong enough to win seats in the Parliament and in Athens municipal council. These political 
developments have brought racist and intolerant discourse (and actions) centre-stage in the debate on 
migration.  
Methodology  
Our case study included both desk research and empirical fieldwork. We have analysed the scholarly 
literature on the issue of the far right in the country, while also collecting material on far right wing 
parties and groups active at the moment in the city centre. We also examined newspaper materials: We 
searched for articles in five mainstream newspapers with the highest circulation at the national level 
(notably Kathimerini, Vima, Eleftherotypia, Ethnos, ta Nea) and in a selection of far right groups’ 
websites. Moreover, we examined how the major political parties present in the Greek Parliament in 
2011 (Conservative party New Democracy, Socialist party PASOK, left wing party SYRIZA, the 
Greek Communist Party KKE, the far right wing party LAOS and the Golden Dawn party that was not 
represented in the national parliament but whose actions and discourse were important for our selected 
case studies.  
Desk material, thus, has been used so as to set the picture of the events and positions taken, while our 
object of analysis were qualitative interviews conducted with actors actively engaged in the events 
under question. We have conducted 19 qualitative interviews with representatives of right and left 
wing parties and groups, with migrant associations active in the events aforementioned, journalists, 
writers and with residents of the city centre that have not taken active part in those conflicts but see 
themselves affected by immigrants’ presence.  
Key Findings  
There are two competing positions emerging from the interviews: Tolerance of Diversity- Intolerance 
of Racism and Intolerance of Diversity/ Islamophobia- Tolerance/ Justification of Racism, correspond 
to two competing framings, the political/ ideological and the cultural/ identity one.  
More precisely, those arguing along a political/ ideological frame sustain a tolerant position towards 
diversity and an intolerant one when it comes to racist words and acts. Even if only one interviewee 
explicitly attributed her choice to a ‘leftist’ ideology, however, all respondents defended what we 
could call ‘new left’ values such as minorities’ rights, equality and diversity according to a ‘left/ right 
cleavage’. Tolerance is endorsed in the name of this framing, but at the same time is proved limited to 
reflect accommodation of diversity in contemporary multicultural settings. Racism is perceived as a 
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problem not to be tolerated and respondents attempt to erase the differences raised between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ situating the framing on the ‘them’ tag of the ‘us/ them’ cleavage.  
Those framing the events as cultural/ identity issues, on the contrary, put forward the ‘intolerance of 
diversity’ position, while justifying if not tolerating racist attitudes. The latter category insist on the 
non political/ ideological nature of their standpoint and present it as apolitical, as a non option, but, 
instead as a natural reaction to the problem of migration. Within this framing, racism is a mere 
symptom of the problem of migration and tolerance accepted in theory but severely limited in practice 
due to the ‘us/ them’ dichotomy. Prioritizing national identity and culture, thus, those frames could be 
situated on the ‘us’ tag along an ‘us/ them’ cleavage and on the ‘right’ tag of the ‘left/right’ cleavage 
as they prioritize national cultural identity over the ‘other’s’ rights, without questioning their liberal 
values and beliefs in a modern society.  
Both frames use the law and order master frame, as well as the anti establishment critique frame, so as 
to develop their competing positions. For instance, state migration policies have been either lacking or 
inefficient and EU regulations contributed to the explosion of the problem. Concerning particularly the 
city centre, many of our respondents, including party representatives and the extreme right 
representative, claim that the first to blame is not the migrants themselves, but the state, along with all 
parliamentary parties, politicians and authorities, that did nothing to prevent or deal with the issue. 
Moving even further, the populist right representative puts the blame for uncontrolled migration to the 
exploitation of the Third World countries by the multinational companies and the dominant economy.  
Those arguing for intolerance through the law and order master frame examine the ‘lamentable’ 
phenomenon of massive immigration in terms of the effects on local people, public image and 
economy, without taking into account the rights of the immigrants themselves, or without rating ‘their’ 
rights equally with ‘ours’. The victims of criminality and lawlessness are first and foremost local 
residents of the central areas of Athens. Even if respondents acknowledge that immigrants’ rights are 
abused, however their public presence in the area puts native people’s security further at risk as this is 
already the case due to economic harsh situation- using in the same way the crisis frame. So, even if 
the law and order frame is presented as a non political way to classify and understand social reality, it 
is however constructed in ethnocultural terms that define the political identities of ‘us’ vs ‘them’ in the 
national public sphere.  
In the same way, the critique of political power that both frames share, presupposes different 
understandings of what is the ‘problem’ and who is considered to be the perpetrator, the agent of 
change and the possible solutions. The cultural/ identity frame attributes the role of the agent of 
change to the state; at the same time, however, it constructs ‘them’ as a homogeneous category that is 
so different than the national self that co existence becomes a cultural problem. So, the dominant 
culture is not to blame, while it remains unclear how the state could have resolved what seems to be 
natural conflicts and unbridgeable cultural differences.  
Even if respondents pay lip service to tolerance during the interview, the solutions suggested through 
this frame are quite intolerant. In other words, there is an inconsistency between the goals formulated 
on the one hand and the analysis of the problems that require a solution on the other. For instance, the 
representative of the radical right party attributes the problem of the public prayer to state’s neglect 
over building a Mosque; soon afterwards, however, he denies any possibility of tolerating Muslim 
culture, a culture that rejects women’s rights. While both positions include the same criticism against 
power, voiced even by those representing power structures, however, the cultural/ identity frame 
attacks power holders in the name of quite different criteria as it is framed in ethnocultural terms.  
Across Europe and along with the rise and gradual legitimisation of ultra right wing rhetoric, hate 
speech is often disguised in the name of liberal values so as to exclude individuals from citizens’ 
liberal rights. A new principled intolerance is seen, paradoxically, as necessary to protect the rights of 
individuals, and the rights, values and the identity of the majority. Greece is experiencing (already in 
the past years but particularly so in spring 2012) an unprecedented rise of far right parties, along with 
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a notable spreading of incidents of racist violence and xenophobic discourse in the public sphere. The 
actual presence of the ‘other’ in need next to the nationals, who are also through a time of crisis, 
renders the issue of tolerance into a central political challenge to be thoroughly examined.  
The contradictory diagnoses of the ‘problem’ notably the political and principled framing of the 
problems by reference to tolerance (if not necessarily acceptance) of diversity and rejection of racism; 
and the identity framing where all issues are subsumed to a fundamental dichotomy between Us and 
Others (we cannot tolerate others if their presence is perceived to harm our material or cultural well 
being. There are no principles that hold here – the interest of the ‘ingroup’ is the utmost priority) are 
however solved by the strategy of objectification.  
Our frame analysis suggests that competing versions of reality and of the ‘good’ are reconciled by 
presenting ‘intolerance’ positions as apolitical and logical reactions towards an ‘objective’ reality. 
Thus, with the exception of a few clearly left-wing and pro-diversity interviewees, most others, 
including those who would classify themselves as faithful to equality and democracy, use the law and 
order frame to justify and legitimize intolerance and racism. This strategy of objectification is also 
adopted to strengthen the culture and identity frame: it is ‘natural’ that the world is divided into ‘us’ 
fellow nationals and ‘them’ others. Exclusion, inequality, intolerance, even racist violence can be 
justified when what is at stake is the perceived interest or well being of the national ingroup. We may 
call this type of intolerance as the new nationalist intolerance. What is particularly worrying in Greece 
is that such discourses of principled national intolerance (and racism) are increasingly seen as justified 
and legitimized by reference to an ‘objective’ reality. They thus push the far right wing discourses 
centre-stage.  
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The Rise of the Extreme Right in Hungary and the Roma Question: The radicalization of media 
discourse  
Zsuszanna Vidra, Central European University and Jon Fox, University of Bristol  
 
Executive Summary 
In Hungary in the last couple of years we have witnessed the rise of radical racist discourse. The 
radical rightwing party succeeded in setting the terms of political debate and bringing the Roma 
question back to centre stage. This resulted in calls to ‘break taboos’ to allow for a sincere biologically 
and a culturally informed discussion of difference. Both forms of discourse lead to exclusion.  
The aim of this case study is to better understand the strengthening of the radical right in Hungary, its 
openly anti-Roma discourses, and the reactions of mainstream political actors to this radicalism. We 
examine the media coverage of two murders, one in which the Roma were the perpetrators and in the 
other in which they were the victims. We also review public debate on the question of Roma 
integration and the end of political correctness as it appeared in the mainstream media. The two 
murders are significant for understanding how the Roma question became increasingly racialised. The 
first incident we have ‘Olaszliszka’ after the locale where the murder took place. In 2006, a, non-
Roma teacher was lynched by a group of Roma. Our second case is ‘Tatárszentgyörgy’, also named 
after the locale where the murder occurred. In 2009, a Roma father and his son were murdered by a 
number of Hungarian men who were known for their neo-Nazi political allegiances. Both murders 
were followed by serious local conflicts between the Roma and non-Roma actors, and both drew 
unprecedented media attention that set off national political debates. Our third case addresses the 
aftermath of the media representation and the public debates generated by the two incidents. The 
conclusion drawn by a number of intellectuals was that politically correct discourse should be 
abandoned, as they viewed it as an impediment to ‘genuine’ dialogue on these important issues. This 
in turn legitimated the further racialisation of the Roma question by virtually all parties to the debate.  
Our interest throughout is in examining the ways in which both radical and mainstream discourse have 
contributed to the reproduction and legitimation of anti-Roma attitudes and actions in Hungary. Our 
analysis considers the radical right’s discourses on these issues and how they ultimately fed into more 
moderate or mainstream political and public debate.  
In our case study we analyse media representations of the two murder cases (with the Roma as the 
perpetrators in the first one (case 1.) and the victims in the second one (case 2.)); we then conclude 
with a debate on ‘Roma integration and the end of political correctness’ (case 3.) as it appeared in left 
orientated papers. Our main purpose is to show the range of reactions to the radical right and how the 
Roma issue was thematised through engagement with these two murder cases. This sheds light on the 
ways in which radical right discourses spread to mainstream discourses. For the first two cases we 
included the following media: kuruc.info.hu, one of the most important radical right-wing internet 
web-sites in Hungary, the left-wing but mainstream Népszabadság, and the right-wing (also 
mainstream) Magyar Nemzet. For our third case we compiled a database by choosing one particular 
debate published in a weekly political and economic magazine, Heti Világ Gazdaság. For case 1. and 
2. we conducted keyword searches – looking for the name of Olaszliszka and Tatárszentgyörgy – in 
both papers and the website to compile a dataset containing all relevant articles published since the 
incidents occurred. From the dataset we selected opinion articles and looked for discursive strategies 
employed in the articles. For case 3, we used all articles of one particular debate launched by the 
editors of hvg.hu entitled: Why don’t Hungarian Roma integrate?  
Our analysis revealed intolerant discourses not only from the radical right media but from the 
conservative as well. In these media the Roma are characterised as biologically different: their innate 
inclination for crime means that they cannot be tolerated. The leftist newspaper we sampled 
emphasizes tolerance through norms of human rights and non-discrimination. In the integration debate 
we found that the emphasis switching to the Roma’s purported cultural distinctiveness. This more 
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culturalist interpretation was nevertheless still exclusionary in its effects, even if it was coming from 
the left. The main distinction between the left on the one hand and the right and radical right on the 
other was in the degree of their exclusion.   
We also consider how these discourses relate to our non-tolerace–tolerance–acceptance model. We 
have argued that both kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet displayed intolerant discursive strategies that 
invoked the putative biological differences of the Roma. The Roma are not deserving of toleration 
given their genetically innate inclination to crime. Népszabadság in contrast used discursive strategies 
that emphasised tolerance through a respect of basic human rights and non-discrimination. In the 
integration debate we found that the ‘end of political correctness’ and ‘peculiar Roma culture’ topoi 
were used to stress the cultural distinctiveness of the Roma (not in genetic but cultural terms). The 
recognition of this distinctiveness, however, does not point to the integration of the Roma but on the 
contrary, to their continued exclusion, as was the case with kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet as well. 
The main element of the Roma’s distinctiveness is their deliberate exclusion.  
These findings point to a growing tendency of non-tolerant public discourse in Hungary that spread to 
almost all corners of the political spectrum. There are several political and social processes that 
contribute to this trend of non-toleration. First, the rise of radical racist discourses which has 
accompanied the political successes of the radical right wing party, Jobbik, has set the political and 
media agenda by thematising the ‘Roma question’.  
Second, non-radical political and public figures from both the left and right have responded to this 
thematisation of the ‘Roma question’ in a way that has not excluded non-tolerant racist discourses. 
Indeed, they have often been complicit in legitimating non-tolerant discourses. By acting as partners in 
‘breaking taboos’, they have simultaneously been breaking with the tolerant language that supposedly 
accompanied those taboos.  
Third, in the current non-tolerant climate, accepting the (cultural) difference of other ethnic groups has 
become impossible. ‘Roma cultural difference’ instead was ‘accepted’, though in a somewhat 
ambiguous way: its existence was acknowledged, but as grounds for deliberate exclusion. This is 
similar to what we witnessed in France in the 1970s when the new right misappropriated the slogan of 
the left, ‘le droit à la différence’ for their own purposes, claiming that immigrants have the right to 
difference because their culture is so different from French culture that integration is not a possibility. 
Similarly, in the UK, cultural racists have claimed that other (immigrant) cultures cannot be 
integrated.  
Finally, in Hungary as in some other post-socialist countries, non-tolerance has troublingly become a 
rally cry of a good number of political and public actors, often irrespective of political affiliation. State 
institutions, political parties and the media have joined forces to fuel suspicion of Roma difference, be 
it biological or cultural. As a result, tolerance as a value and discourse has suffered, embraced by only 
a handful of actors increasingly marginal to the political mainstream.  
Hungary is thus a paradox. It recognises the Roma as culturally distinct; indeed, it reifies and 
essentialises their cultural distinctiveness. But this recognition is not based on respect, as we see in the 
ACCEPT framework. Rather, it is based on racism: the Roma are not just culturally distinct, they are 
culturally inferior, and that cultural inferiority prevents their full incorporation into Hungarian society. 
This is intolerance, feebly masked as cultural recognition. This intolerance may have the radical right 
as its strongest advocates, but what is perhaps most disturbing from our analysis is the extent to which 
the racism voiced by the radical right is used by the mainstream media and political actors as well. 
There is widespread consensus that Roma problem is just that: a problem, and the problem is with the 
Roma, and their deficient culture. This in a sense relieves majority Hungarians of responsibility for 
accommodating the Roma. Indeed, it becomes an argument for the non-tolerance of the Roma: their 
cultural deficiencies must not be tolerated any longer.  
This profound intolerance raises important questions about the relationship between racism and 
intolerance. To be sure, racism can be found in countries of immigration as well. But whilst this 
Minority Mobilisations in France and the United Kingdom: the Case of Muslim Organisations 
85 
racism typically only becomes explicit on the fringes in these other countries (claimed by the radical 
right or voiced on extremist websites), the Hungarian case shows how racism has gone mainstream in 
Hungary. The recent incidents we have examined in Hungary have been unscrupulously used to 
legitimate racism in ways that greatly expands the scope of intolerance.  
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The Embodiment of Tolerance in Discourses and Practices addressing Cultural and Religious 
Diversity in the Political Sphere in Ireland 
Iseult Honohan and Nathalie Rougier, University College Dublin 
 
Executive Summary 
This report examines the extent to which cultural and religious minorities participate as equals in Irish 
public, institutional and political life, and examines the avenues and obstacles to their participation, in 
order to explore the meaning of tolerance and tolerance-related concepts in Ireland and their 
embodiment in practice. 
This issue arises in an Ireland whose population, despite the economic downturn, has continued to 
increase in numbers and diversity in the first decade of the twenty first century,  
Political institutions in Ireland facilitate the inclusion of cultural and religious minorities in certain 
respects. Non-citizens are not excluded from employment in the public service or in specific 
occupations. While political rights in national elections are confined to Irish (and British citizens), 
Ireland has granted political rights to vote and stand in local elections to those resident for a minimum 
of six months, and has thus one of the more inclusive voting systems in the EU.   
The opportunity to stand for local elections has been taken up by a number of candidates from 
minority groups; some of these have been successful and in some cases have achieved considerable 
media notice. Political parties, however, were slow to recognise immigrants until the 2007 local 
elections, when most put up immigrant candidates. Immigrants have been relatively slow to mobilise 
and to register to vote. Aside from conventional electoral politics, migrant communities have also 
engaged in active participation and representation through the development of a variety of community 
structures and networks.   
Access to citizenship, a significant benchmark of inclusion in society and political life, may be seen 
(again in comparative European terms) as relatively inclusive in principle. Resident non-nationals can 
acquire citizenship after five years of residence, but with a number of other conditions. In addition, 
there is complete Ministerial discretion to award or reject applications. For many years, the numbers 
of those naturalising were very low, due to small number of applications, slow processing and a rather 
restrictive approach. In recent years this has changed considerably. Increasing numbers are 
naturalising, and the process has been speeded up, though the numbers refused are still high, and there 
is no process of appeal.  
Issues of recognition for cultural and religious groups have arisen most notably in connection with the 
claim by the Traveller community to be recognised as an ethnic group. This has been supported by the 
Equality Authority and the United Nations Periodic Review on Human Rights group, but has been 
resisted by successive governments. With respect to other areas of recognition, Ireland has not signed 
the European Convention of Nationality nor the Convention on Minority Languages. 
Migrant inclusion is favoured by the Equality Act, which forbids discrimination on nine grounds, 
including race and religion, by a series of government anti-racism campaigns, and by the institution of 
a Minister for Integration, from 2007 to 2011. The office of the minister was intended to co-ordinate 
policy with respect to migrants across government departments. This has now been replaced by a co-
ordinating office without a dedicated Minister of State.  A consultative Ministerial Council with 
appointed migrant minority representatives, which was set up in 2010, has been discontinued.  These 
shifts may, along with shifts identified in official language, constitute a wider trend to interpreting 
integration in a more assimilationist way.  
Ireland has not seen the emergence of any real right-wing, anti-immigrant party, or any significant 
campaign against immigrants.  Nor has there been a strong emphasis on security concerns in 
connection with immigrants. At the same time there is evidence of a significant underlying level of 
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racial discrimination, and of intolerant and racist discourses, including by political and media figures. 
It is not clear whether instances of racially motivated violence have increased in frequency or 
seriousness or whether they are being better documented, and it is clear that only a percentage of these 
is reported.  
In order to explore in more depth and details the meaning of the three levels of acceptance: intolerance 
– toleration – respect/recognition, in political and public life, and how they manifest themselves, this 
report focuses on a case study of a recent challenge relating to religious and cultural diversity in Irish 
public institutions - the controversy that emerged in 2007 when a member of the Sikh community 
applied for membership of the Garda (Police) Reserve.  
While still small in numbers, the Sikh community is quite visible. After 9/11, Sikh men in Ireland 
became more liable to encounter prejudice and racism because of their turban and beard, which led 
some to equate Sikhs with followers of militant Islam. It is a significant part of the Sikh tradition to 
serve in the military and police forces.  As the part-time Garda Reserve was being set up, a Sikh 
applicant, who had taken part in the training process, was informed just before being commissioned 
that he would not be allowed to wear his turban with the uniform. The man refused to accept this, and 
did not take up his post. The issue sparked a significant media and political debate, in which 
journalists, politicians, NGOS and others took a wide variety of positions. The case was referred to the 
Equality Authority, which is still considering it. 
Our analysis of this case is based on desk research and empirical fieldwork, consisting of semi-
structured qualitative interviews with representatives of the Sikh community in Ireland, former and 
current politicians, representatives from NGOs working with migrants, migrant candidates, as well as 
a discussion group. Combining data gathered through the desk research and the empirical study, we 
employ a critical discourse analysis to highlight and discuss the main argumentation strategies 
evidenced in the controversy.  We interpret this as a case of official non-toleration of a practice, and 
non-accommodation of a primarily religious (though also cultural), new immigrant minority in the 
public service. 
 
Three main discursive topoi were identified in the turban debate.  
The first, ‘this is a uniform’ topos, encompasses arguments addressing the most basic, obvious and 
ostensibly rational arguments advanced: the very definition, justification and meaning of ‘a uniform’. 
The Gardai emphasised that the uniform represented the impartiality of the force, claimed to treat all 
religions equally, and drew attention to their concurrent intercultural policies. The opponents of the 
ban questioned the possibility or desirability of homogeneity, and the implied secularity of the Irish 
state - and of the police force in particular, pointing to the acceptance of Catholic practices, and argued 
for the equal recognition of all religions within the police force. The argument that the uniform 
requirement was specifically important for a police force was countered by pointing to its acceptance 
in police forces in other countries, including Canada, England, and notably, Northern Ireland. 
The second topos – ‘discrimination and rights’ encompassed arguments that the uniform argument 
covered up more contentious issues, and that the decision in fact amounted to religious, if not racial, 
discrimination. This was denied by the Gardai, who pointed that they accepted the Sikh reserve on 
condition that he wear the uniform hat.  It was also claimed that the ban was contrary to the 
equivalence of rights under the Good Friday Agreement and to the country’s own National Plan 
against Racism and Migration Nation policies, which called for the reasonable accommodation of 
diversity. 
The third topos identified was the ‘This is Ireland – how far do we have to go to accommodate?’’ This 
encompasses arguments dealing with the recognition of and support for diversity in Irish society, as 
the issue of the turban developed into a broader reflection on the perception and accommodation of 
religious and cultural minorities in Ireland and on the nature of Irish interculturalism. Arguments were 
advanced that newcomers have to recognize the Irish way of doing things, perhaps reflecting a certain 
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sense of threat to the cultural character of a small country from the novelty and difference brought by 
immigrants. Others emphasized the difficulties, including segregation, experienced by countries seen 
as having pursued strong multicultural policies. In response arguments were advanced that integration 
is a two-way process, and criticisms of the slow pace and limits of accommodation and engagement 
with new minorities, even in view of the adoption of an ostensibly interculturalist approach. 
 
This case provides an interesting contrast to the controversy over the wearing of the hijab in Irish 
schools, which concluded with broad acceptance, where the hijab could be incorporated into the 
uniform. The contrast may indicate the limits or selectivity of toleration and accommodation in Ireland 
In interpreting the Sikh turban case in terms of the spectrum of non-toleration, toleration, 
respect/recognition, the ban may initially be understood as exemplifying the limits of recognition or 
accommodation of diversity in Ireland, in not adjusting a policy which creates an obstacle to full 
participation of a minority in public institutions. It may be argued, however, that it also involves the 
border between toleration and non-toleration. To the extent that the turban is a non-negotiable aspect 
of the Sikh faith, and banning it thus effectively prevents any Sikh from joining the police force, the 
ban constitutes a policy of exclusion, limiting the rights and career options not only of ‘new migrants’ 
but also of their Irish-born children. It thus represents a case of non-toleration of the practice, and non-
accommodation of religious/cultural diversity in the public service in Ireland. 
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Local policies of exclusion: the Italian case 
Maurizio Ambrosini and Elena Caneva, University of Milan 
 
Executive Summary 
This paper deals with those local policies which have been introduced in the last few years to 
guarantee urban safety, regulate economic activities, adjust the measures of the welfare state, etc. The 
aim of these local policies was apparently to protect general interests (e.g. urban standards, 
compromised by the presence of annoying beggars), and to suppress any behaviour that was 
considered annoying, indecent or ill-mannered. Nevertheless, many of these have limited immigrants’ 
rights indirectly or directly and favoured their exclusion. We will call them “local policies of 
exclusion”.  
Before going deeply into the issue, the paper discusses the Italian context as regards the political 
participation and representation of migrants. Migrants currently have few political rights in Italy. The 
citizenship law is the most restrictive in EU15: it is based on ius sanguinis and states that citizenship 
can be obtained after 10 years residence for non EU nationals and after 4 years for EU nationals. 
Besides that, the various immigration laws introduced from the ’90s until today have not dealt with the 
political participation and representation of migrants and they have not provided legislative changes in 
order to introduce political rights for migrants (even at local level). These restrictions and the 
unwillingness to change the law depend partly on the political climate: the issues of security and 
control were central in the political programmes of the right-wing coalition (especially of the Northern 
League party) and influenced its victory in the 2008 elections (by contrast, in the 2011 administrative 
elections there was a turnaround). To guarantee these issues, the right-wing coalition sustained (and 
still sustains) the necessity to combat the illegal flow of migrants, fight against crime and repress 
public disorder, defend local cultural identities, give priority to Italian citizens in accessing  welfare 
services.  
Although at national level most policies are constraining, at local level some initiatives have been 
promoted by a few administrations to favour the political participation of migrants. Firstly, some 
Regions and Municipalities modified their Statutes autonomously to give migrants the right to vote. 
Nevertheless, these modifications were rejected by the State Council which declared that national 
institutions rather than local bodies should cover the issue of voting rights. Consequently, these local 
administrations gave migrants the possibility to participate politically by setting up two special bodies, 
the Municipal Consultative Body and the Additional Foreign Council. In addition, they introduced the 
right to vote for non EU nationals at least in District Councils, Circuit Councils and Local 
Consultative Referenda. But these two solutions (the bodies and the voting rights in sub-local 
councils) did not resolve the issue of political participation and representation of minorities. Indeed the 
bodies are consultative and they have no power to legislate. Besides that, the lists of those who are 
eligible to vote for the bodies are incomplete. In the same way, the voting in sub-local councils was 
rejected by the Constitutional Court and by the State Council, which declared that the issue of voting 
rights to immigrants falls under the jurisdiction of the national State.  
Nor do immigrant associations have political power. They have actually been built to satisfy cultural, 
social and religious needs. They are places where migrants meet, stay together, share cultural or 
religious practices, exchange information. They are usually formed by migrants of the same ethnic 
and/or national origins, they are locally organized and they operate only in their municipalities. 
Besides that, they have few relations with Italian institutions and they lack a framework of 
institutionalization and public support. For all these reasons they are not suitable for representing 
migrants politically. Consequently, migrants’ participation in the public arena generally occurs 
through the intermediation of Italian associations and organizations, i.e. no-profit and voluntary 
organizations, and trade unions. These organizations firstly offered assistance and legal protection to 
migrants, facilitated their regularization as residents and workers and their access to social services. 
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Now migrants are also enrolled in trade unions and some hold positions within them. Furthermore, in 
the last few years trade unions, NGOs and charity organizations have defended migrants  as regards 
the local policies of exclusion.  
 
The focus of this study 
This study focuses on how the issues of intolerance, tolerance, respect and recognition of ethnic 
diversity have been thematised in Italian politics. The topic of “local policies of exclusion” is a case in 
point and it is a current and debated question, as these measures became fundamental in local politics 
in 2008 and they are still recurrent in several local administrations. An important aspect related to this 
issue is the introduction of the Security Package, i.e. a set of norms introduced by the Berlusconi 
government in 2008 and 2009, in which the cities’ mayors obtained more power: they could 
autonomously introduce measures in order to guarantee urban safety, without any approval at national 
level. So, many municipalities, mostly governed by the North League or by right-wing coalitions, 
began to introduce local regulations to maintain public order, guarantee urban standards, defend 
citizens from crime, danger, annoying or indecent behaviour. Most of these actually targeted migrants 
directly or indirectly, such as the ban on playing cricket in public parks or the bonus for new-born 
babies reserved only for Italians, the requirement of a minimum income to register in the Registry 
Office, etc. For this reason they provoked reactions from above and below. From above, the UNAR 
(National Office against racial discrimination) exercised the right to carry out checks. It intervened in 
the most flagrant cases of local measures which were discriminatory and it expressed its opinion and 
asked for the removal or the revision of such measures. From below, the advocacy coalition of pro-
immigrants gave rise to protest initiatives and legal battles, often producing positive results. Of course, 
the introduction of these measures, the protests and the legal battles were accompanied by public and 
political debates, media outcry and they attracted the attention of public opinion. The aim of this study 
was therefore to analyze frames and discourses used by mayors, politicians, and civil society actors to 
talk about the issue of “local policies of exclusion”.  
 
Data and methods 
This report is based on desk research and fieldwork. In terms of desk research we collected statistical 
data, policy documents, judgments of courts and newspaper articles. The aim was to collect frames 
and discourses of the political and social actors involved in the processes regarding the local policies 
of exclusion. This phase started at the beginning of the research and ran in parallel to the fieldwork. 
The fieldwork was conducted between October 2011 and January 2012 in the metropolitan areas of 
Milan and Brescia (another province in the Lombardy region, where many ordinances were introduced 
by small or medium size municipalities) and was based on qualitative interviews. More specifically, 
we conducted 15 semi-structured qualitative interviews with people from different backgrounds: 4 
lawyers, 4 members of trade unions, 4 members of no-profit associations, a member of the opposition 
within a municipality, a Regional councillor of the Northern League Party in Lombardy and finally a 
city councillor of the previous administration in Milan (centre-right). Most of them were interviewed 
because they were directly involved in the processes regarding the local policies of exclusion, like the 
members of trade unions or the two lawyers who fought against them in courts. Others were contacted 
because they work in associations and organizations which deal with defending and representing 
immigrants.  
The analysis of the interview data was based on the tradition of qualitative discourse analysis, and a 
critical perspective was used to analyze the main argumentation strategies adopted by the various 
actors interviewed.  
 
Main findings 
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The analysis of secondary sources and of qualitative interviews highlights that the “local policies of 
exclusion” are “institutionalized forms of intolerance”: they are drawn up and enforced by legitimate 
bodies (i.e. the Municipalities), which are elected democratically and which influence social life 
within the local communities. They are institutional obstacles to the rights of several minorities (civil, 
social) and to their freedom of expressing their cultural and religious identity. Nevertheless, there are 
justified by mayors using three types of frames.   
The first is about  urban safety and decency: some local policies are justified because they guarantee 
citizens’ security and preserve urban decorum and social order, e.g. the controls on places of worship 
or checks on the conditions of houses in the city centres. The second frame is the scarcity of economic 
and social resources: the local policies are necessary because the social benefits have been reduced, so 
they have to be set aside only for Italians or for those who have been residents in the town for a long 
period (e.g. bonus for babies reserved only for babies born to Italian parents). Only Italian citizens 
have the rights to access some social and economic benefits, whereas immigrants have to be excluded 
because they are “guests”. Finally, the third frame is about the defence of Italian identity, culture and 
traditions. The prohibition on opening mosques, new kebab shops or to ban non traditional activities in 
the city centres is a case in point. Here the local policies are justified because they defend the Italian 
(and local) culture from immigrants, who are perceived as invaders. They are seen as necessary to 
avoid contamination and changes in Italian cities, culture and habits.  
By contrast, the main frame used by civil society actors to fight against these policies is that of 
discrimination. These measures are in fact discriminatory. They damage fundamental human rights, 
such as the freedom of religion, personal freedom, equality among people, etc. Human rights must be 
guaranteed, and are not open to debate or subject to political discretion.. This is also the frame used in 
courts, and it has often been cited in judgments   condemning the local policies.  
With regard to our conceptual framework, this study shows that the local policies of exclusion are 
institutionalized forms of intolerance that legitimize xenophobic attitudes and behaviours. They are in 
fact formulated and approved within democratic institutions, and justified because they defend citizens 
under three aspects: personal safety and public order, the distribution of economic and social benefits, 
the cultural and religious identity of the country. Besides that, they have symbolic and cultural effects: 
they mark the boundaries between "us" and "them", between the legitimate "owners of the land" and 
newcomers who expect to settle.  
By contrast, civil society actors fight against the intolerance of local policies of exclusion referring not 
to the concepts of tolerance or respect or recognition, but to those of human rights. In their discourses 
the issue at stake is not that of drawing boundaries among what should/must/can/could be tolerated, 
respected and recognised, but of protecting people from having their basic human rights compromised. 
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Do Silesians Exist and can Silesia be Autonomous? Limits of Ethno-Political Tolerance in Poland  
Michał Buchowski and Katarzyna Chlewińska, Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań  
 
Executive Summary 
The report ‘Do Silesians Exist and Silesia be Autonomous? Limits of Ethno-Political Tolerance in 
Poland’, presents the case of the Silesian Autonomy Movement (Ruch Autonomii Śląska, hereafter 
RAS), its participation in political life at a regional level, and the efforts in promoting regionalism as 
well as the idea of a Silesian nation. RAS is an organisation of an educational, cultural and political 
profile fighting for the restoration of Upper Silesia’s political autonomy on the grounds of its specific 
borderland status and a history of autonomy granted to Silesia in the interwar period, and supporting 
Silesian identity-building.  
This case study was inspired by controversies around Silesians and RAS caused by The Report on the 
State of the Republic published by the major right-wing party Law and Justice (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość – hereafter PIS). The document is a list of charges against the ruling party, Platforma 
Obywatelska (Civic Platform, hereafter PO). The right-wing rhetoric of the oppressed nation and the 
threat of Polish unity used in the report was a tool used for discrediting PO. The Report… accuses the 
ruling party of a lack of patriotism and of indifference to a progressing degeneration of national 
identity. The statement that triggered a heated country-wide debate and immediate reactions in the 
circles of Silesian activists (mainly RAS activists and politicians), the German minority and other 
minority communities is a short passage expounding a view that ‘Silesianness’ (Silesian identity) is a 
‘camouflaged German option’, i.e. connecting Silesian organisations promoting autonomy and the 
strengthening of Silesian cultural identity with some kind of an anti-Polish ideology, without even 
attempting to explain this notion and casual link.  
After this strictly political debate stopped, the controversies around Silesia and Silesians have brought 
one remarkable and unexpected outcome, i.e. a revival of interest in ‘Silesianness’, Silesians’ national 
existence, rights and identity. Many people in the region have apparently re-invented themselves as 
members of the ‘Silesian nation’.  
In contrast to most other European countries, national and ethnic minorities in Poland are numerically 
insignificant; the result of the 2002 Census showed that, already then, Silesians were by far the largest 
declared minority (173 000), followed by Germans (153 000). Migrant communities are small and 
practically absent in political life. However, this largest declared minority group is not recognised by 
the state neither as a national, nor as an ethnic minority. Silesians are politically active, have their 
organisations and leaders, and are present in public discourses. All this makes Silesians particularly 
interesting in terms of the issue of the tolerance of diversity in political life.  
The latest Census (carried out in 2011) confirmed the fact that Poland is, at least in comparison to 
many other European states, ethnically homogenous, and over 91% of the population declare Polish 
national identity (36 007 000). The most numerous minority identities are: Silesian (809 000), 
Kashubian (212 000) and German (109 000). These results confirmed previous ones, but the 
significant changes in the numbers surprised even Silesian activists. More than two decades after 
democratic change, it seems that the growing involvement of minority activists in the efforts to 
promote a minority identity and the increasing visibility of ‘non-traditional’ minorities’ in public life 
have brought astounding effects.  
The case of RAS, Silesians and their political and cultural status has been constantly discussed in 
Polish public debates since the 1990s, often in relation to contemporary political challenges. It serves 
as an example of post-transformational tensions between the policy and practice of national unity and 
the grassroots efforts of people in some regions to change the dominant cultural schemata. In the 
centralised Polish state, any challenge to undermine this kind of monolithic socio-political setup, 
which at the same time is permeated by the image of a homogenous Polish nation, any claim to 
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recognise not only minority rights, but also the possibility to exercise them, is often interpreted as 
dangerous and as undermining nation-state integrity. Attempts at implementing constitutionally  
granted entitlements to cultural visibility and the execution of civic rights are perceived either as 
unsubstantiated and unnecessary demands of an insignificant number of people, or as a result of the 
overambitious goals of some activists that manipulate history and people. They are presented as 
presenting a threat to homogeneous society.   
This case study shows, on the one hand, how the opportunities offered as a result Poland’s 
participation in the structures of the European Union (especially European support for regional 
movements and minority organisations) are actually used by local activists and minority organisations, 
and, on the other hand, how they are interpreted within the mainstream political debate. The attacks on 
RAS illustrate strong universalising tendencies and unifying themes present in the rhetoric of the 
nationalistically minded segments of the society and rightist politicians, who have used the case to 
weaken the ruling coalition and frequently use it as an argument against political opponents. In short, 
it illustrates how the issue of basic civil rights can be a hostage of political stalemate as well as how it 
may unveil the structural mechanisms of political life.  
This report, focusing on RAS’s reception and rejection, raises issue of the limits of tolerance in 
political life in Poland in the sphere of the political representation of minorities, and it shows the 
boundary-drawing process in the political life of the country.  
The report is based on secondary sources (scientific literature on Silesia and Silesians, documents, 
reports and expert documents on minorities and their political participation in Poland, on articles in 
newspapers commenting on the ‘camouflaged German option’ controversy), as well as primary data 
(interviews) concerning the political activity of RAS. The secondary sources are to a large extent 
Internet sources – web sites, forums and comments. The interviews were conducted in January and 
February 2012. Four semi-structured, very long (2 hours each) qualitative interviews with RAS leaders 
and members in the two main cities of Silesia – Katowice and Opole – were conducted. In the 
interpretation of the materials the method of thematic analysis was applied.  
The analysis attempts to answer the questions about the limits of ethno-political tolerance in Poland: 
(1) What kind of groups and claims can be tolerated in political life? (2) On what terms can these 
groups express their difference and fight for their civic rights? (3) And, what cannot be tolerated in 
public/political life in Poland? In the course of the so-called thematic analysis we identify three major 
themes and apply discursive means by which we try to answer these three questions.  
The analysis revealed that there is a limited access of minorities to public debates and their political 
participation is restricted; it demonstrates a general lack of support extended to minorities in their 
efforts to participate in public life as equal partners (e.g., the accusation that RAS abuses preferential 
democratic rules designed to promote actual ethnic minorities, such as Germans). This situation can be 
classified as a lack of acceptance and recognition of the minorities in the political sphere. This applies 
both to the marginalisation of recognised minorities (there is a formal possibility of participation in 
political life), and the paradox of Silesians – the largest, unrecognised minority accused of the treason 
of Polishness.  
There is a lack of tolerance at the state level and a partial tolerance at the local level towards the 
identity-based activity of Silesians and its political manifestations. However, thesupport for RAS in 
the region is relatively narrow, which supportsour thesis from our previous studies (Buchowski and 
Chlewińska 2010; 2011) that Polish society conceives itself as a homogeneous ethnic entity, a unified 
and integral nation. Public discourse favours patriotic and national perspectives and there is no room 
for the equal participation of minorities in public life, or, at least, any leeway is constricted for them 
and it is defined by the dominant majority. 
However, all this does not mean that there is no hope for change in this area. Due to their growing 
effectiveness, modern activity strategies applied by RAS are emulated by other political forces in the 
region and elswhere. Silesians are increasingly regarded as a social force that cannot be longer 
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ignored; for instance, RAS activists participate in the ruling coalition at the regional level and 
Silesians’ representatives got invited to the parliamentary committee on minorities, which indicates a 
change in the politicians’ approach to the phenomenon of ‘Silesianness’). It may happen that the 
Silesians will pluralise Polish political life without necessarily achieving their own goals.  
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Acceptance or Lack of Tolerance towards Minorities in Romanian Public Administration  
Ioana Lupea, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Narcis Iordache, Romanian Academic Society  
 
Executive Summary 
On the occasion of the Hungarian Revolution Day on March 15 2010, Mr.Barna performed a public 
show in the streets, which portrayed Avram Iancu on trial and later sentenced to death for crimes 
against the Hungarians during the 1848 Revolution. Csibi Barna’s protest, an ethnic Hungarian, 
Romanian civil servant and keen promoter of a Hungarian ethnic autonomous region Szekler Land 
who hanged a doll representing a Romanian national hero, was a test of tolerance for the society and a 
challenge for the Romanian political elite and the relevant public institutions. This event, with its 
many implications and developments, is a tolerance boundary conflict case between the majority and 
the minority. While the Hungarian minority, unaccustomed to its minority status, intends to move the 
tolerance border by requesting a new public status through the recognition of collective rights, for the 
majority of ethnic Romanians, the limit is much lower. The majority is intolerant when it comes to the 
institutionalization of any ethnic differences, which would require the public presence of ethnic 
diversity (Robotin, 2002). Through the Romanian media, political representatives and state 
institutions, the majority asks the minority to display a civic loyalty beyond the formal-legal 
obligations, and expresses its intolerance towards what it considers to be the lack of loyalty toward the 
Romanian state, through its national symbols.  
The case of Csibi Barna proves the paradoxical situation of Romania, where a strong legislative and 
institutional framework against discrimination does exist, but without any substantial effect because of 
the intolerance towards the other community’s views and interpretation of historical events, which in 
turn are used to justify the current political designs. As Mungiu-Pippidi argued (1999) the two groups 
have separate and opposite views of entitlement, grounded in different interpretations of history. 
Despite the strong centralization of the Romanian school curricula, the two groups are socialized into 
two antagonistic versions of history. Amplified by the political entrepreneurs, this leads to an 
environment of intolerance and distrust manifested on every occasion.  
 
Κeywords 
Csibi Barna, Romanian-Hungarian relationship, dual loyalty, mithological blockage, authonomy for 
Szekler Land, regionalization, tolerance, recognition  
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Intolerant discourses about migrants in Catalan politics 
Flora Burchianti and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona 
 
Executive Summary 
Spain has become the first country of immigration in Europe and has received more than 4 million 
immigrants since 2000. But unlike other European countries, no important extreme-right party in 
terms of electoral results has existed in the country since the re-establishment of a democratic regime 
at the end of the 1970s. In addition Spanish policy toward immigrants settled in the country is said to 
be fairly progressive, in particular because of the usefulness of migrants for Spanish economy and 
welfare system. But the financial crisis experienced by the country since 2008 is setting up a new deal 
for how Spanish politics is managing migration issues and cultural diversity. This new situation 
deserves to be examined from the angle of political discourses. During the two last years, coinciding 
with the economic crisis in Spain and several electoral campaigns, anti-immigrant and intolerant 
political discourse in relation with migration have been at the forefront of public discourses. Intolerant 
statements have attracted differently media and public attention. While some have been almost ignored 
by media and other political actors, others have attracted a huge public and media attention and 
created important controversies. How to deal with the rise of non-toleration is undoubtedly one of the 
main challenges that face Spanish politics for the years coming.  
Case study 
The study focuses on Catalonia due to its particular position within Spain. Catalonia is the first 
autonomous community to have experienced important immigration flows, especially since the late 
nineties. It is still one of the autonomous communities with the main proportion of resident foreigners 
(15.7%) and the second community regarding the proportion of non-communitarian foreigners 
(11.7%). The Catalan policy toward migrants has always been considered as the most integrative 
policy in Spain and a model of acceptance at European level. The Catalan administration and its 
policies have always emphasised the acceptance of migrants, especially by recognizing equal rights 
between nationals and immigrants and pressing the Spanish State for a more inclusive policy and the 
empowerment of autonomous communities. It also succeeded in articulating the definition of the 
Catalan citizenship to the reception of non-Catalan people (foreigners or Spanish) in a civic-inclusive 
way and not in an ethnic-exclusive way. In December 2008, the parliamentary groups, except Popular 
party, signed the National Agreement on immigration, which reaffirms their commitment for building 
inclusion along three lines: “Management of migratory flows and access to the job market”, “Adapting 
public services to a diverse society” and “Integration in a common public culture”. But, despite its 
fairly progressive and comprehensive policy toward migrants, Catalonia has also experienced several 
important local controversies about migration in the last years. The report focuses on three of these 
controversies which serve as an entry to understand the discursive repertoires of intolerance toward 
migrants and also to understand the context in which these discourses are put forward. The three 
controversies are: 
- The local exclusion from city census and basic welfare of undocumented immigrants in the city of 
Vic: In January 2010, the city council of Vic (Barcelona province, pop. 40.000) voted the ban of 
unauthorized migrants from the city census (padrón), which is the only way for them to access public 
welfare provisions and services (health, education, social services...). In Spain, this registration is a 
right and a duty no matter the administrative situation. The ban has raised an important debate in Spain 
about the right of municipalities to do so and about the possibility for undocumented immigrants to 
access basic rights. 
- The “anti-Roma campaign” in the city of Badalona: Candidates of the Popular Party to May 2011 
municipal elections have put the anti-immigrant rhetoric at the centre of their campaign. This was 
particularly the case in the city of Badalona (pop. 215.000), a close suburb of Barcelona, in which the 
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candidate and actual mayor of the town has based his campaign on targeting the Romanian Roma who 
have settled in the town for bringing insecurity, crime and incivility. 
- The “burqa” ban proposals in the city of Lleida and across Catalonia: In 2010, several towns of 
Catalonia decided to vote proposals banning the wearing of religious veils covering the face, such as 
burqa and niqab, in public buildings. The first and most publicized case has been the one of the 
provincial capital of Lleida (pop. 131.000), ruled by the socialist party, and which ban has raised 
contention across the country. In this case, the contention was whether the ban proposals were 
stigmatizing migrants or, conversely, decisions enlightened by human rights values and ensuring 
security. 
In addition, the absence of an electorate for far-right political parties in Spain is currently challenged 
in Catalonia, where a new far-right political party named the Platform for Catalonia (PxC), averse to 
migration and, above all, to resident Muslims, has been created in 2002. Although its electoral scores 
are still very weak in comparison with other European countries (2,4% voters at Catalan level), its 
audience is growing fast from an election to the next.  
Catalonia thus undoubtedly appears as a “laboratory” for Spanish politics concerning issues related to 
cultural diversity.  
Method 
This report draws on a qualitative research methodology to study political discourses and policies 
which express intolerance toward migration and cultural diversity. The methodology chosen to 
research on this challenge combines a content analysis of secondary sources and semi-structured 
qualitative interviews.  
Evidences from other scholars who demonstrated the non explicit and ambiguous presence of racism 
and prejudices in elite's public discourses have oriented the research towards the study of discourses 
accompanying policies and interviews rather than party manifestos or public texts which are much 
more controlled by the “political correctness” when it comes to migration and diversity issues. We 
also chose to examine altogether political discourses, policies and practices. What is the discourse 
accompanying the policy? Are all the policy-makers and representatives producing the same discourse 
on the topic? Is this discourse changing along the controversy which occurred? What are the counter-
discourses and who is producing them? Focusing on controversies and policies and not only on 
explicit anti-immigrant discourse of far-right parties enables to emphasize the plurality of actors and 
topics involved.  
The desk research has been conducted between September and November 2011 and consisted mainly 
in collecting secondary sources. Newspapers materials have been collected on the three cases studied 
for the period between January 2010 and June 2011 (end of municipal elections) in seven Spanish (3) 
and Catalan (4) newspapers. The second part of the desk research consisted in the collection and 
analysis of administrative, policy and civil society documents. We examined in particular: the minutes 
of the city councils of the case studies and Catalan parliament during the controversies, public 
positions of civil society organisations and public reports.  
15 semi-structured interviews were carried out between November and December 201 with relevant 
actors who had taken part in one or more of the three controversies (10) and leaders of the main 
Catalan political parties (ICV, ERC, PSC, CiU and PP). The list of interviews and interview guide are 
provided in appendix. 
Main Findings  
The report focuses on two dimensions of intolerance embedded in political discourses on migration. 
Firstly, it focuses on the framing of the political discourses, especially during the three controversies 
studied. Secondly, it focuses on the role of political parties in the regulation of the discourse in 
Catalonia.  
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Framing processes offer a great resource to analyse the political discourses on migrants and cultural 
diversity in Catalonia. We have identified different modalities of what we call “intolerance” frames, 
defined as emphasizing the impossibility to maintain a tolerant attitude toward migrants (or particular 
groups of migrants) and the need to preserve the local society and its cohesion above the acceptance of 
migrants’ values, practices or accommodation. Intolerance is only one of the way in which migration 
and cultural diversity can be framed but we assume that this frame has been more and more present in 
public discourses since the economic crisis.  
Each of the three local controversies appeals to different framing processes on the challenge which 
was supposedly faced by political representatives, each one being perceived as important for Catalan 
politics. Three principal “intolerance” frames are identified in the report.  
1) Intolerance based on the perception of migration as bringing insecurity, delinquency and problems 
of coexistence. 
2) Intolerance based on the definitions of migration as a threat for the cultural homogeneity of 
Catalonia and its fundamental values.  
3) Intolerance based on a perception of migrants as competitors with locals for limited resources. 
Through all these “intolerance” frames, migration is perceived as undermining the social cohesion and 
norms of civility that are attached to the local society. In the terms of non-toleration, the ones who are 
perceived as “others” then have to merge in the local society (if possible) or be excluded from it so as 
to preserve cohesion.  
In the political landscape of Catalonia, two different discourses claim to halt the toleration that has 
been implemented so far toward migrants. They both start from considering that migration and cultural 
diversity come along with problems posed to the social cohesion, and cannot be only perceived as 
positive for the society. But while some express non-toleration to practices and values of migrants they 
deem problematic, the discourse of others go beyond non-toleration to express exclusion, rejection or 
hate toward (groups of) migrants or religious minorities (Muslims) per se. 
 
The case studies show that non-toleration toward migrants is increasingly expressed by representatives 
of mainstream parties. Anti-immigrant statements would be a manner to test the limits of what can be 
said or not about migration in Catalan politics. Emerging political discourses stretch the limits of 
intolerance toward migrants. The second part of the analysis then focuses on party politics to provide 
elements which help understanding the rise of intolerance. Unlike other countries the influence of the 
radical-right remains limited and the demand for tough discourse and policy on immigration is 
ambiguous. However, the succession of electoral campaigns during the years 2010-2011 in Catalonia, 
in combination with the financial crisis, has undoubtedly created opportunities for a change of 
discourse toward migrants. The relative novelty of international migration and the rather tolerant 
discourse about the “usefulness” of migrants which prevailed during the years 2004-2008, are 
challenged now by the raise of intolerance frames. The most interesting feature of this situation is the 
laissez-faire policy and the trivialisation of the issue done by the political and administrative leaders.  
We thus shift our attention toward the organisational dynamics of political parties that could influence 
the way in which the issue is framed. Firstly, the presence of racism in Catalan politics is discarded by 
political leaders who understand intolerance as an electioneering strategy. The trivialization of 
intolerance and racism then explains in part the laissez-faire policy. Secondly, the organisation of 
parties as stratarchies, with an important autonomy within the party of local and Catalan levels, 
explains also the lack of mobilisation and sanctions against the representatives who express 
intolerance even if it goes against party's ideology. 
This demonstrates the importance of the context and of partisan dynamics when it comes to 
understanding the use of intolerance frames in the political life. In Catalonia, we understand that 
intolerance toward migrants expressed by mainstream political leaders and representatives is allowed 
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by the party as far as it does not undermine its core values or challenge its position within party 
competition. Frames must be coherent to the belief system and experience of the people who is 
mobilized but also to some extent, to the ideological system of the political party or leader. Denial of 
racism and the reference to the autonomy of representatives enables in our view the preservation of the 
position of the party, while testing at the same time the impact of a new discourse on migration. The 
attitude of laissez-faire also serves other purposes for all stakeholders: it appears as a strategy to 
marginalize these discourses by not letting them receive media coverage and it serves also to preserve 
the representation of Catalonia as a welcoming and tolerant territory. And indeed, expressions of 
intolerance tend to change the meaning of Catalan citizenship and notably make it pass from a civic-
inclusive definition to a cultural-exclusive one. The backlash against multiculturalism is located 
around the question of civic behaviours and values that sustain citizenship in Catalonia. This takes the 
opposite view of the central political concept of “convivencia” (life together), which has been used in 
integration policies to stress the positive effect of the social plurality and of the coexistence of diverse 
cultures or religions. 
The report ends by addressing two challenges on the path of the fight of intolerance and racism in the 
political life. Firstly, the tension between freedom of speech and the fight against hate speech and 
racism, which points toward judicial solutions. Secondly, the tension between laissez-faire attitudes 
and the institutionalization of anti-racism, which points toward the regulation of political discourses.  
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The Swedish Sámi Parliament: A Challenged Recognition? 
Ulf Mörkenstam, Andreas Gottardis and Hans Ingvar Roth, Stockholm University 
 
Executive Summary 
When the new Instrument of Government was adopted by the Swedish Parliament in 2010, the special 
status of the Swedish Sámi people was recognised constitutionally for the first time. Already in 1993, 
however, the popularly elected Swedish Sámi Parliament (Sametinget) was established in order to 
grant the Sámi people cultural autonomy, and today the parliament is considered to be the main body 
to ensure Sámi self-determination. In many ways, the situation and status of the Sámi people can be 
said to be highly acknowledged and recognized in Sweden, where the political representation of the 
Sámi is institutionalised in and through the Sámi Parliament. This recognition of the Sámi people 
appears, however, to be challenged or undermined by different forms of discrimination and 
intolerance. There have, for instance, been several conflicts during the last few years on the right to 
use land and water for the maintenance of Sámi reindeer on private property, and there have been 
severe conflicts on the construction of wind power parks in traditional reindeer grazing areas. In its 
observations concerning how Sweden fulfils the conventions concerning the elimination of all forms 
of racial discrimination, the UN is regularly voicing concerns over these kind of issues, for instance, 
regarding the fact that the issue of ownership of land and water still has not been investigated, and 
over the Swedish Government’s passivity in regards to clarifying the borders for the reindeer grazing 
area. Moreover, according to a report from the Swedish Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination, 
the Sámi testifies to harassment in their day-to-day lives connected to their ethnic background. In spite 
of the demonstration of acceptance on a national and constitutional level, an intolerant and 
stereotypical understanding of the Sámi people thus seem to prevail.  
In this case study we investigate this potential coexistence of recognition and intolerance in the 
Swedish society. Our focus is the Swedish Sámi Parliament, as it represents the most radical 
institutionalized form of recognition of the Sámi people (and of any national minority in Sweden). The 
status of the parliament is as an administrative authority under the Swedish Government.. However, it 
is a popularly elected administrative authority and the parliament is assigned two different functions: 
as an administrative authority whose tasks are strictly regulated by law and as a popularly elected 
parliament representing the Sámi people. With the status as an administrative authority, the parliament 
is not granted any actual political power, such as a right of participation in decision-making, veto-
rights concerning administrative decisions or independent sources of income (like taxation rights). In 
2010 the Sámi Parliament was allocated a total amount of 185 146 000 SEK (around 19 405 000 
EUR), where all grants were directed towards its role as an administrative authority. 
By looking at the media coverage of the Swedish Sámi Parliament since its inauguration in 1993, we 
analyse how the parliament is conceptualised within the media discourse. We analysed the media 
coverage of the Sámi Parliament in eight national and local daily newspapers during the years 2005, 
2009-2011, there are no local or regional newspapers in Sámi in Sweden. We also analysed articles 
from the election years 1993, 1997, and 2001 (two elections) ten days before and ten days after the 
elections, and we started out by an analysis of the headlines of all the articles published in three non-
election years (1994, 2000, and 2011). Is the Sámi right to cultural autonomy or self-determination 
widely accepted in the Swedish society as portrayed by the media? Or is this institutional 
accommodation of the Sámi people challenged by a widespread intolerance? If so, what might the 
consequences of this intolerance be for the political representation of the Sámi? 
Our headline analysis clearly showed that the media discourse on the Sámi Parliament is characterized 
by a very limited set of topics out of which the political instability and the administrative performance 
of the parliament were most prominent. This is not too surprising as these topics obviously spring out 
of the dual role of the parliament as both representative body of the Sámi people and as an 
administrative authority under the Swedish government. More interesting, however, is that these topics 
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tend to be conceptualised as major problems and represented in a negatively biased way, as is often the 
case in news reporting on ethnic minorities. Headlines that refer to what can be considered as the 
normal activity of the parliament, like “the Sámi Parliament adopted the budget proposal”, are rather 
uncommon; instead, most of the examined headlines tend to focus on negative attributes such as, 
“’pure Balkan war in the Sámi Parliament’—a negotiator sort out the chaos”.  
When we turned our attention to the more comprehensive analysis of the Swedish press and its 
coverage of the Sámi Parliament, our focus was on how the problem of the parliament’s political 
instability and weak administrative performance was explained in and by the media. What kind of 
problem was the parliament represented to be? What news representations were produced and 
reproduced within the media discourse? What was taken for granted and thus not critically examined? 
The political instability of the parliament was basically explained in two different ways within 
discourse. In the first, the problem is considered to be external to the Sámi Parliament, as it is the 
institutional design of the parliament that hampers its representative capacity and constrains the 
political parties and the MPs. In the second way to explain the limited representative capacity, the 
problem is considered to be internal to the parliament. In this view the problem is typically represented 
to be a result of a persistent and unsolvable conflict between the political parties, a firm unwillingness 
to compromise or a personal antagonism between the MPs. The first way to explain the limited 
representative capacity of the Sámi Parliament is, however, marginal within the media discourse. It is 
the internal explanation that dominates, and it is important to point out that the order of discourse 
remains more or less unchanged during the period of our study. Our ambition is not to discuss or 
evaluate the accuracy of the different ways of explaining the problem. However, the implications of 
the different explanations are extremely severe. If the problem is external, the blame for the defects of 
the parliament is basically to be put on the Swedish state; it is primarily the design of the parliament 
that ought to be in focus of the discussion and, in a wider perspective, Swedish Sámi policy at large. 
But if the problem is considered to be internal—a conception of the parliament that dominates the 
media discourse—the blame is to be put on the Sámi themselves. In this perspective, the discussions 
tend to focus on the political parties and the individual MPs as elected representatives rather than the 
institutional prerequisites for their actual work.  
As in the case of the depiction of the representative capacity of the Sámi Parliament, the explanation 
of the weak administrative performance of the Sámi Parliament, we discerned two general 
explanations regarding the causes of this problem. Within the terms of the dominant discourse, the 
weak performance was assumed to result from individual incompetence of the MPs or the 
functionaries, immature behaviour or a not fully developed organisation and a further explanation 
could be strong and deeply engrained internal divisions between the subgroups of the Sámi population. 
The weak performance is thus explained by internal flaws. The alternative explanation to this problem 
is once again explained in terms of the institutional design of the parliament, i.e. external factors. The 
conclusion is thus similar to the analysis of the other problematic topic within the media discourse: if 
the problem is formulated as an internal problem, the Sámi officials are the ones to blame for the 
defects of the parliament. 
If we return to our research questions it appears as if the recognition of the Sámi as an indigenous 
people is widely accepted in the news representations of the Sámi Parliament, and the parliament in 
itself and the Sámi right to self-determination are not explicitly challenged. In the media discourse, 
however, a consensus can be found on the limited capacity of the Sámi Parliament to function as a 
representative body of the Sámi people and on its weak administrative performance, which—if true— 
must be considered to be a serious problem. On the one hand, the massive critique formulated in the 
media discourse could be seen as legitimate and a fulfilment of one of the major tasks of the media: to 
critically scrutinise political power. From this point of view a malfunctioning Sámi Parliament ought 
rightfully to be criticised, just like any other publicly elected body in Sweden (or elsewhere), and the 
elected MPs have to take their responsibility. Furthermore, the media discourse might be interpreted as 
mainly, or at least partly, reflecting an internal Sámi debate, not the attitudes of the dominant Swedish 
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society, as the articles often refer to or quote Sámi MPs and civil servants. However, the internal Sámi 
debate is much more complex than what is usually represented in the media. Earlier research also 
confirms that the Sámi MPs are worried about the how the parliament works in both its roles, but a 
fundamental problem according to them is the unsolved question of how the Sámi right to self-
determination ought to be interpreted and what it would mean in the day-to-day life of the Sámi 
Parliament.  
On the other hand, this one-sided news representation is problematic, and has consequences for the 
political representation of the Sámi, especially in a context where the right to self-determination—
what it means and ought to mean—is negotiated and re-negotiated in political practice. media 
discourse has both direct and indirect consequences for the political representation of the Sámi, 
delimiting their recognised right to self-determination. Directly, it affects the construction of a Sámi 
public sphere, indispensable for the parliament to function in its role a representative body. The news 
reporting is limited in scope as it, as we have seen, privileges reporting on internal conflicts and 
individual behaviour and tend to neglect or ignore fundamental political problems of the Sámi people, 
thus it contributes to a de-politicisation of Sámi politics. Furthermore, it contributes to a conception of 
the parliament as problematic and dysfunctional, thereby undermining the potential level of trust of its 
constituency. Indirectly, the emphasis on the democratic and administrative immaturity of the Sámi 
parliament reproduces stereotypical images of the Sámi as unable to handle their own affairs, thus 
framing the problem in a specific way. And if we believe that the way a problem is framed affect the 
way that this issue is dealt with politically, then the range of possible political options is seriously 
limited by the way the Sámi Parliament is conceptualised in media discourse. If it is the Sámi 
Parliament (and the Sámi politicians) in itself that is the problem, and not the Swedish Sámi policy or 
the relation between the dominant majority society and the Sámi minority, political proposals trying to 
increase Sámi self-determination in accordance with the UN Declaration will, for instance, easily be 
rejected within discourse.  
Our analysis clearly shows that the recognition of the Sámi people on an institutional level—the right 
to self-determination as institutionalised in and through the Sámi Parliament—is hampered by the way 
the media represents the Sámi Parliament. The practice of toleration in the media discourse seems to 
reach a limit when the Sámi claims equal public and political status in capacity of being an indigenous 
people. By neglecting the relation between the Sámi people and the dominant Swedish society in news 
representations, i.e. the right to self-determination, it is obvious that the Swedish State still is 
considered to be the sole legitimate authority with exclusive “discretion over the values that justify 
and limit toleration”. The practice of toleration as it is expressed in the media is thus based on 
domination and disrespect, not on recognition and respect. In that way, the media discourse could be 
characterised in terms of a limited or very limited tolerance.  
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Contested policies of exclusion in The Netherlands: The lamentable asylum cases of Sahar and 
Mauro  
Inge Versteegt and Marcel Maussen, University of Amsterdam 
 
Executive Summary 
A large percentage of Dutch voters believe that immigration should be curbed to a minimum and 
Dutch immigration and asylum policy now have a reputation as among the strictest in Europe. But 
there is also protest: against the unfair treatment of asylum seekers during their asylum application, 
against (rejected) asylum seekers being excluded from basic social rights, against the bad 
circumstances of alien detention, and many people worry about the situation of children without legal 
status. There is also highly mediatized public protest on behalf of individuals who are at risk to be 
expelled and who are said to be “well integrated”.  
This is a case study on contestation and protest against Dutch asylum policy. We are interested in the 
reasons and arguments used by the protesters, the way they draw on concepts such as tolerance, 
toleration and basic respect, and the consequences of these protests for Dutch asylum and expulsion 
policy. We decided the cases of Sahar and Mauro should be two focus points of the study. These were 
two young end-of-line asylum seekers who were to be expelled and who became the centre of public 
and political debates in 2010 and 2011.  
The research aims to answer the following main question: How do different actors resist (aspects of) 
the execution of asylum policy, what argumentations do they articulate in relation to concepts such as 
tolerance and respect?  
Results  
Six main groups of protesters could be identified: 1. Political organisations, politicians, policy makers 
and bureaucrats. 2. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) for migrants. 3. NGOs involved with 
human rights or asylum law. 4. Religious and humanistic NGOs involved with charity. 5. Academics 
specialized in human rights, migration and/or asylum. 6. Media and journalists.  
Five main aspects of policies for (rejected) asylum seekers are contested:  
1. False rejection and unfair asylum admission procedures  
2. Homelessness and refusal of housing/ social security  
3. Detention, circumstances of detention and criminalization  
4. Expulsion (protests related to dangerous circumstances in country of origin and inhumane treatment 
during expulsion)  
5. The uprooting of children, and (too) limited use of discretionary abilities for individual cases  
The report shows how the debate about rejected asylum seekers constantly circles around two central 
questions: First: should the asylum seeker be qualified as a “victim” or an “intruder”? Second, is the 
government responsible for providing assistance? The different combinations of answers that are given 
to these questions are used to legitimize the steps that need to be taken for individuals and groups, for 
example, whether a residence status should be given, or emergency shelter provided (see table A).  
 
Protest movements tend to argue in various ways that asylum seekers should be regarded as “victims”, 
not as an “intruders”, and that there is an obligation for the Dutch state to provide assistance. The 
varying ways in which these arguments are being developed in relation to broader narratives, 
representations and normative positions can be mapped out by distinguishing four discourses. These 
are:  
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1 Asylum authenticity discourse. In this discourse the leading question is how to know whether or not 
the asylum demand has been authentic (but falsely rejected).  
2. Global injustice discourse. In this discourse, economic refugees are recognized as victims of 
poverty. Those who make use of this discourse demand more solidarity and more open borders.  
3. The duty of care discourse. In this discourse the (local) government is said to have a duty to prevent 
homelessness and destitution among rejected asylum seekers, especially for vulnerable groups like 
children, ill people and the elderly.  
4. Accomplished cultural inclusion discourse. This discourse draws on ideas about “cultural 
citizenship” to present the rejected asylum seeker who has become connected to the (people in the) 
Netherlands as a victim of the length of Dutch procedures.  
Seen in this light different discursive strategies are available. The protest movement is drawing on 
these four different discourses to establish categorization of an asylum seeker as “victim”. If one 
discourse fails to categorize an asylum seeker as victim, another discourse can be used in which this is 
possible. Such re-framing is visible in our two case studies on Mauro and Sahar. The 13-year old 
Afghan girl Sahar, who feared expulsion with her family, was successfully re-categorized as a victim, 
because she was considered too Westernised to be expulsed to Afghanistan. Because the frame 
“sending her into the burqa” was initialised by the Socialist Party, the objections of Wilders’ anti-
Islam PVV party were refuted and she was considered an authentic refugee in hindsight. Contrarily, 
Mauro, an 18-year old Angolan boy who wished to be with his Dutch foster family, was insufficiently 
re-framed as a victim, because he was also framed as an imposter who still had connections in Angola 
and because fears of a honeypot effect could not be countered (see table B)  
Recommendations for policy makers and researchers:  
• Awareness that the asylum debate draws on different discourses and several ways to determine 
whether a person is a “victim” or not, and that these categorizations exceed one-dimensional asylum 
and refugee definitions.  
• Becoming frame-sensitive will improve communication between policy makers, politicians and 
protest movement. This requires an understanding of different perspectives in the debate   
• More realism and pragmatism is necessary in policies for undocumented migrants who are reluctant 
or unable to return. 
Method  
In order to answer these questions, a qualitative research method was used. Three main sources were 
analyzed. The first source consisted of interviews with thirteen experts, policy executioners and 
representatives of the protest movement. A second source included policy documents and political 
debates, motions and reports. A third source consisted of various newspapers which described aspects 
of the asylum policy. The mediatized, lamentable cases which we examined in particular were that of 
Sahar Hbrahim Gul and Mauro Manuel in 2010 and 2011. Legal procedures (trials and court cases) 
and violent protests and extremist activism were excluded from the research.  
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The ‘Muslim Vote’ in 2010. Misrecognition and Political Agency 
Jan Dobbernack, Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, University of Bristol 
 
Executive Summary 
Immigrants to the United Kingdom, coming predominantly from Commonwealth countries, benefited 
from significant political rights upon arrival. As was to be expected, political participation was 
generally not among the highest priorities for newcomers. Institutional obstacles and wide-spread 
racism meant that official channels into mainstream politics were barred. Beginning in the 1950s, 
initial mobilizations on an ethnic minority-basis occurred largely in response to local experiences of 
racial discrimination. The current competition among the three mainstream parties, Labour, 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, for ethnic minority votes is a comparatively new phenomenon, 
as the Labour Party was historically the main access route for post-immigration groups into British 
politics.  
Despite new attention to ethnic minority voters as a result of electoral competition, there are a number 
of obstacles that remain in the way of equitable representation and access into politics. Political 
agency that highlights ethno-religious identities, for example, tends to be conceived as particularist, 
divisive or sectarian. The implication often was, and to a lesser extent still is, that in order to be 
representative, such as to embody a Labour philosophy, minority politicians need to undertake 
additional efforts. It would be their responsibility to prove the ability to represent. While such 
paternalistic motifs have become weaker over the last few decades, they remain in place and, together 
with concerns about extremism, radicalization and ‘identity politics’, account for features of British 
Muslim political agency.  
In order to explore such features, the report considers the case of the General Election 2010 and how 
national-level organisations that mobilized Muslim constituents conceived of their objectives and 
responded to perceived pressures. It explores a number of salient issues, including the act of political 
representation, the ‘Muslim Vote’, and significant concerns to do with political neutrality and 
partisanship. Organisations and initiatives investigated in this report are the Muslim Council of Britain 
(MCB) for its ‘Muslim Vote 2010’ website, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC), Operation 
Black Vote (OBV), ENGAGE and YouElect.  
The report firstly shows that among the actors of the 2010 mobilization there was a measure of 
concern about dilemmas of representation. This concern was about the way Muslim political actors 
were forced to abjure their Muslimness in order to claim a more encompassing political identity. At 
the same time, the notion that increased representation would provide a remedy to inequality that 
could be achieved without a serious and issue-based commitments was widely denounced. How to 
balance the ‘politics of ideas’ with the politics of ethnic minority ‘presence’ was a live political issue 
for respondents and reflects a strong concern to counter simplistic or particularist mis-representations 
of their political agency. 
Secondly, the notion of the ‘Muslim Vote’, and how actors of the mobilization consider or 
problematize its weight and coherence, points into a different direction for our concern with political 
agency. As with political representation, there are ambiguities to consider that are the reflection of a 
difficult environment. The aspiration to ‘normalize’ the participation of British Muslims – to 
emphasize that a ‘bloc vote’ no longer exists or to argue that bloc-like voting instincts need to be 
overcome in favour of informed political decision-making – runs through the rhetoric of all of our 
respondents. At the same time, respondents acknowledge the strategic usefulness of the appeal to 
shared concerns and are apprehensive about what they consider to be the disempowering effects of an 
individualizing perspective on shared concerns.  
Thirdly, the appropriate distance or proximity to political parties and candidates is contested among 
the actors investigated in this report. Some organisations see themselves as ‘service facilitators’ and 
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refrain from offering recommendations on who to vote for, as this would contradict their conception of 
self-reliance and sophistication among Muslim voters. Others offer specific advice and 
recommendations on the basis of strong of candidates’ policy record and their positive or negative 
attitudes towards issues of concern to Muslims. In such calculations about endorsements, the 
organisations respond to what they perceive as a problematic environment for political positioning.  
The report investigates such features of Muslim political agency by drawing on the concept of 
misrecognition. ‘Misrecognition’ allows for a consideration of how actors respond to perceived 
pressures, make claims and project identities in opposition to alleged misperceptions or the refusal to 
acknowledge desired self-descriptions. We highlight five specific types of misrecognition:  
1) misrecognising Muslim identity politics as markedly different in kind to other identity politics;  
2) misrecognising the dynamic positioning and complexity of Muslim identities and concerns,  
3) misrecognising Muslim agency as purely reactive, grievance-based or ‘pariah politics’,  
4) misrecognising Muslim concerns as ‘sectarian’, not compatible with an orientation towards the 
common good;  
5) misrecognising Muslim political actors as ‘toxic’ and refusing political association. 
While misrecognition has been our focus, we do not suggest that it provides a complete or 
determinative account of Muslim political agency. Indeed experiences of misrecognition are not 
understood particularly well if they are viewed as merely oppressive and constraining, limiting spaces 
for agency and inviting nothing more than coping strategies and postures of defensiveness. The 
political positioning that is evident among the organisations examined in this report shows that 
constraints are often creatively dealt with and that perceived pressures invite a significant degree of 
reflexivity and strategic awareness. Although the past decade has been a challenging time for 
confident expressions of Muslim identities in British politics, there are some indications that political 
actors succeed in projecting political subjectivies that are not simply determined by the experience of 
misrecognition. The diversity of attempts to delineate such identities, as is evident among the 
mobilizations examined in this report, might indeed make it more difficult for Muslim political claims 
to be misrecognized. 
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Circassian Claims to Equal Citizenship in Turkey: Institutionalizing Political Participation  
Ayhan Kaya, Istanbul Bilgi University  
 
Executive Summary 
This study investigates the way the regime of tolerance has been implemented in Turkey as far as the 
political participation of the Circassians is concerned since the late nineteenth century. The paper first 
scrutinizes the political and cultural claims raised by the Circassians, and then explores which claims 
have so far been tolerated by the state, what political practices are considered to be tolerant, or 
intolerant, and what values/norms are considered to promote, or undermine, tolerance in Turkish 
political life.  
Circassians embody one of the largest ethno-cultural minorities living in Turkey. Though they are not 
legally defined as a minority like the non-Muslim minorities (Jews, Greek-Rums, and Armenians), 
sociologically and anthropologically they constitute a minority. So far, they have not been considered 
by the majority society to be facing any major obstacle since their arrival in Anatolia in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century. However, recent studies carried out in Turkey demonstrate that it is not only 
the non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevis who have been subject to a kind of structural exclusion with 
regard to having equal access to political and cultural rights, but also that the Circassians have 
experienced discriminatory acts of the state and the majority society.  
The common belief in Turkey concerning the Circassians is that they are more privileged than the 
other ethnic groups. This belief may be correct to a certain extent, however research shows that the 
Circassians have also been subject to various exclusionary acts in the nation-building process. Hence, 
the basic premise of this study is that Circassians have been exposed to some acts of discrimination by 
the Turkish state, and that while having a strong orientation towards their homeland, most of the 
Circassian population in Turkey still feel themselves to be guests. The fact that the voices of the 
Circassians have not been heard so far in public space reflects to some extent the power of both the 
formal and the popular majority nationalism to which they have been subjected.  
Despite being a ‘constitutive element’ of the Turkish nation, the Circassians became subject to various 
discriminatory policies in the nation-building process, especially after the 1930s when the spectre of 
Fascism and National Socialism was rampant in Europe. In the current Turkish political context, the 
Circassians, who have been mobilized along with other ethno-cultural claimants, protest against the 
suppressive and discriminatory policies and practices implemented by the state throughout the history 
of the Republic. By mobilizing through ethno-cultural associations, protests, conferences and 
campaigns, along with the other cultural minorities the Circassians aspire to be one of the driving 
forces of the democratization process whereby they vocalize their claims for the elimination of 
discrimination against ethnic minorities, and for respect for individual rights as well as cultural rights. 
Therefore, although the political mobilization of Circassians contributes to the democratic 
consolidation of Turkey, the Circassians cannot yet raise their voices through legitimate political 
channels as much as they wish to. Rather, the Circassian challenge vis-á-vis the nation-state is 
predominantly handled by government policies making a specific reference to all-encompassing 
principles and concepts, such as constitutional citizenship, equal citizenship rights, and respect and 
recognition for cultural differences.  
Since the deepening of the European integration process in the early 2000s, the Circassians have 
become more vocal in raising their claims to the recognition of their right to education in their mother 
tongue, recognition of their ethno-cultural identity, their right to dual citizenship, recognition of the 
contribution to the foundation of the Republic made by the politicians, military officers and 
bureaucrats of Caucasus origin, and the removal of the descriptions of Çerkes Ethem as a “traitor” 
from school textbooks. Circassian claims for constitutional citizenship, recognition and respect, along 
with the government’s initiative for constitutional reform and legal arrangements to secure political 
Angéline Escafré-Dublet and Jan Dobbernack 
108 
and cultural rights, can be categorized as a good example of accommodation of the ethno-cultural 
diversity challenge regarding tolerance in political life.  
This study undertakes a textual discourse analysis of various policy documents, public statements, 
newspaper articles, NGO reports, academic works, blogs and websites regarding Circassian political 
participation. In addition, some in-depth interviews were held with the community leaders of the 
Circassian diaspora and executive members of their associations who are involved in the public 
debates and initiatives with regard to the recent constitutional changes and other legal arrangements 
regarding the recognition of political and cultural rights of ethno-cultural minorities. I also made 
active participant observations in the meetings of various Circassian associations engaged in preparing 
their suggestions for the new constitution.  
This study finds that the current state policies generated to respond to the Circassian claims cannot be 
considered as a discourse and practice of respect and recognition. On the contrary, the policies of the 
contemporary government (Justice and Development Party, AKP) spring from a discourse of 
toleration towards the Circassians, who are actually in search of constitutional citizenship, equality 
and respect with regard to their ethno-cultural differences. The study also reveals that cultural and 
folkloric forms of representations demonstrated by ethno-cultural minorities are tolerated by the 
Turkish state. However, the state actors are not yet tolerant of the politicization of minority claims, as 
in the case of the Circassians.  
One of the important findings of this study is that the Circassians have recently discovered the power 
of transnationalizing their cause in order to put pressure on the Turkish state to extend political and 
cultural rights to the Circassians. The European Parliament and the Council of Europe have become 
important venues for the Circassian diaspora to express their concerns on the international platform. 
Transnational connections and global communication channels have shaped the ways in which the 
Circassian diaspora have recently started to raise their claims in a way that transcends the hegemonic 
power of their countries of settlement, such as Turkey. Circassians are no longer content with the ways 
in which they are perceived by the Turkish state. They want to be recognized by the Turkish state as a 
collective group, not only as individuals. The research also reveals that the transnationalization of the 
Circassian social movements and the use of the social media impact the ways in which their claims are 
currently being raised in a way that challenges the traditional patriarchal structure of the Circassian 
communities.  
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